Swedish Multinationals and Competition from High- and Low-Wage Locations

This study uses data on Swedish multinationals to estimate cross-elasticities of labor demand in different locations. With a vertical decomposition of the firm's activities, whether there is substitution or complementarity between employment in different parts of the firm will depend on whether wage changes lead to a relocation of activities or simply to changes in marginal costs and/or demand for inputs in other parts of the firms. It is found that there is some evidence of a substitutionary relationship between employment in the Swedish parts of the firms and employment in other high-income locations, but no evidence of substitution stemming from employment in low-income locations.     

Estimation of an adaptive stock market model with heterogeneous agents

Standard asset pricing models based on rational expectations and homogeneity have problems explaining the complex and volatile nature of financial markets. Recently, boundedly rational and heterogeneous agent models have been developed and simulated returns are found to exhibit various stylized facts, such as volatility clustering and fat tails. Here, we are interested in how well the proposed models can explain all the properties seen in real data, not just one or a few at a time. Hence, we do a proper estimation of some simple versions of such a model by the use of efficient method of moments and maximum likelihood and compare the results to real data and more traditional econometric models. We discover two main findings. First, the similarities with observed data found in earlier simulations rely crucially on a somewhat unrealistic modeling of the noise term. Second, when the stochastic is more properly introduced the models are still able to generate some stylized facts, but the fit is generally quite poor.     

The Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Federal Systems: The Political Economy of NIMBY

This paper offers a new political economy explanation for thepervasive problem of siting hazardous waste treatment facilitiesin federal system. We first show that a decentralized systemyields the first-best waste treatment capacity level and that acentralized structure gives rise to free-riding behavior amonglocal jurisdictions. In our model, each community seeks toinfluence the central government through political contributions.This leads to suboptimal levels of treatment capacity. Thecapacity is increasing in the compensation level if the marginalbenefit of treatment capacity is sufficiently large, and in thegovernment's weight on aggregate social welfare relative tolobbying activities. The centralized system can replicate thedecentralized system with a sufficiently high compensation level.Since compensation has proved difficult, a centralized systemfaces greater obstacles than a decentralized system.     

Anchoring Induced Biases in Consumer Price Negotiations

Two studies were conducted with the aim of demonstrating anchoring induced biases in consumer price negotiations.In Study 1, 96 undergraduate students of business administration who were recruited as subjects played the role of buyers of a condominium. All subjects were given the same market information. They were then asked to state whether their reservation price was higher or lower than an arbitrary price example (irrelevant anchor) that for different groups of subjects was either low or high. Finally, subjects indicated their reservation price. As would be predicted if adjustments from the anchor are insufficient, the indicated reservation price was lower when the anchor was low than when it was high.In Study 2, employing 64 undergraduate students of psychology who conducted dyad negotiations about the price of condominiums, the effect of the irrelevant anchor on the initially indicated reservation price was replicated. In addition, an anchoring effect of the seller's initial offer was observed. The results also revealed effects of both irrelevant anchor and initial offer on the purchase price.From a public policy point of view, the results imply that consumers may be strongly influenced by irrelevant anchors provided by sellers. Provision of accurate market price information may however lessen the impact of irrelevant anchors.     

Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders

Can price and advertising be used by vertically differentiated duopolists to signal qualities to consumers? We show that pure price separation is impossible if the vertical differentiation is small, while adding dissipative advertising ensures the existence of separating equilibria. Two simple, but nonstandard, equilibrium refinements are introduced to deal with the multisender nature of the game, and they are shown to produce a unique separating and a unique pooling profile. Pooling results in a zero‐profit Bertrand outcome. Separation gives strictly positive duopoly profits, and dissipative advertising is used by the high‐quality firm when products are sufficiently close substitutes. Finally, compared to the complete‐information benchmark, the separating prices of both firms are distorted upwards when the degree of vertical differentiation is large, and downwards when it is small.     

Adaptive planning and uncertainty resolution

The article discusses uncertainty resolution and the approaches to uncertainty in planning. Statically perceived uncertainty may be described more or less explicitly in decision making. Stating various possible outcomes and, possibly, their numerical probabilities may allow quantitative theory to be applied. However, there will be a residual of genuine uncertainty due to the limits set by the available information. By “buying” more information the decision maker can decrease the genuine uncertainty. It is also often possible to reduce uncertainty by waiting. The most effective way is to state the expectations explicitly and to let the various future states of information correspond to alternative decisions in a conditional strategy. This requires a new kind of forecast that refers to the development of information available. A less efficient mode of planning can still take into consideration the fact that revisions are expected. This is flexible planning in a wide sense.     

