Repeated interaction in standard setting

Standardization may allow the owners of standard‐essential patents to charge higher royalties than would have been negotiated ex ante. In practice, however, standard‐setting efforts are often characterized by repeated interaction and complementarities among technologies. These features give firms that contribute technology to standards both the ability and the incentive to avoid excessive royalties by threatening to exclude other technology contributors from future rounds of standardization if they charge royalties exceeding ‘fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory’ (FRAND) levels. We show that such an outcome can be sustained as a subgame‐perfect equilibrium of a repeated standard‐setting game and examine how the decision‐making rules of standard‐setting organizations (SSOs) affect the sustainability of FRAND royalties. Our analysis provides a novel justification for super‐majority requirements and other rules frequently adopted by SSOs.     

A unified approach to systemic risk measures via acceptance sets

We specify a general methodological framework for systemic risk measures via multidimensional acceptance sets and aggregation functions. Existing systemic risk measures can usually be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash needed to secure the system after aggregating individual risks. In contrast, our approach also includes systemic risk measures that can be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash that secures the aggregated system by allocating capital to the single institutions before aggregating the individual risks. An important feature of our approach is the possibility of allocating cash according to the future state of the system (scenario‐dependent allocation). We also provide conditions that ensure monotonicity, convexity, or quasi‐convexity of our systemic risk measures.     

Asia's ‘little divergence’ in the twentieth century: evidence from PPP-based direct estimates of GDP per capita, 1913–69

This article uses expenditure-based purchasing power parities (PPPs) to estimate GDP per capita in comparable prices for 12 Asian countries for six benchmark years during the period 1913–69. The article finds that in 1913 levels of real GDP per capita in several countries were comparable to those in Japan. GDP per capita in Japan and other Asian countries diverged during and after the First World War. The article questions whether Asia's ‘little divergence’ between Japan and other Asian countries dates back to the late eighteenth century. It draws attention to the different resource endowments of Japan, China, and India compared to other Asian countries, and their implications for the development trajectories of Asian countries. The article demonstrates that using historical PPP estimates yields estimates of GDP per capita that diverge from those based on retropolations of the single 1990 PPP-converted benchmark year. It concludes that historical estimates of PPPs are needed to confirm analyses of comparative economic performance based on available GDP per capita data.     

Did foreign exchange holding influence growth performance during the global financial crisis?

In a context of increased foreign exchange reserves holding from emerging and developing countries, this paper investigates the diminishing return of reserves holding assumption over the most severe phase of the global financial crisis (2008Q1–2010Q4). Relying on a Panel Smooth Transition Regression model, we highlight the differential effect of the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves for a set of financial vulnerabilities variables. In a specific manner, although reserves accumulation is effective above a critical threshold to cope with vulnerabilities related to the financial channel, we show that it becomes less effective beyond a certain threshold for domestic bank vulnerabilities. Our results are robust to alternative specifications.     

Gender and Promotions: Evidence from Academic Economists in France*

The promotion system for French academic economists provides an interesting environment to examine the promotion gap between men and women. Promotions occur through national competitions for which we have information both on candidates and on those eligible to be candidates. Thus, we can examine the two stages of the process: application and success. Women are less likely to seek promotion, and this accounts for up to 76 percent of the promotion gap. Being a woman also reduces the probability of promotion conditional on applying, although the gender difference is not statistically significant. Our results highlight the importance of the decision to apply.     

Ethnic divisions and the effect of appropriative competition intensity on economic performance

This paper features a growth model with an appropriative contest and a common-pool investment game between politically organised rival ethnic factions. I determine how the long-run equilibrium coalition shapes incentives to invest, show the existence of a unique steady state, and investigate how the ease to capture rents affects economic performance. The use of numerical simulations concerning a global sample of countries demonstrates that contest intensity can sometimes be beneficial, despite wasteful grabbing behaviours, due to a mechanism related to the concentration of power. When rents become easier to capture, dominant groups have an incentive to expand their influence further. This adjustment can be beneficial as these groups contribute most to capital accumulation.     

Natural Disaster Insurance and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off

This article investigates the role of private insurance in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters. We characterize the equity‐efficiency trade‐off faced by the policymakers under imperfect information about individual prevention costs. It is shown that a competitive insurance market with actuarial rate making and compensatory tax‐subsidy transfers is likely to dominate regulated uniform insurance pricing rules or state‐funded assistance schemes. The model illustrates how targeted tax cuts on insurance contracts can improve the incentives to prevention while compensating individuals with high prevention costs. The article highlights the complementarity between individual incentives through tax cuts and collective incentives through grants to the local jurisdictions where risk management plans are enforced.     

Iterated VaR or CTE measures: A false good idea?

The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we consider different risk measures in order to determine the solvency capital requirement of a pension fund. Secondly, we illustrate the impact of the time horizon of long-term guarantee products on these capital. We consider a financial market modelled by a common Black–Scholes–Merton model. We neglect the mortality and underwriting risks by assuming that the pension fund is fully hedged against these risks, which allows us to keep understandable and tractable formulæ (the longevity risk will be a part of future researches). A portfolio is built in this market according to different strategies and the pension fund offers a fixed guaranteed rate on a certain time horizon. We begin with well-known static risk measures (value at risk and conditional tail expectation measures) and then we consider their natural dynamic generalization. In order to be time consistent, we consider their iterated versions by a backward iterations scheme. Within the dynamic setting, we show that solvency capital can be expensive and that attention must be paid to the safety level considered.     

Why not fully spend a conditional block grant?

This paper studies a conditional block grant that Dutch municipalities receive for welfare-to-work programs. Many municipalities do not fully use this grant, although programs are beneficial for them. We argue that municipalities incur expenses to use the grant. If these costs are substantial, then it is optimal not to fully use the grant. Based on municipality-specific data on grants and actual expenditures, we estimate that municipalities have to add about 90 cents from their own resources to spend 1 euro of the grant. As a result, the conditional block grant is de facto a closed-ended matching grant.