The fundamental theorem of asset pricing for continuous processes under small transaction costs

A version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing is proved for continuous asset prices with small proportional transaction costs. Equivalence is established between: (a) the absence of arbitrage with general strategies for arbitrarily small transaction costs ${\varepsilon > 0}${\varepsilon > 0}, (b) the absence of free lunches with bounded risk for arbitrarily small transaction costs ${\varepsilon > 0}${\varepsilon > 0}, and (c) the existence of e{\varepsilon}-consistent price systems—the analogue of martingale measures under transaction costs—for arbitrarily small ${\varepsilon > 0}${\varepsilon > 0}. The proof proceeds through an explicit construction, as opposed to the usual separation arguments. The paper concludes comparing numéraire-free and numéraire-based notions of admissibility, and the corresponding martingale and local martingale properties for consistent price systems.     

Productivity, terms of trade and the ‘home market effect’

This paper analyzes the international transmission and welfare implications of productivity gains and changes in market size when macroeconomic adjustment occurs both along the intensive margin of trade (changes in the relative price of existing varieties of tradable goods) and the extensive margin (creation and destruction of varieties). We draw a distinction between productivity gains that enhance manufacturing efficiency and gains that lower the cost of firms' entry and of product differentiation. Countries with lower manufacturing costs have higher GDP but supply their products at lower international prices. Instead, countries with lower entry costs supply a larger array of goods at improved terms of trade. Output growth driven by demographic expansions, as well as government spending, is associated with an improvement in international relative prices and firms' entry. While trade liberalization may result in a smaller array of goods available to consumers, efficiency gains from deeper economic integration benefit consumers via lower goods prices. The international transmission mechanism and the welfare spillovers vary under different asset market structures, depending on trade costs, the elasticity of labor supply, and consumers' taste for varieties.     

Explaining the World Heritage List: an empirical study

The UNESCO World Heritage List is designed to protect the global heritage. We show that, with respect to countries and continents, the existing World Heritage List is highly imbalanced. Major econometric determinants of this imbalance are historical GDP, historical population, area in square kilometers of a country, and number of years of high civilization. Surprisingly, economic and political factors, such as membership on the UN Security Council, which should be unrelated to the value of a country’s heritage and therefore should have no impact, are shown to have a systematic impact on the composition of the World Heritage List.     

The role of leadership in salespeople’s price negotiation behavior

Salespeople assume a key role in defending firms’ price levels in price negotiations with customers. The degree to which salespeople defend prices should critically depend upon their leaders’ influence. However, the influence of leadership on salespeople’s price defense behavior is barely understood, conceptually or empirically. Therefore, building on social learning theory, the authors propose that salespeople might adopt their leaders’ price defense behavior given a transformational leadership style. Furthermore, drawing on the contingency leadership perspective, the authors argue that this adoption fundamentally depends on three variables deduced from the motivation–ability–opportunity (MAO) framework, that is, salespeople’s learning motivation, negotiation efficacy, and perceived customer lenience. Results of a multi-level model using data from 92 salespeople and 264 salesperson–customer interactions confirm these predictions. The first to explore contingencies of salespeople’s adoption of their transformational leaders’ price negotiation behaviors, this study extends marketing theory and provides actionable guidance to practitioners.     

Feelings that Make a Difference: How Guilt and Pride Convince Consumers of the Effectiveness of Sustainable Consumption Choices

A significant body of research concludes that stable beliefs of perceived consumer effectiveness lead to sustainable consumption choices. Consumers who believe that their decisions can significantly affect environmental and social issues are more likely to behave sustainably. Little is known, however, about how perceived consumer effectiveness can be increased. We find that feelings of guilt and pride, activated by a single consumption episode, can regulate sustainable consumption by affecting consumers’ general perception of effectiveness. This paper demonstrates the impact that guilt and pride have on perceived consumer effectiveness and shows how this effect rests on the ability of these emotions to influence perceptions of agency. After experiencing guilt or pride, consumers see themselves as the cause of relevant sustainability outcomes. The process of causal attribution associated with these emotions influences consumers’ use of neutralization techniques. Through the reduction in consumers’ ability to neutralize their sense of personal responsibility, guilt and pride positively influence perceived consumer effectiveness. The inability to rationalize-away their personal responsibility, persuades consumers that they affect sustainability outcomes through their decisions. The research advances our understanding of sustainable consumption and identifies a new avenue for the regulation of individual consumer behavior that has significant implications for the development of sustainable marketing initiatives.     

Competition and cooperation among exchanges: A theory of cross-listing and endogenous listing standards

We analyze firms’ choice of exchange to list equity and exchanges’ choice of listing standards when insiders have private information about firm value, but outsiders can produce (noisy) information at a cost. Exchanges are populated by two kinds of investors, whose numbers vary across exchanges: sophisticated (low information production cost) investors and ordinary (high–cost) investors. While firms are short-lived, exchanges are long-lived, value-maximizing agents whose listing and disclosure standards evolve over time. The listing standards chosen by exchanges affect their “reputation,” since outsiders can partially infer the rigor of these standards from the post-listing performance of firms. We show that, while exchanges use their listing standards as a tool in competing for listings with other exchanges, this will not necessarily lead to a “race to the bottom” in listing standards. Further, a merger between two exchanges may result in a higher listing standard for the combined exchange relative to that of either of the merging exchanges. We develop several other implications for firms’ listing choices and resulting valuation effects, the impact of competition and co-operation among exchanges on listing standards, and the optimal regulation of exchanges.