Does Central Bank Financial Strength Really Matter for Inflation? The Key Role of the Fiscal Support

This paper examines whether weak central bank finances affect inflation by scrutinizing the key rationale for such a relationship: that the absence of Treasury support makes central bank finances relevant for price stability. Specifically, I ask whether central banks which are not likely to enjoy fiscal support when needed experience higher inflation as their financial situation deteriorates. I find this to be true among a large sample of 82 countries between 1998 and 2008. De facto potential fiscal support appears relevant, while de jure fiscal support, which I survey analyzing 82 central bank laws, does not appear to matter. The results also bring forward an explanation for the conflicting results of the previous empirical studies, which neglected this key component.     

Conjectural variations, symmetric equilibria and economic policy

In this paper, we consider conjectural variations in a simple static general equilibrium model under oligopolistic competition. The modeling of conjectures captures the role played by beliefs in a micro-founded model. So, the economy may have three kinds of symmetric general equilibria. Furthermore, these equilibria can be Pareto-ranked by the conjectural variation parameter. Finally, we consider the implementation of a tax on the strategic behaviors in case of balanced-budget rule. The comparative statics illustrates the idea according to which the effectiveness of the multiplier mechanism to mitigate the market distortions depends on the symmetric equilibrium considered. Therefore, the effect of the tax on the prices and economic activity depends on the degree of market power which is conjectured by the agents.     

Raising Capital in an Insurance Oligopoly Market

We consider an oligopoly market where firms offer insurance coverage against a risk characterised by aggregate uncertainty. Firms behave as if they were risk averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a two-stage game where firms choose their internal capital level at stage one and compete on price at stage two. We characterise the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and focus attention on the strategic impact of insurers capital choice. We discuss the model with regard to the insurance industry specificities and regulation.     

Risk aversion,prudence and temperance: An experiment in gain and loss

We characterize the individual's attitude towards risk, prudence and temperance in the gain and loss domains. We analyze the links between the three features of preferences for a given domain and between domains for each feature of preferences. Consequently, the reflection effect, the mixed risk aversion and the risk apportionment, are key concepts of our study. We also display some determinants for risk aversion, prudence and temperance in each domain. To do this, we conducted a lab experiment with students eliciting risk aversion, prudence and temperance in the two domains, and collected information about each subject's characteristics.     

Implementing the Mortensen rule in a frictional labor market

We show that, in settings where meetings can be multilateral, the allocation rule proposed by Mortensen (1982) can be relatively straightforward to implement: as a local auction conducted by sellers. The implications of using this mechanism in a simple model of the labor market are then explored. We characterize the equilibrium properties of this model, which include wage dispersion, and examine its implied Beveridge curve. A dynamic version of the model is calibrated to the US labor market, and we show that the model can account for observed vacancy rates, given parameters that are chosen to match the average wages and the natural rate of unemployment, although the implied wage dispersion is quite small. Finally, in the limit, as the time between offer rounds in the model approaches zero, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium.     

RESIDUAL WAGE DISPARITY AND COORDINATION UNEMPLOYMENT*

How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high‐ or low‐productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can conduct on‐the‐job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump‐shaped, skewed significantly to the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates residual dispersion statistics 75–90% of those found empirically. However, the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment.     

FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS

We study the optimal design of financial safety nets under limited private credit, asking whether and when it is optimal to restrict ex ante the set of investors that can receive public liquidity support. When the government lacks commitment, we show that the optimally designed safety net covers only a subset of investors. Compared to an economy where all investors are protected, this results in more liquid portfolios, better social insurance, and higher welfare. Our results can rationalize the prevalence of limited safety nets as well as the coexistence of traditional and shadow banks.     

Small transaction costs, absence of arbitrage and consistent price systems

The aim of this note is to establish a criterion of absence of arbitrage opportunities under small transaction costs for a family of multi-asset models of financial markets.     

Understanding the economic determinants of the severity of operational losses: A regularized generalized Pareto regression approach

We investigate a novel database of 10,217 extreme operational losses from the Italian bank UniCredit. Our goal is to shed light on the dependence between the severity distribution of these losses and a set of macroeconomic, financial, and firm‐specific factors. To do so, we use generalized Pareto regression techniques, where both the scale and shape parameters are assumed to be functions of these explanatory variables. We perform the selection of the relevant covariates with a state‐of‐the‐art penalized‐likelihood estimation procedure relying on L₁‐penalty terms. A simulation study indicates that this approach efficiently selects covariates of interest and tackles spurious regression issues encountered when dealing with integrated time series. Lastly, we illustrate the impact of different economic scenarios on the requested capital for operational risk. Our results have important implications in terms of risk management and regulatory policy.