Securitization, Insurance, and Reinsurance

This article considers strengths and weaknesses of reinsurance and securitization in managing insurable risks. Traditional reinsurance operates efficiently in managing relatively small, uncorrelated risks and in facilitating efficient information sharing between cedants and reinsurers. However, when the magnitude of potential losses and the correlation of risks increase, the efficiency of the reinsurance model breaks down, and the cost of capital may become uneconomical. At this juncture, securitization has a role to play by passing the risks along to broader capital markets. Securitization also serves as a complement for reinsurance in other ways such as facilitating regulatory arbitrage and collateralizing low-frequency risks.     

How long do housing cycles last? A duration analysis for 19 OECD countries

This paper analyzes the duration of house price upturns and downturns in the last 40 years for 19 OECD countries. Both upturns and downturns display duration dependence: they are more likely to end as their duration increases. Downturns display also lagged duration dependence: they are less likely to end if the previous upturn was particularly long. These patterns are consistent with a boom-bust view of housing price dynamics, where booms represent departures from fundamentals that are increasingly difficult to sustain and busts serve as readjustment periods. Findings are robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic variables, which allow for the estimation of additional determinants of house price expansions and contractions.     

Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations

This paper studies the effects of analogy-based expectations in static two-player games of incomplete information. Players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy: they bundle states into analogy classes and play best-responses to their opponent's average strategy in those analogy classes. We provide general properties of analogy-based expectation equilibria and apply the model to a variety of well known games. We characterize conditions on the analogy partitions for successful coordination in coordination games under incomplete information [Rubinstein, A., 1989. The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under ‘almost common knowledge’. Amer. Econ. Rev. 79, 385–391], we show how analogy grouping of the receiver may facilitate information transmission in Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk games [Crawford, V.P., Sobel, J., 1982. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50, 1431–1451], and we show how analogy grouping may give rise to betting in zero-sum betting games such as those studied to illustrate the no trade theorem.     

The Exchange Rate Policy of the Euro: A Matter of Size?

This paper analyzes how country size affects exchange rate policy and volatility. A hump shaped relation between exchange rate variability and the size of countries is generated in the theoretical model: exchange rate variability increases with country size for small countries but then decreases for large countries. The paper finds that this theoretical prediction holds well for bilateral exchange rates of the OECD countries in the period between 1980 and 1995 as well as for a subsample of European exchange rates with respect to the dollar. The results suggest that the dollar/euro volability may be lower than the present dollar/DM volatility.J. Japan. Int. Econ., Dec. 1998,12(4), pp. 455–482. CERAS-ENPC, Graduate Institute of International Studies, and CEPR, 28 rue des Saints Pères, Paris 75007, France.Copyright 1998 Academic Press.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers F33, F41, F42.     

Growth, distance to frontier and composition of human capital

We examine the contribution of human capital to economy-wide technological improvements through the two channels of innovation and imitation. We develop a theoretical model showing that skilled labor has a higher growth-enhancing effect closer to the technological frontier under the reasonable assumption that innovation is a relatively more skill-intensive activity than imitation. Also, we provide evidence in favor of this prediction using a panel dataset covering 19 OECD countries between 1960 and 2000 and explain why previous empirical research had found no positive relationship between initial schooling level and subsequent growth in rich countries.     

How to win a decision in a confederation

This paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent states. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority to one of the states through a bidding procedure among the group state members. We identify the following tradeoff: competition among states yields higher transfers to the central authority, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when states negotiate prior to the decision making process. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several heterogeneous states.     

Public pensions and growth

This paper investigates the relationship between the size of an unfunded public pension system and economic growth in an overlapping generation economy, in which altruistic parents finance the education of their children and leave bequests. Unlike the existing literature, we model intergenerational altruism by assuming that children's income during adulthood is an argument of parental utility. Unfunded public pensions can promote growth when families face liquidity constraints preventing them from investing optimally in the education of their children. We consider two alternative ways of financing a public pension system, either by levying social contributions in a lump-sum manner or in proportion to labour income. We find that there is no case for unfunded public pensions in economies where bequests are operative. By contrast, there exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system in economies where bequests are not operative and individuals are sufficiently patient.     

Construction of a state space for interrelated securities with an application to temporary equilibrium theory

Summary We construct an endogenous state space in an exchange economy with possibly infinite horizon. Every period agents trade securities whose payoffs depend on future dividends and asset prices. We reject the perfect foresight assumption on the ground that agents have not only limited knowledge of other individuals' endowments and preferences, but also limited capacity to compute equilibria. We choose instead absence of arbitrage as the principle which allows agents to determine if a system of future prices is possible. We give an alogrithm to compute the set of nonarbitrage prices every period, with both finite and infinite horizon. We then apply this endogenous structure of uncertainty to an infinite horizon temporary equilibrium model.I would like to thank Professor Donald Brown for his constant help and guidance. I have also greatly benefited from helpful discussions with Professors Jacques Drèze, Bernard Dumas, Mordecai Kurz, Carsten Nielsen, Jan Werner, and Ho-Mou Wu.     

A sequential approach to regional integration: The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe

This paper develops a theory of optimal sequencing of regional integration and applies it to the specific question of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the EU. We show that the timing of transition and integration has implications for the long-term trade structure of Europe. In this model the interest to integrate the CEECs comes from harmonization of policies to attract industries. Without integration, European countries will try to inefficiently protect their industries. Because of the transfers implied by the CAP and the Structural Policies, the EU delays enlargement until the CEECs have sufficiently converged. CEECs might at this point prefer to stay outside the EU and attract industries by offering them more generous protection than the EU. Such timing may be inefficient ex ante for all countries because it may prevent full European integration in the long run, inducing firms to relocate outside of the EU and governments in the EU and the CEECs to inefficiently protect industry. During the transition, all countries benefit from regional integration among the CEECs.     

Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation

Game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form. We study learning in such games by using valuation of moves. A valuation for a player is a numeric assessment of her moves that purports to reflect their desirability. We consider a myopic player, who chooses moves with the highest valuation. Each time the game is played, the player revises her valuation by assigning the payoff obtained in the play to each of the moves she has made. We show for a repeated win-lose game that if the player has a winning strategy in the stage game, there is almost surely a time after which she always wins. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1 there is a time after which strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff.