Benefits and barriers of telework: perception differences of human resources managers according to company's operations strategy

Telework as an integration of Information and Telecommunication Technologies with Human Resources management, means a new job organisation paradigm for companies working in the New Economy. However there are very few empirical studies that have analysed the perception differences of telework benefits and barriers in industrial and service companies. This paper contributes with empirical data to the relationship between the use of telework techniques and the implementation of this new work organisation with the company's operations strategy. The paper uses data from Spanish companies to test the relationship between innovation, employee training, and other production strategy performance parameters with the feasibility of telework adoption.     

Overzicht van buitenlandse tijdschriften

Jaartal en blz. achter de namen der tijdschriften hebben betrekking op de plaats, waar deze laatstelijk in De Economist werden behandeld.     

Foreign Factor Ownership and Optimal Tariffs

In the presence of foreign factor ownership tariffs change not only the terms of (goods) trade but also income flows between countries. Assume that only the home country owns factors abroad. Then the optimal tariff is negative if and only if foreign factor ownership entails trade-pattern reversals. Trade-pattern reversals are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a negative optimal tariff if the foreign country owns factors in the home country. Changes in the home country's tariff shift the foreign country's offer curve. This adds a new dimension to optimal tariff analysis.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

Contemporary ethical issues in labor-management relations

Numerous labor-management issues possess ethical dimensions and pose ethical questions. In this article, the authors discuss four labor-management issues that present important contemporary problems: union organizing, labor-management negotiations, employee involvement programs, and union obligations of fair representation. In the authors view, labor and management too often view their ethical obligations as beginning and ending at the law's boundaries. Contemporary business realities suggest that cooperative and enlightened modes of interaction between labor and management seem appropriate.Robert S. Adler is Associate Professor of Legal Studies at the Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He teaches courses in Business Law, Business Ethics, and Regulation. Prior to coming to UNC, Professor Adler served as Counsel to the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives.William J. Bigoness is Professor of Business Administration and Director, Center for Management Studies at the Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His professional interests include organizational behavior, human resource management, and labor-management relations. Dr. Bigoness was Visiting Professor of Business Administration at the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) located in Lausanne, Switzerland from 1985 to 1987.     

The dynamics of economic systems,or how to transform a failed socialist economy

How to transform a failed socialist economy raises questions about the processes of structural and institutional changes, which standard economics is inadequately equipped to study. An economic theory that can study both these processes is suggested and applied to the actual debate of how the transformation should be conducted. Standard notions of institutional roles (R) and organizational structures (S) are seen in a non-standard way as outcomes of two interrelated but distinct evolutions. Comparing different given Rs for their influence on S-evolution throws new light on which R should be the target of the transformation. Compared to standard analysis, the case against socialism on the supply side is strengthened, whereas the case against a redistributive welfare society on the demand side is weakened. S-evolution is shown to require more time and be more difficult to be helped by government than R-evolution. This clarifies several controversial points about the speed and the sequencing of the transformation policies. The study of R-evolution discloses an important cognitive constraint on these policies, which teaching of economics can help to soften. Standard economics, shown to be a special case of the suggested theory, is rehabilitated as the best subject by which such teaching should start.