Public pensions and growth

This paper investigates the relationship between the size of an unfunded public pension system and economic growth in an overlapping generation economy, in which altruistic parents finance the education of their children and leave bequests. Unlike the existing literature, we model intergenerational altruism by assuming that children's income during adulthood is an argument of parental utility. Unfunded public pensions can promote growth when families face liquidity constraints preventing them from investing optimally in the education of their children. We consider two alternative ways of financing a public pension system, either by levying social contributions in a lump-sum manner or in proportion to labour income. We find that there is no case for unfunded public pensions in economies where bequests are operative. By contrast, there exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system in economies where bequests are not operative and individuals are sufficiently patient.     

Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation

Game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form. We study learning in such games by using valuation of moves. A valuation for a player is a numeric assessment of her moves that purports to reflect their desirability. We consider a myopic player, who chooses moves with the highest valuation. Each time the game is played, the player revises her valuation by assigning the payoff obtained in the play to each of the moves she has made. We show for a repeated win-lose game that if the player has a winning strategy in the stage game, there is almost surely a time after which she always wins. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1 there is a time after which strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff.     

How to win a decision in a confederation

This paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent states. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority to one of the states through a bidding procedure among the group state members. We identify the following tradeoff: competition among states yields higher transfers to the central authority, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when states negotiate prior to the decision making process. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several heterogeneous states.     

From free oil to ‘freedom oil’: terrorism,war and US Geopolitics in the Persian Gulf

Oil has been a major driving force behind foreign interests, regional and domestic balance of power, and territorial conflicts in the Persian Gulf. As a result of the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks debates on oil and the United States' security agenda have significantly shifted. If on one side, those opposing US military interventionism have argued that the ‘war on terror’ provided one more convenient cover for a renewed ‘imperialist oil grab’ in this region; on the other, links between oil and terrorism pointed at problems of governance in oil-producing countries. As the ‘war on terror’ became justified as a ‘war of liberation’ against oil-funded dictators, the US portrayed its foreign policy as shifting from ensuring free access to oil for the world market, to ensuring that oil is delivering ‘freedom’ to local populations. Although engaging the crucial issue of oil governance, there is yet little evidence given the number of war victims and potential vested interests that a US policy shift from ‘free oil’ to ‘freedom oil’ is genuine and viable.     

Adherence,persistence, and inpatient utilization among adult schizophrenia patients using once-monthly versus twice-monthly long-acting atypical antipsychotics

Aims: This study compared healthcare resource utilization (HRU), healthcare costs, adherence, and persistence among adult patients with schizophrenia using once-monthly (OM) vs twice-monthly (TM) atypical long-acting injectable (LAI) antipsychotic (AP) therapy.

Materials and methods: A longitudinal retrospective cohort study was conducted using Medicaid claims data from six states. Patients initiated on aripiprazole or paliperidone palmitate were assigned to the OM cohort; risperidone-treated patients were assigned to the TM cohort. HRU and healthcare costs were assessed during the first 12 months following stabilization on the medication. Adherence was measured using the proportion of days covered (PDC) during the first year of follow-up. Persistence to the index medication was measured during the first 2 years following the index date. Comparison between the cohorts was achieved using multivariable generalized linear models, adjusting for demographic and clinical characteristics.

Results: Patients in the OM LAI cohort had lower inpatient HRU and medical costs when compared with patients in the TM cohort. Higher medical costs in the TM LAI cohort offset the higher pharmacy costs in the OM LAI cohort. Mean PDC during the first 12 months of follow-up was higher in the OM cohort than in the TM cohort (0.56 vs 0.50, p?<?.01). Median persistence was longer in the OM cohort than in the TM cohort (7.5 months vs 5.5 months), as was the hazard of discontinuing the index medication (hazard ratio?=?0.83, p?=?.01). Kaplan-Meier rates of persistence at 1 year were higher for OM patients than for TM patients (37.6% vs 29.6%, p?<?.01).

Limitations: This was a Medicaid sample with few aripiprazole LAI patients (5.4% of OM cohort). Medication use was inferred from pharmacy claims.

Conclusions: Among Medicaid patients in these six states, OM AP treatment was associated with lower HRU, better adherence and persistence, and similar total costs compared to patients on TM treatment.     

Psychology at work

We compare three wage–effort psychological games. In the first game, the agent’s motivation hinges on a degree of altruism influenced by the surprise generated by the principal’s wage offer. The agent works harder when the wage is greater than expected and vice versa when the wage is smaller than expected. Consistent equilibrium beliefs oblige the principal to randomize in order to surprise the agent, which results in the principal being worse off than if she were dealing with an unemotional agent. We then consider an intention-based reciprocity model and a model of guilt aversion. We find that guilt aversion may potentially yield the best outcome for the principal.     

Healthcare resource utilization with ixazomib or placebo plus lenalidomide-dexamethasone in the randomized,double-blind,phase 3 TOURMALINE-MM1 study in relapsed/refractory multiple myeloma

Aims: The aim of this analysis was to assess healthcare resource utilization in the pivotal phase 3 TOURMALINE-MM1 study of the oral proteasome inhibitor ixazomib or placebo plus lenalidomide and dexamethasone (Rd) in relapsed and/or refractory multiple myeloma (RRMM).

Methods: In this double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized study (NCT01564537), 722 patients with RRMM following 1–3 prior lines of therapy received Rd plus ixazomib (ixazomib-Rd; n?=?360) or matching placebo (placebo-Rd; n?=?362) until disease progression or unacceptable toxicity. Healthcare resource utilization data were captured on Day 1 of each 28-day cycle, every 4 weeks during follow-up for progression-free survival, and every 12 weeks during subsequent follow-up, and included medical encounters (length of stay, inpatient, outpatient, and reason) and number of missing days from work or other activities for patients and caregivers.

Results: Exposure-adjusted rates of hospitalization were similar between the ixazomib-Rd and placebo-Rd arms, at 0.530 and 0.564 per patient year (ppy), respectively, as were outpatient visit rates (3.305 and 3.355 ppy). Mean length of hospitalization per patient was 10.0 and 10.8 days, respectively. In both arms, hospitalization and outpatient visit rates were higher in patients with two or three prior lines of treatment (ixazomib-Rd: 0.632 and 3.909 ppy; placebo-Rd: 0.774 and 3.539 ppy) compared with patients with one prior line (ixazomib-Rd: 0.460 and 2.888 ppy; placebo-Rd: 0.436 and 3.243 ppy). Patients and their caregivers who missed any work or other activity missed a median of 7 and 5 days in the ixazomib-Rd arm, respectively, vs 8 and 4 days with placebo-Rd.

Limitations: The study was not powered for a statistical comparison of healthcare resource utilization between treatment arms, nor did it capture costs associated with utilization of the identified healthcare resources.

Conclusions: This pre-specified analysis demonstrated that the all-oral triplet regimen of ixazomib added to Rd did not increase healthcare resource utilization compared with placebo-Rd.     

Menger, Jevons, and Walras Un-homogenized, De-homogenized, and Homogenized: A Comment on Peart

Abstract . Response to Sandra J, Peart, “Jevons and Menger Re-homogenized?: Jaffé After 20 Years,” 1998. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 57(July): 307-325.     

Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation

The rules under which jurisdictions (nations, provinces) can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution, but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best. We stylize this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission: free mobility, admission by majority vote, admission by unanimous consent, admission by a demand threshold for public goods. In a simple model we characterize the equilibria that result from these rules, and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rules will be chosen.