Financial Innovation in the Management of Catastrophe Risk

Like the preceding article, this article argues that the high costs of reinsurance present the opportunity for hedging instruments to be offered to primary insurers that are both competitive with current reinsurance and that offer investors high rates of return. But the combination of high reinsurance premiums and the vast capacity of the capital market for diversification is not sufficient to ensure the success of these new instruments. If new instruments such as catastrophe options and catastrophelinked bonds are to compete successfully with reinsurance, they must provide a cost-effective means of resolving incentive conflicts between the primary insurer and the ultimate risk bearer that are known as "moral hazard." Without an effective solution of this moral hazard problem, the use of past insurance loss data to estimate the potential returns for purchasers of catastrophe bonds and other such instruments will be misleading and unreliable.
As the author demonstrates, both traditional reinsurance and each of the new catastrophe hedging instruments presents insurance companies and other hedgers with the challenge of managing a different combination of moral hazard, credit risk, and basis risk. For example, traditional catastrophe reinsurance is subject to significant credit risk and moral hazard, but little if any basis risk. By contrast, both catastrophe options and bonds can be designed in ways that reduce moral hazard and credit risk, but at the cost of taking on some basis risk. The risk manager's task in such circumstances is to design an instrument that embodies the optimal, or cost-minimizing, trade-off among these three sources of risk.     

Capitalization of the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Overview

The 1990s witnessed an unprecedented decline in leverage ratios in the United States property-liability insurance industry. The premiums-to-surplus ratio, the most commonly used leverage ratio in the industry, fell from its historical average of 2.0 to less than 1.0 by the end of 2000; and the industry-wide capital-to-asset ratio increased from an historical average of about 25% to 35%. The international reinsurance industry also experienced significant capital increases and leverage declines during the 1990s (Cummins and Weiss, 2000).¹ These unusual trends raised widespread concerns that the property-liability insurance industry had become over-capitalized (The Economist, 1999; Bowers, 2001; Seifert, 2001). To investigate the growth in capitalization and its potential causes, the Conference on Capitalization in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry was held at the Wharton School in September 2000 under the joint sponsorship of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center and AON. Selected papers from the conference comprise this issue of the Journal of Financial Services Research (JFSR).     

Customer loyalty to food retailers in Northern Ireland: ‘devoted loyals’ or ‘promiscuous switchers’?

Store loyalty is a major challenge for food retailers, and the food retail market in Northern Ireland has been subject to considerable change in the past decade. Although shoppers will often patronize many stores, they typically have a primary affiliation to a ‘main’ food store that captures the majority of their food purchases. This study uses a unique approach to segmenting customers into groups based on loyalty in terms of both the type of data used to generate a loyalty score and the data collection techniques used. Innovative projective techniques have been used alongside traditional questioning techniques to reveal ‘behavioural’ and ‘emotional’ loyalty indicators, and in doing so create a holistic measure of customer loyalty to a main food store, allowing customers to be segmented into groups based on loyalty. A paper‐based questionnaire was administered to 152 food shoppers from throughout Northern Ireland. Responses to traditional questioning formats and projective techniques (cartoon friends and mini case studies) were analysed and used to generate a loyalty score for each respondent. The first group of customers nearly always visit the same store, are willing to recommend the store to others and are less likely to switch to a competitor, even when offered an incentive to do so. They also rate the ‘hard’ attributes of this store highly. As a result of these characteristics, customers in this segment were termed ‘devoted loyals’. The second group of customers may occasionally use a different supermarket for food shopping, some would consider switching to a competitor if offered an incentive, and they rate ‘hard’ store attributes at a slightly lower level than the ‘devoted loyals’. Based on their group profile, these customers were assigned the title of ‘susceptibles’. The third group of customers are less willing to actively encourage friends and family to shop at a specific store. Many in this group did not consider their current store as their number one choice in the next few years. An incentive to switch to a competitor store is more likely to trigger a transfer of loyalty by this group. These customers were termed ‘promiscuous switchers’.     

Relational foundations of an unequal consumer credit market: Symbiotic ties between banks and payday lenders

Banks have financially supported payday lenders for decades. In this article I qualitatively demonstrate how these financial relationships have reinforced and expanded a bifurcated consumer credit market, and why these relationships matter for consumer access to financial services. I use archival financial documents from publicly traded payday lending companies between 1996 and 2014, available through the Securities and Exchange Commission, to construct the bank-payday lender network and reveal motivations for these financial relationships. I find that bank-payday lender relationships are sustained over many years, and that these relationships are mutually beneficial, enabling payday lender expansion and providing a way for banks to quietly profit from high-interest lending in the face of other regulatory constraints. Further, I show that these relationships have significantly reshaped the consumer credit market over the past two decades. I conclude by considering broader implications of symbiotic institutional relationships in contemporary markets.