The characteristics of family firms: exploiting information on ownership,kinship, and governance using total population data

Family firms are often considered characteristically different from non-family firms. However, our understanding of family firms suffers from an inability to identify them in total population data; information is rarely available regarding owners, their kinship, and their involvement in firm governance. We present a method for identifying domiciled family firms using register data; this method offers greater accuracy than previous methods. We apply this method to Swedish data concerning firm ownership, governance, and kinship from 2004 to 2010. We find that the family firm is a significant organizational form, contributing over one third of all employment and gross domestic product (GDP). Family firms are common in most industries and range in size. Furthermore, we find that, compared to private non-family firms, family firms have fewer total assets, employment, and sales and carry higher solidity, although family firms are more profitable. These differences diminish with firm size. We conclude that the term “family firm” includes a large variety of firms, and we call for increased attention to their heterogeneity.     

The dynamics of government

We model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations. We find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment. The difference is larger, the lower is the political influence of young agents, the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations, and the lower is risk-aversion. Furthermore, there tends to be too much redistribution in the political equilibrium. Finally, smooth preference aggregation, as under probabilistic voting, produces less persistence and does not admit multiple equilibria, which occur under majority-voting aggregation.     

Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players

If an infinitely-lived monopolistic firm has private information about its (stochastic) quality possibility set in each period, the actions of the firm are subject to moral hazard. Consequently, the strategies of the finitely-lived consumers must provide incentives for the firm to produce the highest possible quality. For any discount factor, the costs of providing incentives are strictly positive, and we conclude that even the most patient firm cannot attain its first-best payoff. In order to give the firm sufficient incentives to supply the maximum quality when the possibility set is favorable, the firm must be punished for failing to perform when the set is unfavorable. The best perfect equilibrium strategy profile for the firm specifies that the firm always produces the highest possible quality given the possibility set. It follows that even a very patient firm suffers a strictly positive loss as a result of the adverse incentives, since the punishment is carried out with a positive probability along the equilibrium path.This paper is based on chap. 6 in may Ph. D. thesis (Overgaard, 1991a). The first draft was written while I visited UCLA, and I would like to thank David K. Levine for suggesting the set-up used in the paper and his extensive comments. An anonymous referee and the members of my thesis committee, Claude d'Aspremont (CORE), Françoise Forges (CORE), Jean-François Mertens (CORE), Jean-Pierre Ponssard (Paris), and Eric van Damme (Tilburg), provided valuable suggestions. Finally, I received many useful comments at the Econometric Society meeting in Cambridge, UK, Sept. 1991. The financial support from the Danish Research Academy is greatly appreciated.     

Harnessing the Creative Potential among Users*

User involvement in the development of new products may offer a novel approach to improved methods of meeting customer needs. These users are considered to offer possibilities for generating original, valuable, and realizable ideas leading to successful innovation. However, the merit of users' ideas compared to ideas generated by the company itself has not been investigated empirically. In the present study, advanced users, ordinary users, and professional product developers were given the task of creating ideas for future mobile phone services. The main purpose was to examine the benefit of involving users in suggesting new product ideas in an innovation project. An experimental three‐group design was used in order to assess the output in terms of its original, valuable, and realizable merit. The results indicated that ordinary users create significantly more original and valuable ideas than professional developers and advanced users. Professional developers and advanced users created more easily realizable ideas, and ordinary users created the most valuable ideas. The results were discussed from the viewpoint of divergent thinking. It was suggested that divergent thinking was facilitated through the opportunity to combine different information elements that appeared separate at the outset, such as personal needs coupled with the functionality of mobile phone services.     

Intentions to use mobile services: Antecedents and cross-service comparisons

This article develops and tests a model to explain consumers’ intention to use mobile services. Through triangulating theories from the diverse fields of information systems research, uses and gratification research, and domestication research, the authors put forth an integrated model that explains intention to use mobile services. The model proposes four overall influences on usage intention: motivational influences, attitudinal influences, normative pressure, and perceived control. The authors study the type of interactivity and process characteristics associated with the service that moderate the effects on the relationship between the proposed antecedents and usage intention. The results from empirical studies of four mobile services show strong support for the effects of motivational influences, attitudinal influences, normative pressure, and perceived control on consumers’ intentions to use mobile services. Some of the effects are moderated by process characteristics (goal-directed vs. experiential services) that are associated with the service.     