Accounting for the role of habit in behavioural strategies for injury prevention

The limited success of behavioural strategies in injury prevention has been attributed to failure to properly apply behaviour change models to intervention design and the explanation of safety behaviours. However, this paper contends that many health behaviour change interventions do not succeed because they fail to take into account the habitual quality of most health and safety-related behaviour; a more complete model of behaviour change needs to be based on a better understanding of the role of habit. The overall aim is to contribute to better understanding of behavioural strategies for injury prevention. When habits are weak, attitudes and intentions predict behaviours, but as behaviours turn into habits, they become better predictors of future behaviour than attitudes or intentions. Furthermore, where habits are strong, individuals are less likely to act on new information, evaluating counter-habitual information negatively. Integrating the concepts of strong and weak habits with upstream and downstream strategies, a framework is presented for tailoring strategies to the habit strength of the target behaviour.     

Determinants of the Prevalance of Start-ups and High-Growth Firms

The purpose of this study is to identify key institutional determinants of firm emergence and growth. We do this using various types of data from Sweden. A characterization of a number of institutions and policy measures shows that they are likely to have contributed to an environment that discourages entrepreneurial activity and firm growth. Aspects dealt with include: missing arenas for entrepreneurship in the care sectors and for household-related services, taxation of entrepreneurial income, incentives for wealth accumulation, wage-setting institutions and labor market regulations. Using original data, we provide evidence of a low prevalence of nascent entrepreneurs and a small net employment contribution by high-growth firms. We admit that indisputable evidence for the effects of institutional arrangements is almost impossible to establish. However, the consistency of our theoretical arguments and empirical data makes a strong case for the notion that the Swedish case illustrates the costs of giving too little weight to economic renewal in policy making.     

Are the choices of people stochastically rational? A stochastic test of the number of revealed preference violations

Revealed preference tests are frequently used to check data on the behavior of agents for consistency with economic theory. Unfortunately these tests lack a stochastic element and thus one violation of revealed preference causes a rejection of the behavior being tested. To remedy this lack of a stochastic element in revealed preference analysis, we suggest a general, simple, and intuitive statistical procedure to test whether the observed number of violations is more consistent with a pre-specified type of non-degenerate behavior than with rational behavior. We illustrate this general procedure with an example using uniform random behavior that allows researchers to test whether the actual number of violations of revealed preference is more consistent with uniform random behavior than rational behavior. This statistical test takes advantage of the fact that nonparametric revealed preference tests involve known prices and expenditures. Our illustrative example is accompanied by some Monte Carlo exercises showing that the uniform test performs very well. We implement our test using datasets from two well-known economic experiments. One is a dataset on altruistic choices from Andreoni and Miller (Econometrica 70:737–753, 2002). The second is a dataset on the choices made by subjects who act within a token economy from Battalio et al. (West Econ J 11:411–428, 1973) and Cox (Econ J 107:1054–1078, 1997). We find that for a majority of subjects in one altruistic behavior sub-experiment uniform random behavior can be rejected in favor of rational behavior at the 10 % level of significance. For all but one subject, living in the token economy, uniform random behavior cannot be rejected. For that one subject in the token experiment uniform random behavior is rejected in favor of perverse economic behavior.     

The Interplay of Communication and Decisions in Electronic Negotiations: Communicative Decisions or Decisive Communication?

Whilst much research has been conducted on decision support for electronic negotiations and some research has been done on communication support in this area, there is a lack of research on the interplay between these two elements of negotiations. The questions whether both are equally important, whether one effects the other, or whether they show counter-effects are important both for negotiation training (i.e. what should be the focus for becoming a good negotiator) and for system research (i.e. which system support elements need to be developed). The current paper presents results of a controlled laboratory experiment with negotiators that were provided with decision support and communication support and negotiators that had only communication support available. The impact of decision support on the communication process and on outcome dimensions as well as the impact of communication behaviour on the negotiation process and the qualitative dimensions of the outcome will be discussed.