Boards,Executive Excess Compensation,and Shared Power: Evidence from Nonprofit Firms

We investigate how executives, the board, and excess compensation jointly affect the performance of nonprofits. Since the common measure of nonprofit performance often includes salaries, we also use expenses that directly benefit the targeted population. Our results suggest that above average compensation for executives is associated with poor firm performance. However, the negative relation of CEO pay to performance occurs for firms with only one executive, the CEO. We conclude that a powerful CEO with autonomy can harm firm performance, but other executives can mitigate these agency problems. The board also appears to monitor direct community benefits more than indirect benefits.     

Contemporary University Strategising: The Financial Imperative

This paper examines the financially focused strategies now evident amongst institutions competing for space in the global higher education system. In their search for increasing financial self‐sufficiency, universities and other higher education providers are examined for their primary competitive strategies. The study provides comprehensive evidence of their cost and operating efficiency strategies, facilitated by increasingly pervasive financial performance accountability systems. The primary operational strategies of teaching and research are found to have been transmogrified into strategies of customised education and research that is primarily focused upon and measured in terms of its funds generation. These trends contribute to complex performance management and accountability challenges as universities’ senior managers balance their internal financial ambitions with the expectations of external stakeholders, while simultaneously projecting sanitised imagery through corporate public relations strategies.     

An Investigation of the Relationship between Use of International Accounting Standards and Source of Company Finance in Germany

This study examines the relationship between use of international accounting standards and companies’ source of finance. We investigate the proposition contained in Nobes’ (1998) model that postulates outsider companies (those with a higher level of public finance) in weak equity–outsider markets (capital markets where public equity finance is not the dominant source of finance) are more likely to change their type of accounting system from one focused on information for creditors and tax authorities to one that meets the needs of external financiers. We found strong support for Nobes’ model. Using 408 German listed companies at 1999, we observed that companies with more outsider finance (the proportion of shares held by outsiders and the presence of public debt) were more likely to use international standards (U.S. GAAP or IAS). The results indicate the importance of controlling for source of finance at the company rather than country level in cross‐country studies investigating the benefits of adoption of international standards.     

Corporate Risk Management under Information Asymmetry

This paper examines the financial and operational hedging activities of US pharmaceutical and biotech firms that are subject to a high level of information asymmetry stemming from R&D investments during 2001–2006. We find evidence in support of the information asymmetry hypothesis à la Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) that hedging helps mitigate the under‐investment problem. Specifically, we find that the use of financial derivatives is associated with greater firm value and that the value enhancement is larger for firms subject to greater information asymmetry and better growth opportunities. There is a synergy between financial hedging and operational hedging where the latter is used to counter product development risk. The results are robust with respect to alternative performance measures, industry‐specific growth measures, and the endogeneity problem. Our work is differentiated from existing studies that examined commodity‐based industries without addressing information asymmetry.     

The density of the time to ruin for a Sparre Andersen process with Erlang arrivals and exponential claims

We derive expressions for the density of the time to ruin given that ruin occurs in a Sparre Andersen model in which individual claim amounts are exponentially distributed and inter-arrival times are distributed as Erlang(n,?β). We provide numerical illustrations of finite time ruin probabilities, as well as illustrating features of the density functions.     

Mean and dispersion modelling for policy claims costs

A model for the statistical analysis of the total amount of insurance paid out on a policy is developed and applied. The model simultaneously deals with the number of claims (zero or more) and the amount of each claim. The number of claims is from a Poisson-based discrete distribution. Individual claim sizes are from a continuous right skewed distribution. The resulting distribution of total claim size is a mixed discrete-continuous model, with positive probability of a zero claim. The means and dispersions of the claim frequency and claim size distribution are modeled in terms of risk factors. The model is applied to a car insurance data set.     

Literatur

1. A simplified method for the deduction of Sheppard's correction formulae for ordinary and factorial moments, and for semi-invariants, together with more general results than those previously known, especially with regard to the remainder term, has recently been given ¹ H. Wold: Sulla correzione di Sheppard. Giornale dell' Istituto Italiano degli Attuari IV 1934, pp. 304–314. The methods used in the note referred to are similar to those used by W. F. Sheppard in his paper “The Calculation of Moments of a Frequency Distribution”, Biometrika V 1907, pp. 450–459. However, Sheppard's results are not valid under equally general conditions. . The method is based upon a very simple application of Euler—MacLaurin's formula, and the usual corrections are thereby shown to be valid for very general frequency curves, even for those without high contact in one or both directions. The note referred to deals with the case of one variable; the use of the method employed there can, however, easily be extended to an arbitrary number of variables, which extension it is the purpose of this paper to carry through. For the sake of formal simplicity the deductions are performed with two variables; the results can then immediately be generalized.