An analysis of Hansen–Scheinkman moment estimators for discretely and randomly sampled diffusions

We derive closed-form expansions for the asymptotic distribution of Hansen and Scheinkman [1995. Back to the future: generating moment implications for continuous-time Markov processes. Econometrica 63, 767–804] moment estimators for discretely, and possibly randomly, sampled diffusions. This result makes it possible to select optimal moment conditions as well as to assess the efficiency of the resulting parameter estimators relative to likelihood-based estimators, or to an alternative type of moment conditions.     

Internationalization of an academic invention through successive science-business networks: The case of TAVI

The aim of this paper is to explain how new technology ventures move, grow, and scale. Such ventures internationalize much faster than depicted by the traditional Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, J Int Bus Stud 8:23–32, 1977; Johanson and Vahlne, Mark Rev 7(4), 1990; Johanson and Vahlne, J Int Entrep 1:83–101, 2003; Johanson and Vahlne, Manag Int Rev 46:165–178, 2006; Oviatt and McDougall, J Int Bus Stud 25:45–64, 1994). According to the Uppsala model, the main reason it takes time is that entrepreneurs need to build networks and learn. Many scholars have investigated how they may be able to learn faster and grow networks more effectively. While these explanations contribute to a better understanding of the process, they appear disturbingly insufficient. By means of an in-depth case study, we aim at identifying how learning and network-building constraints may be circumvented. We have investigated the internationalization process of an invention at a Danish university hospital that became a new technology within minimally invasive heart surgery. While the invention took place in the periphery of the international medical network, the venture circulated to the most competent international science-business networks to mobilize resources and competencies. We found that its ability to succeed resulted from its roots in international academic networks and its connecting to core nodes in these as well as in adequate business networks—including, in particular, Venture Capital firms that are in the business of developing and scaling such technology ventures. We also found that the innovation process evolved through phases that called for different resources and capabilities. It thereby offered opportunities for actors, networks, and companies that control such capabilities to move in to take control and pull the venture through the next phase. The process is less like a long distance run, and more like a relay race. This radically reduces the need to learn as the new venture expands and scales.     

Gaming,Accountability and Trust: DRGs and Activity‐Based Funding in Norway

This paper examines a particular performance management instrument in Norway: DRGs used in conjunction with activity‐based funding of hospitals. We ask whether this system creates opportunities for undesirable gaming practices, how accountability arrangements deal with gaming, and how trust and institutional logic may help to explain anomalies and their resolve. From an instrumental and cultural perspective, we examine six Norwegian cases of gaming and two governmental assessments of coding and activity‐based funding. Current solutions do provide gaming opportunities, in a highly complex accountability setting. Accountability arrangements highlight tensions between trust and distrust, rather than resolving the balance between individual goals and collective norms.     

On the interpretation of ‘green’ NNP measures as cost-benefit rules

In this paper we consider the possibility of using green welfare change measures as the basis for cost-benefit analysis of new projects. Such green welfare change measures look very similar to what one would expect a cost-benefit analysis of the entire economy to look like. It is shown that although green welfare measures contain the shadow prices needed in the evaluation of a small new project, one must account for changes in these prices.We are grateful to two referees for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper     

Upstream Pricingand Advertising Signal Downstream Demand

This paper considers price and advertising decisions by a monopolist manufacturer who is privately informed about the strength of consumer demand. Consumers respond to advertising and to the retail price chosen by an uninformed retailer on the basis of his beliefs about demand. This signaling game has a unique intuitive equilibrium outcome in which a high-demand manufacturer chooses his full-information pair of wholesale price and advertising. When demand is low, the wholesale price is distorted downward from its full information level, whereas demand-enhancing advertising may be distorted in either direction. Dissipative advertising is not distorted because it is never used.