Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis

This article investigates whether the passage and the implementationof the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) drove firms out of thepublic capital market. To control for other factors affectingexit decisions, we examine the post-SOX change in the propensityof American public targets to be bought by private acquirersrather than public ones with the corresponding change for foreignpublic targets, which were outside the purview of SOX. Our findingsare consistent with the hypothesis that SOX induced small firmsto exit the public capital market during the year followingits enactment. In contrast, SOX appears to have had little effecton the going-private propensities of larger firms. (JEL G30,G34, G38, K22)     

The impact of EU accession on Turkish industrial relations and social dialogue

This article examines whether the European Union membership process is transforming the ‘deep structure’ of Turkish industrial relations. We make an attempt to illustrate this through the prism of Turkish experience in social dialogue regarded as an indispensable tool of the European social model. Turkish industrial relations is characterised by restrictive labour laws, employer hostility to unionisation, a large informal economy and labour market, and strong state intervention, which have historically constituted the main elements of ‘the deep structure’ of Turkish industrial relations. In procedural terms, the institutions for social dialogue have been established but the influence of the social partners is limited because of the dominance of the state and the weakness of labour. The existing attempts at developing social dialogue rest on shaky foundations emanating mostly from the state's and employers' disrespect of basic labour rights.     

The cost of operational risk loss insurance

Using the Algo FIRST operational risk database, this paper computes the cost of operational risk loss insurance for a sample of banks over a 1-year horizon. The estimated cost of 1-year operational risk loss insurance for an average bank is 1.24% as a percentage of firm value on December 31, 2006, while an average AA bank is 0.24%. These estimates far exceed the typical 1-year default insurance premiums as reflected in market CDS rates for similarly rated banks. These insurance premiums confirm the economic importance of operational risk in the management of financial institutions.     

Practices for managing information flows within organizations

Firm organization determines how coworkers communicate and howinformation flows within the firm. Banking, accounting, consulting,and legal firms process proprietary information which theirclients wish to protect. The firm's ability to safeguard andmanage information determines its market demand. Yet employeesmay leak and otherwise abuse information to enhance their personalperformance and wealth. This article analyzes how bureaucraciesare erected within the firm to control information flows andprotect clients.     

Costs of a missing FTA: the case of Turkey and Algeria

Turkey has been deeply integrated with the EU, its largest trading partner, particularly following the Customs Union agreement in 1996. However, the free trade agreements (FTAs) signed by the EU with third party countries may create some unfair competitive pressures, market share and welfare losses for Turkey. This study investigates the impact of the FTA signed by Algeria and the EU in 2005 on Turkey’s trade flows. Covering 181 countries, a difference-in-differences analysis embedded in an extended gravity framework is employed to quantify the trade effects of the EU-Algeria FTA for the period of 1996–2013. Our findings suggest that bilateral trade between Turkey and Algeria is affected adversely due to the FTA. The counterfactual analysis shows that Turkish exports and imports to/from Algeria could have been 12 and 17% higher, respectively, had there been no FTA between the EU and Algeria.     

Estimating Default Probabilities Implicit in Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS)

This paper uses a structural credit risk model, providing an analytical formula to estimate default probabilities implicit in commercial mortgage backed security prices. Empirical studies of CMBS default have focused on the probability of default depending on loan characteristics at the origination and market indices. Recent studies show that unobservable current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is a key state variable driving default. We update this variable using Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) property-type indices over time. Later, we employ first passage time approach to study CMBS default using implied LTV.

Social network design for inducing effort

Quantitative Marketing and Economics - Many companies create and manage communities where consumers observe and exchange information about the effort exerted by other consumers. Such communities...     

Geographic Deregulation and Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on state‐level competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976‐2005. The empirical results confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined. After partitioning the sample based on bank size we find that the market competition for large banks in Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island can be characterized as monopolistic while small banks in Arizona and Massachusetts seem to have operated under the conditions of perfect competition. The removal of geographic restrictions appears to have very limited and non‐uniform effect on state‐level competitive conduct. There is some evidence that the U.S. banking industry might have actually experienced a less competitive behavior in recent years due to increased market power of larger banks.     

Growing with the market: How changing conditions during market growth affect formation and evolution of interfirm ties

Research Summary: Market conditions are known to matter for firm performance and growth. This study explores how changing levels of uncertainty and competition affect interfirm ties of entrepreneurial firms as markets transition from nascent to growth stage. Tracing six entrepreneurial game publishers during the growth stage of the U.S. wireless gaming market, the findings reveal that in a growth stage market, as uncertainty decreases, certain ties of entrepreneurial firms are terminated. First, existing partners may cut ties and become competitors after entering the market directly. This is a “winner's curse” as more successful firms are more likely to entice their partners to enter the market directly. Second, ties may be terminated as prominent firms that are “overwhelmed” with too many partners cut ties with low to mediocre performance, while their remaining partners enter a positive spiral of tie strength and performance. Finally, as uncertainty decreases, new firms may enter the market as competitors to prominent firms. While entrepreneurial firms with high‐ and low‐performing ties to prominent partners may find ties with these new entrants attractive, those with mediocre ties to few prominent partners find this move too risky and wait for a first mover to legitimate it. Overall, the findings show that changing levels of uncertainty and competition in growth stage markets can have different consequences for firms due to heterogeneity in their ties and power relative to partners. The findings provide several contributions to literature regarding the relationship among interfirm ties, firm performance, and market evolution. Managerial Summary: Based on interviews at six entrepreneurial game publishers in the United States and their partners, this study shows how changing levels of uncertainty and competition in growing markets can have different consequences for firms based on the different types of alliances in their portfolio and their power relative to partners. The findings highlight the importance of managing partners differently based on alliance type and goal of the partner. They advocate remaining flexible in alliance management as information asymmetries, intentions and bargaining power of partners can change and lead to abrupt alliance dissolution. They show that alliance portfolio management goes beyond a firm's capability of managing individual alliances, and provide a tool for managers to evaluate their alliance portfolios and take the necessary precautions.