Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model

We derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous‐time principal‐agent setting, and implement it with a capital structure (credit line, long‐term debt, and equity) over which the agent controls the payout policy. While the project's volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm's total debt capacity, they increase the use of credit versus debt. Leverage is nonstationary, and declines with past profitability. The firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing (at a higher rate) through the credit line. Surprisingly, the usual conflicts between debt and equity (asset substitution, strategic default) need not arise.     

ASIA'S ROLE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ARCHITECTURE

The global economic and financial landscape has been transformed over the past decade by the growing economic size and financial power of emerging economies. The new Group of Twenty summit process, which includes the largest emerging economies, has established high‐level international policy cooperation in this new setting. This article argues that effective global economic governance will also require changes in key global organizations—such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, and the Financial Stability Board—and closer collaboration between global and regional organizations. We suggest that federalism be introduced on a global scale by creating hierarchies of global and regional organizations with overlapping ownership structures in various functional areas (as is already the case with the World Bank and regional development banks in the area of development finance). Asia could contribute to this transformation by building effective institutions to promote macroeconomic and financial stability and deepen regional trade and investment integration. Similar logic could be applied to a broader issue of providing international public goods, such as environmental and climate protection, communicable disease control, and disaster risk management. (JEL F02, F13, F33, F55, O59)     

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and the Response of the Yield Curve to Policy Shocks

This paper studies the nonlinear response of the term structure of interest rates to monetary policy shocks and presents a new stylized fact. We show that uncertainty about monetary policy changes the way the term structure responds to monetary policy. A policy tightening leads to a significantly smaller increase in long-term bond yields if policy uncertainty is high at the time of the shock. We also look at the decomposition of bond yields into expectations about future policy and the term premium. The weaker response of yields is driven by the fall in term premia, which fall more strongly if uncertainty about policy is high. Conditional on a monetary policy shock, higher uncertainty about monetary policy tends to make securities with longer maturities relatively more attractive to investors. As a consequence, investors demand even lower term premia. These findings are robust to the measurement of monetary policy uncertainty, the definition of the monetary policy shock, and to changing the model specification.     

MARKETS VS. MANAGEMENT: WHAT ‘DRIVES’ PROFITABILITY?

This study addresses the issue of the relative degree of variance in ROA accounted for by industry, corporate, and SBU effects while controlling for the business cycle and the interaction between the business cycle and industry. Two key articles, Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991), are discussed in detail. Research results on a recent data base (COMPUSTAT), using variance components analysis (VARCOMP) are presented that not only confirm most of the Rumelt (1991) findings, but also suggest the existence of a corporate effect, heretofore undetected.     

Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations

A group of players in a cooperative game are partners (e.g., as in the form of a union or a joint ownership) if the prospects for cooperation are restricted such that cooperation with players outside the partnership requires the accept of all the partners. The formation of such partnerships through binding agreements may change the game implying that players could have incentives to manipulate a game by forming or dissolving partnerships. The present paper seeks to explore the existence of allocation rules that are immune to this type of manipulation. An allocation rule that distributes the worth of the grand coalition among players is called partnership formation‐proof if it ensures that it is never jointly profitable for any group of players to form a partnership and partnership dissolution‐proof if no group can ever profit from dissolving a partnership. The paper provides results on the existence of such allocation rules for general classes of games as well as more specific results concerning well‐known allocation rules.     

Harmonization of Accounting in France and Britain: Some Evidence

The European Community's accounting harmonization initiative is intended to create harmonized reporting by Community companies. If the Community's programme is successful, measurement practices in each member state should be such that the same transactions receive broadly comparable treatment irrespective of the country where the accounts are prepared. This study sets out to test whether this is the case in France and Britain and the application of the Fourth Directive, and whether in practice there is any consensus even within each jurisdiction. An empirical test for harmony and uniformity is made by asking accountants within each jurisdiction to compile financial statements from a common set of data.
The results of the test show that in this sample there is relatively little harmony within each national group, let alone between one jurisdiction and another.