Promoting the Entry of New Firms

Although in the beginning the entry in the market of new companies has a positive effect on production and employment, the results don't seem to be so obvious in the long term. On the one hand, the possibilities of survival of the new companies are very scarce, on the other, the new companies that survive expel the less efficient incumbents from the market. The results of the simulations show that the effects of the policies on the population of firms in the long term are quite small because the policies are strongly limited by the pressure that the new companies cause on the established ones. On the other hand, the policies favor on increase in productivity but in a different way depending on whether they favor the rotation or not.     

An Operative Framework for Total Hicksian Income Measurement: Application to a Multiple-Use Forest

A methodology for estimating total hicksian income in multiple-use forests is presented. The approach consistently incorporates commercial as well as non-commercial economic values and enables the measurement of national accounting aggregates taking into account variation in man-made and natural capital. Innovative solutions are developed (i) for the estimation of non-market values, such as recreation, where an attempt to determine exchange values has been made simulating markets, (ii) for timber, where standing timber valuation methods have been extended to cover uneven stands, and (iii) for carbon fixation valuation, where only permanently fixed carbon after 1990 has been taken into account. The methodology is applied to a multiple-use pinewood in the Guadarrama mountains, near Madrid (Spain). Timber, cattle grazing, hunting, recreation, carbon fixation and conservation values are measured and integrated in the accounting system, using primary microeconomic data from the case study. Results indicate the importance of non-commercial income, which accounts for 51% of the total income, and the social relevance of the analysed forest, implying that only 31% of the total income generated is appropriated by the forest owner.     

Home-grown middle eastern franchises: prospects for the future

This research explores the local factors that drive the competitiveness of Middle Eastern food service franchises in international markets. The literature on franchising is largely concerned with the success and competitiveness of Western franchises in global markets, with little information on the Middle East. This is despite its relevance as a major franchise market, with an economy shifting towards oil-alternative businesses. When referenced, the region is depicted solely as a host to foreign franchise operations, overlooking the opportunities of local businesses to adopt franchising as a strategy for international expansion. A qualitative case study methodology is applied to prominent food service franchises from Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. The cases highlight real experiences of success and failure in specific regional and international markets, and suggest that culture contributes to international competitiveness. Implications for future research are discussed.

     

Delegation of board work to committees in Europe

A sample of 6169 firm year observations in 14 western European countries between 2002 and 2009 is used to investigate how committee practice within boards of directors is related to company characteristics, and to the existence of alternative corporate governance instruments in place. We find that committees in Europe are prevalent in larger companies, and in companies with large and independent boards. However, we also find that leverage, director interlocking, concentrated ownership, and the presence of managers on the board mitigate the use of committees, suggesting that committee use is limited by the existence of alternative governance mechanisms. Consequently, recent regulatory changes in Europe that promote the creation of committees within boards may be unsuited for certain types of company, especially smaller companies and those with concentrated ownership.     

James Sullivan. Jeans: A Cultural History of an American Icon

How is it that jeans evolved from durable work clothes intoa global symbol of America? James Sullivan's new work surveysthe history of denim wear, showing how "... a pair of blue jeansembodies two centuries     

Accounting for single and aggregated forest incomes: Application to public cork oak forests in Jerez (Spain) and Iteimia (Tunisia)

This study presents an applied improvement in the agroforestry accounting system (AAS) approach to two public cork oak forests in the Mediterranean region: Jerez (Spain) and Iteimia (Tunisia). Both forests have similar environments but differ in land property rights, labour markets and countries (developed and developing economy, respectively).The income analysis considers the differences between forest ownership, and household and landowner economic rationalities. In the case of Jerez, the public landowner has a right to exclude others from using the forest resources; community employment and natural resource conservation criteria determine Jerez's management. In the Iteimia case, the public landowner has regulated free-use rights for livestock grazing, firewood and crops so that local households can meet their needs and improve their income. Households operate by maximizing their income from the full employment of their own family workforce.The results show that Jerez's management generates negative commercial capital income for the public landowner, despite receiving significant public subsidies, while it maintains high internal forestry investment that generates additional local employment. Conversely, Iteimia produces positive commercial capital income for the public landowner and high household self-employed labour income per hectare.     

Estimating a socially optimal water price for irrigation versus an environmentally optimal water price through the use of Geographical Information Systems and Social Accounting Matrices

This article develops a method for establishing water prices and their effects in order to provide policy makers an environmentally and socially optimal range of regional prices for irrigation water. Two prices are determined. The “environmentally optimal price” of water is defined as the one that internalizes the environmental costs generated by agricultural consumption. The “social optimally price” of water is defined as the one that maximizes levies on water for agriculture without affecting the regional economy. The environmentally optimal price is calculated with an economic model built over a Geographical Information System (GIS) that allows the economic quantification and valuation of the environmental cost of water in different basins. The optimal price is calculated with a demand curve for irrigation water introduced into a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) to observe if the regional economy can accept higher prices without affecting the regional GDP. Potential water prices are established, ranging from prices that minimize the negative impact in the regional economy to those that totally internalize the environmental cost of water.     

Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain

We develop a general equilibrium model of wealth transfers in the presence of uncertain lifetimes and default. Without introducing exogenous debt constraints, agents are allowed to make collateral-backed promises at any state of their life span.     

Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization

Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent’s rent‐seeking activities.