Judo Strategy: 10 Techniques For Beating A Stronger Opponent

The idea of judo economics, building on analogies with the sport of judo, has been around for at least 20 years. But taking these ideas further to judo strategy means that a framework of strategic principles can be developed to help companies put stronger opponents on the mat.     

Asymmetric performance: the market share impact of scale and link alliances in the global auto industry

This study investigates how participating in strategic alliances with rivals affects the relative competitive positions of the partner firms. The paper builds on studies that show significant differences in the outcomes of scale and link alliances. The study argues that the more asymmetric outcomes of link alliances translate into greater changes in the relative market shares of the partner firms, due to unbalanced opportunities for inter‐partner learning and learning by doing. We find support for this argument by examining 135 alliances among competing firms in the global automobile industry, from 1966 to 1995. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

An Analysis of Differences in Earnings Between Small and Large Commercial Banks

This paper introduces a simple, yet rich, measure of efficiency changes based on the revenue-generating-ability (RGA) principle. Using this principle, we explain the connections between efficiency changes and the variables, such as pretax profits, interest expense, non-interest expense, profit margins, loan loss provision, and asset quality. These connections are used to explain earnings differences between small and large commercial banks.     

Spreads, depths, and the impact of earnings information: an intraday analysis

For a sample of NYSE firms, we show that wide spreads are accompaniedby low depths, and that spreads widen and depths fall in responseto bigger volume. Spreads widen and depths fall in anticipationof earnings announcements; these effects are more pronouncedfor announcements with larger subsequent price changes. Spreadsare also wider following earnings announcements, but this effectdissipates quickly after controlling for volume. Collectively,our results suggest liquidity providers are sensitive to changesin information asymmetry risk and use both spreads and depthsto actively manage this risk.     

Innovative productivity and returns to scale in the pharmaceutical industry

This study shows that firms in the pharmaceutical industry experience decreasing returns to scale in R & D as the level of R & D expenditures rises. The paper presents the results of our study of the innovative output of 16 pharmaceutical firms over a 19 year period. Given the strong correlation between R & D budgets and firm size, our study suggests the wave of mergers in the industry may yield less innovative productivity than managers expect.     

Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.