Comparing Tax and Tax Reallocation Payments in Financing Rail Noise Abatement Programmes: Results from a Stated Choice Valuation Study in Italy

The paper examines the use of stated choice experiments (SC) to assess the economic value of alternative rail noise reduction interventions on the Brennero railway in Italy. The paper formally tests the econometric robustness of the SC estimates under three payment regimes: (a) a regional tax, where consumers must trade off welfare gains due to noise reduction for part of their income; (b) a transport tax reallocation scheme, where consumers must trade off a part of the tax payments that are currently spent on the public transport sector; and (c) an administration tax reallocation scheme, where consumers must trade off a part of the tax payments that are currently spent on the administration sector. The test results are varied. On the one hand, the SC estimates are found to be statistically different for the tax reallocation and the tax introduction regimes. This confirms previous valuation research results, and thus reiterates the hypothesis that states the inequality between marginal values of private income and public money. On the other hand, the SC estimates are not found to be statistically different for the two proposed tax reallocation regimes, suggesting that, in the case study investigated here, the marginal value of public money does not depend upon the budget source.     

Multifactor models and their consistency with the ICAPM

Can any multifactor model be interpreted as a variant of the Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM)? The ICAPM places restrictions on time-series and cross-sectional behavior of state variables and factors. If a state variable forecasts positive (negative) changes in investment opportunities in time-series regressions, its innovation should earn a positive (negative) risk price in the cross-sectional test of the respective multifactor model. Second, the market (covariance) price of risk must be economically plausible as an estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA). We apply our ICAPM criteria to eight popular multifactor models and the results show that most models do not satisfy the ICAPM restrictions. Specifically, the “hedging” risk prices have the wrong sign and the estimates of RRA are not economically plausible. Overall, the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models perform the best in consistently meeting the ICAPM restrictions. The remaining models, which represent some of the most relevant examples presented in the empirical asset pricing literature, can still empirically explain the size, value, and momentum anomalies, but they are generally inconsistent with the ICAPM.     

Do social networking sites contribute for building brands? Evaluating the impact of users' participation on brand awareness and brand attitude

Social networking sites (SNSs) have attracted increasing attention from brands, which look at the platform as a privileged communication channel to reach their audiences. Despite their growing adoption, few research efforts have been devoted to evaluate SNSs' concrete implications for the brands. The current study addresses this opportunity, proposing a model that evaluates the impact of users' participation in SNSs on brand awareness and brand attitude, the two main pillars of brand knowledge. The study focuses on brand like pages in Facebook, the most used SNSs platform for brands. An online quantitative survey with brand like page users of leading brands in Facebook was implemented. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to estimate the measurement model and structural equation modelling was used to test the proposed research hypotheses. The results identify a significant, positive and direct impact of users' participation on brand awareness. Brand attitude also substantially benefits from users' participation, but this relationship is mediated by brand awareness. The findings help to validate SNSs' significant role on building brand knowledge and to position users' participation at the core of brands' SNSs objectives. Furthermore, the study provides a practical research framework, easily adapted for monitoring purposes and managerial guidance. Future research directions are discussed.     

Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism—and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.     

Portfolio choice with high frequency data: CRRA preferences and the liquidity effect

This paper suggests a new approach for portfolio choice. In this framework, the investor, with CRRA preferences, has two objectives: the maximization of the expected utility and the minimization of the portfolio expected illiquidity. The CRRA utility is measured using the portfolio realized volatility, realized skewness and realized kurtosis, while the portfolio illiquidity is measured using the well-known Amihud illiquidity ratio. Therefore, the investor is able to make her choices directly in the expected utility/liquidity (EU/L) bi-dimensional space. We conduct an empirical analysis in a set of fourteen stocks of the CAC 40 stock market index, using high frequency data for the time span from January 1999 to December 2005 (seven years). The robustness of the proposed model is checked according to the out-of-sample performance of different EU/L portfolios relative to the minimum variance and equally weighted portfolios. For different risk aversion levels, the EU/L portfolios are quite competitive and in several cases consistently outperform those benchmarks, in terms of utility, liquidity and certainty equivalent.     

Financial constraints and firm post-entry performance

Firms finance production by internally generated funds and external loans. The benefits of leverage, however, come with a cost. This cost is related to the uncertainty banks face about the firm's quality and output price. As time evolves banks learn about the firm and adjust the terms of the loan contract. Because of this, firms do not have equal access to credit: small, young firms face greater binding debt constraints than more mature firms with well-known prospects. The firm survival rate, as well as the firm rate of growth, are, therefore, important issues in analyzing firm post-entry performance.     

Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each seller competes for a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. We call this game a catalog game. Our main objective is to show that catalog games have Nash equilibria. The Nash existence problem for catalog games is particularly contentious due to payoff discontinuities caused by tie-breaking. We make three contributions. First, we establish under very mild conditions on primitives that no matter what the tie-breaking rule, catalog games are uniformly payoff secure, and therefore have mixed extensions which are payoff secure. Second, we show that if the tie-breaking rule awards the sale to firms which value it most (i.e., breaks ties in favor of firms which stand to make the highest profit), then firm profits are reciprocally upper semicontinuous (i.e., the mixed catalog game is reciprocally upper semincontinuous). This in turn implies that the mixed catalog game satisfies Reny’s condition of better-reply security—a condition sufficient for existence (Reny in Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999). Third, we show by example that if the tie-breaking rule does not award the sale to firms which value it most (for example, if ties are broken randomly with equal probability), then the catalog game has no Nash equilibrium. This paper was written while the second author was Visiting Professor, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Universite Paris 1, Pantheon-Sorbonne. The second author thanks CES and Paris 1, and in particular, Bernard Cornet and Cuong Le Van for their support and hospitality. The second author also thanks the C&BA and EFLS at the University of Alabama for financial support. Both authors are grateful to Monique Florenzano and to participants in the April 2006 Paris 1 NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference for many helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Finally, both authors are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose thoughtful comments led to substantial improvements in the paper. Monteiro acknowleges the financial support of Capes-Cofecub 468/04.     

The behaviour of seasonal unit root tests under neglected local drifts

This paper analyses the limit distributions of the seasonal unit root test procedures proposed by Dickey, Hasza and Fuller (1984) and Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo (1990), when local trends at different frequencies are present in data generation processes, but ignored in the test regressions used. The findings presented explicitly show that neglected deterministic trends have negative effects on the distributions of the test statistics. Analytical observations and Monte Carlo simulations reveal that seasonal unit root test statistics become severely undersized as the values of standardized local trends increase. Hence, failure to consider local trends may often bear the undesirable effect of biasing decisions towards non-rejection of unit roots.Received: February 2001, Accepted: September 2001, JEL Classification: C12, C22Paulo M. M. Rodrigues: I am thankful to two anonymous referees for their detailed and useful comments and suggestions.