Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation

The finite horizon version of D. P. Baron and J. Ferejohn's [1989, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.83, 1181-1206] legislative bargaining model is investigated. With three or more periods, a continuum of divisions is supportable as subgame perfect equilib- ria. There exist equilibria where coalitions larger than a minimal winning coalition receive strictly positive shares. With sufficiently patient players and a sufficiently long horizon, any interior distribution is supportable as an equilibrium. In contrast, a generic uniqueness result applies when introducing heterogenous time preferences. The unique backwards induction equilibrium in the perturbed game is nonstationary, and neither the original (symmetric) nor the perturbed game provides guidance for equilibrium selection in the infinite game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C78, D72, D78, H49.     

Societal preferences for fertility treatment in Australia: a stated preference discrete choice experiment

Objective: To investigate preferences for fertility treatment from the Australian general population with the aims of calculating the willingness to pay in tax contribution for attributes (characteristics) that make up treatment and for an “ideal” fertility treatment program. We also assessed whether willingness-to-pay varies by the relationship status or sexual orientation of the patient.

Methods: A stated preference discrete choice experiment was administered to a panel of 801 individuals representative of the Australian general population. Seven attributes of fertility treatment under three broad categories were included: outcome, process, and cost. Attributes were identified through published literature, focus group discussions, expert knowledge, and a pilot study. A Bayesian fractional experimental design was used, and data analysis was performed using a generalized multinomial logit model. Further analyses included interaction terms and latent class modeling.

Results: Six of the seven attributes influenced the choice of a treatment program. Under process attributes, individuals preferred: continuity of care of clinic staff, where patients are seen by the same doctor but different nurses at each visit; “alternative” treatments being offered to all patients; and onsite clinic counseling and peer-support groups. Personalization and tailoring of the treatment journey were not important. Among outcome attributes, the improved success rate of having a baby per cycle and significant side-effects were considered important. Cost of treatment also influenced the choice of treatment program. Individual preferences for fertility treatment were not associated with patients’ relationship status or sexual orientation. Latent class modeling revealed sub-groups with distinct fertility treatment preferences.

Conclusion: This study provides important insights into the attributes that influence the preferences of fertility treatment in Australia. It also estimates socially-inclusive willingness-to-pay values in tax contributions for an “ideal” package of treatment. The results can inform economic evaluations of fertility treatment programs.     

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.     

The effect of defense program uncertainty on cost,schedule, and capital investment

Program instability, low levels of capital investment and uneconomical production rates have been recognized as significant problems in defense acquisition programs. In this paper, we use a dynamic programming model under uncertainty to investigate the relations among these problems. We show that capital investment and production rates that appear to be too low may be the result of cost minimizing responses by contractors to program instability. Attempts to change the level of capital investment or production rate on defense programs without regard to the nature of program instability may hinder efficient resource allocation.The refereeing process of this paper was handled through J.F. Muth.     

Product differentiation, cost‐reducing mergers, and consumer welfare

Abstract.  Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two‐firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost‐reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post‐merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre‐merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two‐firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings. JEL classification: L10, L41     

On pricing lookback options under the CEV process

Abstract We consider the problem of pricing European lookback options when the underlying asset price is driven by a constant elasticity of variance (CEV) process. The evaluation model is based on the binomial approximation developed by Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) and we show how to apply it in the case of such options. We develop simple pricing algorithms that compute accurate estimates of the option prices.     

Concentration and public policies in the broadcasting industry: the future of television

New technologies are deeply transforming the broadcasting industry. What we have seen so far is only the beginning of a long story. Inevitably, industry regulations must adapt, which means that a wide-ranging rethink of current practices is required. In order to assess the likely evolution of the industry, this article decomposes it into a number of components, from conception of programmes to their broadcasting, including distribution, storage and licensing. Contrary to popular expectations, the analysis suggests that the current high degree of concentration will, if anything, increase. The policy implication is that regulation, so far driven by now obsolete technological constraints, should increasingly emphasize promoting competition.     

MRP II (material requirements planning): one year later

This article addresses the continued need for the behavior change process that must be managed long after materiel requirements planning (MRP II) implementation. Mason & Hanger, Pantex Plant is the final assembly and dismantlement facility for all United States nuclear weapons. On October 1, 1990, Mason & Hanger implemented a full production cutover to MRP II. One year later, following class A certification, the MRP II implementation team is still actively managing the change process through education and training programs and overall continuous improvement initiatives. Actual behavior change problems are identified together with the proven solutions implemented in a government-owned, contractor-operated facility environment. Performance measurements ranging from senior management planning to shop floor accomplishments and cost variance reports are shown as normal management tools used to identify target improvement areas.