On the benefits of party competition

We study the role of parties in a citizen-candidate repeated-elections model in which voters have incomplete information. We first identify a novel “party competition effect” in a setting with two opposing parties. Compared with “at large” selection of candidates, party selection makes office-holders more willing to avoid extreme ideological stands, and this benefits voters of all ideologies. We then allow for additional parties. With strategic voting, citizens benefit most when the only two parties receiving votes are more moderate. With sincere voting, even with three parties, extreme parties can thrive at the expense of a middle party; and whether most citizens prefer two or three parties varies with model parameters.     

Commentary: Morality and workability ­ a rejoinder to O'Riordan

This paper is about understanding the rhetoric of precaution and the practice of decision-making in areas of environmental controversy. It untangles the rhetoric, as established in documented agreements referring to precaution, from the constituent ideas that embody it, as characterized by those who deliberate on its application. By analysing the ways in which the rhetoric of precaution is framed within these documents it is possible to identify different elements that make up the principle in theory. By focussing on the constituent ideas behind the precautionary principle it is possible to move forward from the stalemate of rhetoric that could become the focus of attention itself.     

Multistage bilateral bargaining model with incomplete information—A fuzzy approach

The study proposes the implementation of an intermediation model in supply chains, integrating game theory and fuzzy logic, to represent the characteristic aspects of a bilateral bargaining with incomplete information where supplier–customer relationships are indirectly managed by a third party agent.The choice of combining these theories comes out from the necessity of smoothing the peculiar elements of the two analysis tools that, in describing real situations, present many potentialities of reciprocal adaptation. The scope is to combine a formal structure that could figure out the interrelations among actors involved in a strategic decisional context, with a mathematical elaboration of natural imprecision, uncertainty and incompleteness of data and information.The model derives from the theoretic foundation of Spulber [1999. Market Microstructure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK] and Rubinstein [1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50(1), 97–109] that, compared to the classical framework of asymmetric information and bid-spread problem by Harsanyi [1967. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players. I. The basic model. Management Science 14, 159–182], describe the process through the definition of new parameters such as bargaining power and breakdown probability. The contribution to the research is enriched by fuzzyfication process of data, considering Qi et al. [2005. Design retrieval technology of fuzzy customer requirements. In: World Congress on Mass Customization and Personalization] experiences, to build a framework that could transform inputs from the transaction, agents and market in an output that could regulate the possible concessions and the opportunity of accepting or refusing an offer.     

Combination schemes for turning point predictions

We propose new forecast combination schemes for predicting turning points of business cycles. The proposed combination schemes are based on the forecasting performances of a given set of models with the aim to provide better turning point predictions. In particular, we consider predictions generated by autoregressive (AR) and Markov-switching AR models, which are commonly used for business cycle analysis. In order to account for parameter uncertainty we consider a Bayesian approach for both estimation and prediction and compare, in terms of statistical accuracy, the individual models and the combined turning point predictions for the United States and the Euro area business cycles.     

On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets

It is argued that impediments to the establishment of an independent central bank arise in the presence of unstable policy targets. Changing policy targets may occur with an office-motivated policymaker. This differs from politico-economic models where targets change depending on the partisanship of the politicians in office. In the model the principal faces a tradeoff between the credibility benefits of an independent central bank and the flexibility to pursue shifts in his policy targets allowed by a regime of policy discretion. An empirical section addresses the issue of the correlation between central bank independence and the stability of policy targets.     

Measuring Value‐at‐Risk in Project Finance Transactions

Despite the remarkable importance of project finance in international financial markets, no quantitative models to measure and quantify the risk associated with a deal for the project's lenders have been developed yet. The topic has recently become crucial, since the New Basle Capital Accord gives banks a choice of whether to adopt simpler (but possibly higher) standard capital requirements or to develop internal rating models for project finance transactions. The paper proposes how Monte Carlo simulations may be used to derive a Value‐at‐Risk estimate for project finance deals and discusses the critical issues that must be considered when developing such a model.     

Basis Pricing, Futures-Cash Price Transmission and Appropriate Hedge Ratios: The Case of the Soybean Market in Ontario

The academic literature on the determination of risk-minimizing hedge ratios has apparently ignored the potential impact that the pricing strategies adopted by the grain elevators may have on the futures-cash price transmission, and therefore on the determination of the correct hedge ratio. This paper addresses this problem from a theoretical perspective, and then develops a model that is applied to the soybean market in Chatham, Ontario.
La littérature académique concernant la détermination des ratios de couverture à terme minimisant le risque a apparemment ignoré l'impact potential des stratégies des faiseurs de prix sur un marché sur la relation entre les prix spot et les prix à terme. II est possible que de ce fait ces stratégies influencent également la détermination du vrai ratio de couverture. Ce papier traite ce problème d'un point de vue théorique, puis vérifie ces résultats en les appliquant au cas du marché du soja à Chatham, Ontario.     

Disclosure as a tool in stakeholder relations management: a longitudinal study on the Port of Rotterdam

This study applies stakeholder management principles to the port domain. We provide a conceptual framework for evaluating the communication strategies a (landlord) Port Authority (PA) relies on in the management of its relevant stakeholders and the adoption of disclosure to critical issues. The theoretical arguments are supported by empirical evidences from the Port of Rotterdam (PoR), i.e. a major port which leverages disclosure to successfully manage stakeholders and support the implementation of corporate strategy. The research questions are addressed using a content analysis on the annual reports (ARs) of PoR in the period 2000–2012. The overall research design enables the investigation of PA disclosure as a tool for managing the evolving interests of stakeholders from a longitudinal perspective. The PoR case shows that the relative importance of topics reported in the ARs change over time, as a result of external pressures and internal key events. The outcomes demonstrate the growing attention of PoR on topics relevant to the broader community (e.g. environment and safety/security) after a period characterised by a prominent focus on financial and governance issues. Besides, key breakthrough forces stimulating the shifts in landlord communication strategies are identified and discussed. Finally, by suggesting an indirect approach to evaluate how PA prioritises its salient stakeholders, the paper adds to extant port literature and brings methodological implications.     

Testing for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in generalized linear models for panel data

Recent literature on panel data emphasizes the importance of accounting for time-varying unobservable individual effects, which may stem from either omitted individual characteristics or macro-level shocks that affect each individual unit differently. In this paper, we propose a simple specification test of the null hypothesis that the individual effects are time-invariant against the alternative that they are time-varying. Our test is an application of Hausman (1978) testing procedure and can be used for any generalized linear model for panel data that admits a sufficient statistic for the individual effect. This is a wide class of models which includes the Gaussian linear model and a variety of nonlinear models typically employed for discrete or categorical outcomes. The basic idea of the test is to compare two alternative estimators of the model parameters based on two different formulations of the conditional maximum likelihood method. Our approach does not require assumptions on the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, nor it requires the latter to be independent of the regressors in the model. We investigate the finite sample properties of the test through a set of Monte Carlo experiments. Our results show that the test performs well, with small size distortions and good power properties. We use a health economics example based on data from the Health and Retirement Study to illustrate the proposed test.