Welfare Effects of Tariff Reduction Formulas

World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations rely on tariff reduction formulas. Formula approaches are of increasing importance in trade talks, because of the large number of countries involved, the wider dispersion in initial tariffs (e.g. tariff peaks), and gaps between bound and applied tariff rates. This paper presents a two country intra‐industry trade model with heterogeneous firms subject to high and low tariffs. We examine the welfare effects of applying three different tariff reduction formulas discussed in the literature that were used and proposed in previous and current General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO negotiations (1) a proportional cut, (2) the Swiss formula and (3) a tiered formula. No single formula dominates for all conditions. The ranking of the three tools depends on the degree of product differentiation in the industry and the achieved reduction in the average tariff.     

Family size and child outcomes: Is there really no trade-off?

We study the impact of family size on intermediate and long-term outcomes using twin births as an exogenous source of variation in family size in an unusually rich dataset. Similar to recent studies, we find no evidence of a causal effect on long-term outcomes and show that not taking selection effects into account will likely overstate the effects. We do, however, find a small but significant negative impact of family size on grades in compulsory and secondary school among children who are likely to be vulnerable to further restrictions on parental investments.     

Conversational use of genres in managerial meetings

This article addresses the question of how the concept of genre, defined as a linguistically realized activity type, can be applied to the study of organizational discourse. In particular, the authors show how and for what practical purposes managers invoke genres in meetings. The data of the study consist of video-recorded company-internal meetings and the methodology is based on ethnomethodological conversation analysis. In the empirical analysis the authors show how genres are used as resources for joint understanding and for conducting a particular conversational action in a meeting, namely proposing a solution to a problem. The study highlights the importance of genre knowledge in managerial meetings and the practical nature of this knowledge.     

The influence of investment experience on market prices: laboratory evidence

We run laboratory experiments to analyze the impact of prior investment experience on price efficiency in asset markets. Before subjects enter the asset market they gain either no, positive, or negative investment experience in an investment game. To get a comprehensive picture about the role of experience we implement two asset market designs. One is prone to inefficient pricing, exhibiting bubble and crash patterns, while the other exhibits efficient pricing. We find that (i) both, positive and negative, experience gained in the investment game lead to efficient pricing in both market settings. Further, we show that (ii) the experience effect dominates potential effects triggered by positive and negative sentiment generated by the investment game. We conjecture that experiencing changing price paths in the investment game can create a higher sensibility on changing fundamentals (through higher salience) among subjects in the subsequently run asset market.     

Information Manipulation in Election Campaigns

We provide a game‐theoretical model of manipulative election campaigns with two political candidates and a Bayesian voter. The latter is uncertain about how good the candidates are. Candidates take unobservable, costly actions to manipulate voter's opinion about their positions. We show that if the candidates differ in campaigning efficiency, and the voter receives the biased campaign messages with some noise, then the cost‐efficient candidate can win the election with higher probability than her opponent even when she is ex‐post an inferior choice for the voter. Our paper offers a novel informational justification for imposing limits on campaign spending and encouraging diversity in the supply of political information.