Do poverty and poor health and nutrition increase the risk of armed conflict onset?

We analyze the effects of improving the economic, food security and health status on the risk of armed cotntectflict onset, focusing on the factors related to the millennium development goals. We employ the discrete-time hazard model that allows us to examine the time-varying effects of socioeconomic factors controlling for the reverse effect of conflict. Our results show that income poverty and poor health and nutritional status are more significantly associated with armed conflict onset than GDP per capita, annual GDP growth, and the ratio of primary commodity exports over GDP. In particular, poor health and nutritional status seems to play a key role in inducing armed conflicts in poor countries. These results indicate that, when a majority of the poor and the malnourished resides in rural areas and depends on agriculture directly or indirectly, investments in public goods for agriculture and rural areas can be effective tools to achieve the multiple goals of reduced poverty, food security and armed conflict, including riots in early 2008 triggered by high food prices. Food policy can be an effective element of efforts to maintain stability.     

Asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty as moderators of the sales growth — Employment growth relationship in emerging ventures

Sales growth and employment growth are the two most widely used growth indicators for new ventures; yet, sales growth and employment growth are not interchangeable measures of new venture growth. Rather, they are related, but somewhat independent constructs that respond differently to a variety of criteria. Most of the literature treats this as a methodological technicality. However, sales growth with or without accompanying employment growth has very different implications for managers and policy makers. A better understanding of what drives these different growth metrics has the potential to lead to better decision making. To improve that understanding we apply transaction cost economics reasoning to predict when sales growth will be or will not be accompanied by employment growth. Our results indicate that our predictions are borne out consistently in resource-constrained contexts but not in resource-munificent contexts.     

Agglomeration, Relative Wage Costs and Foreign Direct Investment—Evidence from Swedish MNCs 1974–1998

This paper examines the relationship between agglomeration economies and relative wage costs in influencing location of multinational corporations. An inflow of firms to certain regions and industries is likely to increase demand for labor. If mobility of labor is low increased costs can be expected to deter additional inflows of firms, albeit agglomeration economies may compensate for higher wages. Despite its important policy implications this relationship has to our knowledge not been exposed to empirical testing. The empirical analysis finds that foreign direct investment has become increasingly sensitive to differences in wage cost across industrialized countries, but also that agglomeration economies related to knowledge externalities positively influences higher costs. The relative strength of these two forces impacts the spatial distribution of production.

Optimal policy rules and regime switching in disequilibrium models

This paper emphasizes the need to search for globally optimal policy levels (for public production, say) in fix-price disequilibrium analysis. Regime-specific rules are inadequate. They ignore the fact that moving a policy towards its optimal level may move the economy from its initial disequilibrium regime to a different regime where the rule no longer applies.     

Measures of similarity between distributions

Eleven criteria are suggested as suitable for measures of similarity between distributions. For seven measures it is discussed whether they satisfy these measures or not. Two measures, the proportional similarity and the Hellinger coefficient satisfy all the eleven criteria.     

MEASURING VALUES FOR IMPROVED AIR QUALITY FROM DISCRETE RESPONSE DATA: TWO EXPERIMENTS

This paper derives and estimates two different measures of the value of an elimination of sulphur emissions in Sweden. One measure is a usual willingness-to-pay measure, while the other measure yields the willingness to offer jobs in the industry in order to secure an improvement in air quality. According to both approaches, the average willingness to pay for an improvement in air quality is surprisingly high: 4 to 5 per cent of disposable income and 3 to 4 per cent of the total number of jobs in Sweden, respectively. These figures suggest that it is socially profitable to undertake further measures to reduce air pollution in Sweden given existing estimates of cleaning costs.     

On planning and forecasting the location of retail and service activity

In countries with mixed economies, planning authorities cannot usually enforce micro location and travel decisions of urban activities, but are confined to forming macro location and transport policy, within which agents can operate according to the market. An attempt is made here to describe such multilevel behaviour of the planning authority, landlords, firms and customers, and to obtain non-cooperative equilibria in terms of the controls exerted by each group. The behaviour of the market groups is described via entropy maximization, while alternative modes of behaviour are ascribed to the authority. In addition, a Pareto-type solution is examined.     

Keeping others in our mind or in our heart? Distribution games under cognitive load

It has recently been argued that giving is spontaneous while greed is calculated (Rand et al., in Nature 489:427–430, 2012). If greed is calculated we would expect that cognitive load, which is assumed to reduce the influence of cognitive processes, should affect greed. In this paper we study both charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load to test if greed is affected by the load. This is tested in three different dictator game experiments. In the dictator games we use both a give frame, where the dictators are given an amount that they may share with a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may take from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results from all three experiments show that the behavioral effect in terms of allocated money of the induced load is small if at all existent. At the same time, follow-up questions indicate that the subjects’ decisions are more impulsive and less driven by their thoughts under cognitive load.