Wealth, Enterprise and Credit Policy

Empirical evidence suggests that capital-market constraints prevent low-wealth individuals from setting up in business. This paper shows this finding to be consistent with socially excessive lending and an interest-rate tax being welfare-improving. One feature of the model, banks' inability to identify entrepreneurial quality, leads to excessive bank lending and investment in low-return projects. The reduction in the probability of bankruptcy lowers the cost of borrowing and eliminates deadweight costs and hence promotes entry. If the incentive effects are sufficiently large, wealth and the volume of entrepreneurial activity move together. A key result of the paper is to show that a market equilibrium in which there is a positive relationship between entry and the level of wealth is consistent with either subsidies to inactivity or taxes on interest raising welfare.     

Long memory in volatilities of German stock returns

We show that there is strong evidence of long-range dependence in the volatilities of several German stock returns. This will be done by applying a method using the difference of the classical log-periodogram regression estimator for the memory parameter and of the tapered periodogram based estimator. Both estimators give similar values for the memory parameter for each series and this indicates long memory. To support our findings we apply also a methodology using the sample variance and a wavelet based estimator to the data. Also these two methods show clear evidence of long-range dependence in the volatilities of German stock returns.First version received: December 2001/Final version received: March 2003The computational assistance of Eleni Mitropoulou and Björn Stollenwerck as well as the helpful comments of two unknown referees are gratefully acknowledged. Research supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under SFB 475. Stock returns were obtained from Deutsche Finanzdatenbank (DFDB), Karlsruhe.     

The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information

The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo [Cooperative outcomes through non-cooperative games, Games Econ. Behav. 7 (1994) 428-440] to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson's coarse core [Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica 46 (1978) 807-816]. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.     

Governance structures in R&D networks: An analysis in the European context

This paper analyses governance structures used to organize partnerships in R&D networks using two approaches: transaction costs theory and social capital theory. We argue that these theories are complementary; this explains forms of governance through the degrees of administrative (structural and safeguard mechanism) and social factors (cohesion and openness) they embody. Data was obtained from European R&D networks created through Framework Programmes which include a great number of universities, non profit institutions and firms. Findings show the variables that characterize and explain the governance forms based on the applicability of R&D networks. This study not only provides a theoretical model for analysing governance structures of these networks, but is also useful for both improving the management of networks and for fostering collaboration at an international level.     

Mr. Market's Mind: Finance's Hard Problem

The market as a mind is the implicit premise in any discussion on whether the market is rational or not. Still, its implications, in terms of ontology and epistemology, are hardly understood. In particular, this paper defines the market's version of the mind-body problem and labels it as finance's “hard” problem. Its denial by modern finance causes this dominant paradigm to fail in dealing with reality in general and to produce incomplete investment knowledge in particular. Finally, as part of facing up to this problem, this paper offers a glimpse at a practical approach which may enrich investment research.