U-shaped relationship between vertical integration and competition: Theory and evidence

This paper considers how competition can affect aggregate innovative activity through its effects on firms' decision whether or not to vertically integrate. A moderate increase in competition enhances innovation incentives and too much competition discourages innovative effort. These effects generate an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation and between competition and the incentive to vertically integrate. Preliminary evidence finds that there is a nonlinear relationship between competition and the propensity of firms to vertically integrate. These results seem to be more consistent with the Property Right Theory of vertical integration than with the Transaction Cost Economics approach.     

Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting

The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium stochastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deterministic general equilibrium models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments (e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than revenue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits). To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first-best.     

LIBERALIZATION OF EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: SECTORAL DYNAMICS AND STRUCTURAL MUTATIONS

ABSTRACT ** :  This contribution intends to draw up an assessment of structural changes in the telecommunications sector impelled by the European policy of liberalization. Deep transformations with contrasted results have occurred. A strong differentiation in offer of services and a considerable fall in cost appears. After a strong growth, however, investment sharply decreased with the financial crisis. Employment has become a variable of adjustment for companies subjected to strong risks due to the economic situation. Lastly, the assertion of the universal service of telecommunications is accompanied by an important reduction of public service missions.     

House Prices and Rents: Microevidence from a Matched Data Set in Central London

I analyze a real estate agency's proprietary dataset containing tens of thousands of housing sale and rental transactions in Central London during the 2006–2012 period. I isolate 1,922 properties that were both sold and rented out within six months and measure their rent‐price ratios. I find that rent‐price ratios are lower for bigger and more central units. These stylized facts are consistent with the user cost formula and reflect differences in maintenance costs, vacancy rates, growth expectations and risk premia.     

Unravelling the JPMorgan spoofing case using particle physics visualization methods

On 29 September 2020, JPMorgan was ordered to pay a settlement of $920.2 million for spoofing the metals and Treasury futures markets from 2008 to 2016. We examine these cases using a visualization method developed in particle physics (CERN) and the messages that the exchange receives about market activity rather than time-based snapshots. This approach allows to examine multiple indicators related to market manipulation and complement existing research methods, thereby enhancing the identification and understanding of, as well as the motivation for, market manipulation. In the JPMorgan cases, we offer an alternative motivation for spoofing than moving the price.     

Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts

We consider contracts for public transport services between a public authority and a transport operator. We build a structural endogenous switching model where the contract choice results from the combined effects of the incentivization scheme aimed at monitoring the operator's efficiency and the political agenda followed by the regulator to account for the voice of private interests. Our results support theoretical predictions as they suggest that cost‐plus contracts entail a higher cost for society than fixed‐price contracts but allow the public authority to leave a rent to a subset of individuals. Accounting for transfers to interest groups in welfare computations reduces the welfare gap between cost‐plus and fixed‐price regimes.     

Reforming the training system in France

The French system of continuing vocational training was set up in 1970 by an intersectoral collective agreement that was then followed by legislation. More than 30 years on, the economic and social context has changed and the system now faces new challenges. In 2001 and again in 2003 the social partners embarked upon new negotiations in a bid to redesign the system. Analysis of the negotiation process and of its outcomes reveals both the persistence of societal characteristics and the emergence of significant innovations, particularly in the individualisation of training. This dual trend is explained by the characteristics of the actors involved as well as by the weakness of the state.     

Further education and training in the french public sector

Since 1989, the French public sector has imitated the private sector's further education and training mechanisms. But today, it seems that just as in the private sector, the training policies in the public sector have severe limitations. Based on a case study of a large public research institute and on a national survey making it possible to compare the private and public sectors, the paper studies the further education and training policies and their links with the organizational needs. In the public sector, the difficult balance between individual's choices and strategic management comes on the one hand from the specificities of the administrative rules of human resource management, and on the other hand from the unions' power and strategies. Faced with new challenges (demographic evolutions, decentralisation, new demands from the users of public services), the French public sector must develop new training policies.     

Temporary bubbles

This article studies the dynamics of an overlapping generations model with capital, money and cash-in-advance constraints. The economy can exhibit two different regimes. In the first one, the cash-in-advance constraint is binding and money is a dominated asset. In the second one, the constraint is strictly satisfied and money has the same return as capital. When the second regime holds on a finite number of periods, we say that the economy experiences a temporary bubble. We prove that temporary bubbles can exist in an economy, which would experience under-accumulation without money. We also show that cyclical bubbles may occur.     

The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects

This paper studies majority voting over quadratic taxation and investigates under which conditions marginal progressivity emerges as a voting outcome. In our model with endogenous income, there is no majority (Condorcet) winning tax schedule. We then investigate less demanding political equilibrium concepts in order to see under which conditions the set of equilibria is composed only of progressive tax functions. We follow three strategies: (i) reduction of the policy space to the tax functions that are ideal for some voter; (ii) elimination of weakly dominated strategies and the use of mixed strategies in a standard Downsian two-party competition game; (iii) assumption that political parties interact repeatedly and care about the size of their majority. Although each approach captures a different aspect of political behavior, they point to the same (simulation-based) conclusion that progressivity is more likely to emerge for most distributions of abilities and that it is actually the only possible voting outcome if the distribution is sufficiently concentrated at the middle.