The Value Relevance of Corporate Social Responsibility Expenditure: Evidence from Regulatory Decisions

We examine the value relevance of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditure of Bangladeshi banks from 2007–2014 in response to a regulatory directive on banking firms’ engagement in CSR activities. We find a positive association between CSR expenditure and a firm's market value. Evidence of an inverse U-shaped curvilinear association between CSR expenditure and market value suggests that the impact of CSR expenditure on a firm's market value has a certain limit. We also document that unexpected or abnormal components of CSR expenditure comprise value-relevant information. Our study provides empirical evidence to support the value relevance of CSR expenditure as an explanation for why firms should invest in CSR and why they should inform various stakeholders about their CSR activities.     

Consumer preferences and product and process R&D

Firms often conduct both product and process R&D. Consumer preferences typically play a vital role in determining these R&D choices. The economics literature, however, has mostly ignored the interrelationship between the R&D choices of firms and consumer preferences. Istudy product and process R&D from the perspective of their relationship with consumer preferences. In doing so, I find a novel distinction between the two kinds of R&D. This distinction can explain several empirical observations regarding firms' choices of the two, and can also potentially enable us to better empirically identify the two.     

Estimation from two-stage unequal probability sampling with missing units

A formula is presented for an unbiased estimator for the variance of an unbiased estimator of a survey population total as well as for an unbiased estimator of its variance based on sampling in two-stages following Rao et al. J Roy Stat Soc B 24: 482–491 (1962) scheme in both stages when the originally selected units in both stages cannot be fully covered in the survey but are to be randomly sub-sampled. The development is helpful to tackle non-responses if assumed to have occurred at random in either or both the stages     

Generic Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry

We develop a simultaneous equations estimation framework to understand the interactions among generic entry, prices, and market shares. We base our estimates on a panel data sample of 40 brand‐name drugs that first experienced generic competition during the period July 1992–January 1998. We find that generic share and price are simultaneously determined, while the number of generic entrants is a key determinant of generic market share and the generic‐to‐brand price ratio. In addition, we find generic competition to be particularly intense for blockbuster drugs, which experience significantly more generic entrants, price erosion, and generic penetration than other drugs.     

An optional scrambled randomized response technique for practical surveys

Eichhorn and Hayre (J Stat Plan Inference 7:307–316, 1983) introduced the scrambled response technique to gather information on sensitive quantitative variables. Singh and Joarder (Metron 15:151–157, 1997), Gupta et al. (J Stat Plan Inference 100:239–247, 2002) and Bar-Lev et al. (Metrika 60:255–260, 2004) permitted the respondents either to report their true values on the sensitive quantitative variable or the scrambled response and developed the optional randomized response (ORR) technique based on simple random sample with replacement (SRSWR). While developing the ORR procedure, these authors made the assumption that the probability of disclosing the true response or the randomized response (RR) is the same for all the individuals in a population. This is not a very realistic assumption as in practical survey situations the probability of reporting the true value or the RR generally varies from unit to unit. Moreover, if one generalizes the ORR method as developed by these authors relaxing the ‘constant probability’ assumption, the variance of an unbiased estimator for the population total or mean can not be estimated as this involves the unknown parameter, ‘the probability of revealing the true response’. Here we propose a modified ORR procedure for stratified unequal probability sampling after relaxing the assumption of ‘constant probability’ of providing the true response. It is also demonstrated with a numerical exercise that our procedure produces better estimator for a population total than that provided by the method suggested by the earlier authors.     

Multi-market trading in the Eurodollar futures market

On March 18, 2004, the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange launched trading in Eurodollar futures contracts in an attempt to compete with a U.S. rival, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange responded to the challenge by introducing several policy changes that aided the transfer of its trading volume in Eurodollar futures from open outcry to the electronic trading platform, Globex, thereby retaining its market share. We compare trading volume, effective spread, and price discovery in Eurodollar futures at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange before and after the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange began trading the same contract. We find a general increase in trading volume on Globex beginning October 2003, way before the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange launched its contract. Globex provides greater price discovery than open outcry during the entire time period under study. Our research thus supports the global trend of conversion of traditional open outcry systems into electronic exchanges.     

Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’

We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm‐union pair may face a conflict between rent sharing and transmitting its cost information. When the wage is not observable to outsiders and employment is the only signalling instrument, over‐employment features in all entry deterring contracts. When the wage is also observable, information transmission becomes easier. Most of the time, then, but not always, the efficient contract deters (induces) entry against the low (high) cost incumbent.     

Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products

We determine optimal privatization in a symmetric differentiated duopoly when the public firms do not bear the full cost of production and hence their objective functions differ from the government’s objective function. In the social optimum firms will generally have mixed ownership, and it will depend on the type of uncovered cost, the degree of substitutability of the two products and the output decision rule of the partially public firms. Different types of mixed duopoly emerge, ranging from both firms being partially privatized, to one being fully privatized. We also derive an optimal tax-subsidy scheme as a substitute for privatization.