The Only Solution to the Decline in Business Ethics: Ethical Managers

This paper defines business ethics as a seriesof behaviors that adhere to values held by theindividual manager, the manager's supervisorsand subordinates, general society and, mostimportantly, the manager's customers andclients. The concept of business ethics isexplored through several levels of businessorganizations and operating environments.The paper then examines recent evidence of thedecline in business ethics by noting a fewexamples involving Beech-Nut, Hertz, MichaelMilken, E.F. Hutton, Sears, Salomon Brothers,Dalkon Shield, Exxon Valdez, S&L scandal,brokerage analysts. Surveys are cited toindicate that the American public believes thatbusiness ethics are declining.To further analyze the topic, the authorreports on a series of structured interviewswith managers in a variety of organizations.Fourteen senior managers were interviewed: 4from large county government, 3 from stategovernment, 4 from large corporations, 3 fromsmall businesses. The managers were asked theiropinions concerning the decline of businessethics, and for their recommendations topossibly retard the decline. All managers saidthey believed that ethics are in decline andthat the public believes ethics are declining.The recommendations for retarding or reversingthe decline yielded several suggestions: teachethics in schools and business organizations,develop and enforce Codes of Ethical Conductwithin all organizations, establish bettermonitoring and reporting mechanisms, and hireethical managers.The paper builds on theinterview results by coupling the managers'remarks with admonitions from many authors:while teaching ethics and Codes of EthicalConduct are important, the most importantfactor is the ethical behavior of managers(leaders). Ethical leadership is fundamentalsince ethical behavior is an individual – not acorporate – matter. In practice, ethics is notsomething that a manager ``does'; it issomething that the manager ``is.'     

A theory of global strategic alliances: The case of the global auto industry

The theory articulated in this paper suggests that the desire to reduce demand and competitive uncertainty are two separate, important motives for alliance formation. Taking this as a starting point, we predict the configuration of horizontal alliances that we might expect to observe within an industry when firms experience these uncertainties to different degrees. An empirical test of this theory using data from the global auto industry yields results consistent with the view (1) that alliances are a device for reducing both the uncertainties that arise from unpredictable demand conditions and those that arise from competitive interdependence, and (2) that variation of demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty across firms explains differentials in both the intensity and structure of their horizontal alliance activity.     

TESTING FOR INTEGRATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT MARKETS

The degree of spatial market integration in European Community agricultural product markets is investigated. The methodology is based on co-integration analysis. A two-step testing procedure is applied to test the existence of the ‘Law of One Price’ which should be in force if these markets are truly integrated. The results show that market integration has not been achieved in a number of cases even when MCAs are subtracted from the price series used.     

Exact Ruin Probabilities and the Evaluation of Program Trading On Financial Markets

For a compound Poisson process with negative drift and jump distribution consisting of a mixture of exponentials on [0) and on (-, 0), an exact expression is derived for the probability of hitting the level c, c > 0. the problem is motivated by modeling the returns from trading on financial markets.     

Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes.     

Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.     

Tax-Induced Intra-Year Patterns in Bonds Yields

The ratio of the yields on short-term tax-exempt and taxable bonds exhibits a sawtooth pattern that is consistent with the impacts of tax deferments from dates on which interest payments are received to dates on which the resulting tax payments are paid. The effect of the tax deferment at turns of calendar years does not differ appreciably from the effect at the turn of any other tax quarter. Investors with tax payment schedules that differ from that of the investor that is indifferent between investing in taxable and tax-exempt bonds may benefit from tax-related timing strategies for investing in these bonds. Issuers may benefit from tax-related timing strategies for scheduling interest payments.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984: THE CASE OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants.