A New Methodological Approach for Studying Moral Reasoning Among Managers in Business Settings

The introduction and validation of a new instrument, The Moral Reasoning Inventory, designed to measure an individuals’ moral reasoning (MR) in response to two moral dilemmas within a business setting is the subject of this article. The instrument consists of two moral dilemma scenarios with eight MR statements. Two measurement scales were used for analyzing patterns of individual responses: the strength of belief in the reasons and the importance of those reasons for resolving the dilemma. Managers enrolled in a part-time MBA program were administered the new instrument. Data analysis clearly supported the effectiveness of the instrument to differentiate patterns of consistency in MR within decision groups.     

Reinigung oder Desinfektion?

Zusammenfasung  So viel Desinfektion ist n?tig — Bis in die 70er Jahre wurden in den Krankenh?usern der Fu?boden, die OP-W?nde und andere Fl?chen teils mehrmals t?glich gro?zügig desinfiziert. Mit der durch zahlreiche Publikationen untermauerten Feststellung, dass eine Infektion nicht per se vom Fu?boden ausgeht, der Zunahme einer Allergisierung des Personals sowie finanzieller Aspekte begann ein Umdenken.     

Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-way, Experimental Elections

If (often costly) election campaigns are simply advertising, they do not increase social welfare directly. Given this, should we limit campaign expenditures? We propose that costly campaigns can inform voters about the strength of candidates. This may increase welfare indirectly by helping voters avoid coordination failures. In laboratory elections, we study campaign finance levels as coordinating signals and compare them with our earlier work on polls. Both coordinate majority voters effectively, allowing them to stop Condorcet losers from winning. Finance levels were rational in that the total benefits of coordination exceeded the costs. Further, benefits of typical incremental contributions exceeded costs ex-post, while the next typical increment's benefits would not have.     

Investitionsanreize unter RPI-X-Regulierung und die angemessene Höhe von Kostendurchreichungen

In the classic view, the fundamental decision between a rate-of-return and price-cap regime depends upon the aim of regulatory action: a rate-of-return is considered to more likely induce infrastructure investment while a price-cap regime is expected to increase managerial effort in reducing costs. While an asset-based regulation may lead to the unwanted Averch-Johnson effect, efficiency-oriented regulation such as RPI-X may decrease the company’s incentive to invest. To avoid this behaviour, RPI-X-regimes do often exempt certain costs from regulation, e.g. by allowing for pass-throughs for capital expenditures. Starting with the finding that efficiency-based regulation may lead to postponement or abandonment of investment projects in a real options based model, a fair rate of capital cost pass through is derived to mitigate the negative effects on investment projects. This ‘regulation-adjusted’ cost-pass-through depends on the regulatory X the regulator imposes on the regulated industry. Given the valuation of the investment project and the efficiency-value, a cost-pass-through can be calculated which is less or equal than the risk free interest rate as long as the pass-through itself is risk-free.