Managerial pay and executive turnover in the Czech and Slovak Republics*

Despite the crucial role played by managers in changing the functioning of labour markets in transition economies, research on the determinants of executive pay and CEO turnover in these countries is almost non‐existent. The current paper aims to add to this minuscule literature. For this purpose I make use of a unique dataset containing relevant firm–manager information from the Czech and Slovak Republics in the late nineties. This allows me to examine the influence of individual and in particular firm characteristics, such as, size, ownership type, industry and region, as well as corporate performance on chief executive compensation levels and changes therein and on the extent of executive turnover.     

Understanding issue salience,social inequality and the (non) appointment of UK public inquiries: a new research agenda

ABSTRACT

Why are public inquiries appointed and what factors are influential? Research shows that inquiry appointment is driven by issue salience, but how this occurs is unclear. The authors suggest that issue salience is driven by: (1) victim relatability, (2) visibility of failings and (3) perceived blameworthiness. This has three significant implications. First, highly salient issues may lead to the appointment of statutory-type inquiries, which might not be the most appropriate form to effectively address the causes of inequality. Second, if wrongdoing against minorities is not sufficiently relatable (as is often the case), there may be insufficient public salience to drive demands for an inquiry. Finally, inquiries may privilege the investigation of blameworthy behaviour and thereby overlook complex systemic flaws.     

Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting

In this paper we study the behavior of rivals when there is a known probability of imminent entry. Experimental markets are used to collect data on pre‐ and postentry production when there is an announced time of possible entry; some markets experience entry and other do not. In all preentry markets competition is more intense. Postentry behavior in all markets is more competitive compared to a baseline that had no threat. There is evidence that postentry multimarket contact raises outputs in those markets that did not experience entry, behavior we generally refer to as a conduit effect.     

DRUG POLICY AND INTERGENERATIONAL INCOME MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES

A conviction for drug possession blocks some of the most common pathways through which individuals from low income families achieve upward economic mobility in the United States, such as access to higher education, entry‐level employment, and military service. These considerations are of growing importance because the number of drug‐related arrests have nearly quadrupled since 1980. This article estimates the effect of a conviction for drug possession on earnings mobility using a sample of individuals born between 1980 and 1984, some of the first cohorts to come of age in the context of intensive U.S. drug criminalization and enforcement. To distinguish the effect of a drug conviction from the effect of drug use or general criminality, I compare mobility among individuals with drug convictions to control groups who self‐report significant drug use and who have had interactions with the criminal justice system that did not lead to a drug conviction. I find that relative to these groups, a drug conviction reduces the probability of transitioning upward from various points in the lower half of the income distribution by 10–15 percentage points, or as much as 50%, and that these effects are substantially stronger for non‐whites than for whites. These findings suggest that a policy of decriminalizing nonviolent drug possession would substantially increase intergenerational mobility among low income populations, and this effect should be weighed alongside more conventional costs and benefits in formulating optimal drug policy. (JEL J38, J15, K42)     

Saving face and group identity

Are people willing to sacrifice resources to save one’s and others’ face? In a laboratory experiment, we study whether individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self- but also other group members’ image, even when group identity is minimal. When group identity is made more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the least performer is an in-group or an out-group. In contrast, people are less likely to sacrifice for individual strangers, showing a major role for group identity and reputation concerns within groups relative to an interpretation in terms of moral norms.     

Respect and relational contracts

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect in a labor market context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect by giving the employee costly symbolic rewards after observing his level of effort. We study whether symbolic rewards are used by the employers mainly to praise employees or as a coordination device to build relational contracts by manipulating the balance between labor demand and supply in the market. We find that a high proportion of long-term relationships have been initiated by the assignment of symbolic rewards. However, the assignment of symbolic rewards decreases when it becomes clear that the relationship is durable, suggesting that employers mainly use symbolic rewards as a coordination device to initiate relational contracts. Compared to the balanced market condition, assigning symbolic rewards in initial relationships is less likely when there is excess demand in the market and more likely when there is excess supply, i.e., when the relationship is more valuable. Receiving symbolic rewards increases the employees’ likelihood of accepting to continue the relationship with the same employer. It also motivates them to increase their effort further but only when the market is balanced. Overall, the ability to assign symbolic rewards does not give rise to higher profits because it is associated with lower rents offered to the employees on average, leading to lower effort levels.