Fiscal policy, distortionary taxation, and direct crowding out under monopolistic competition

A simple macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition onthe goods market is developed which displays Keynesian features.The model is used to study the effects of a rise in public spendingon national income. The model extends the literature in twodirections. Fust, we assume that the government balances itsbudget by employing distortionary income taxation. Second, weallow for direct crowding out since public consumption entersprivate utility in a non-separable fashion. With upward dopinglabour supply, an increase in public spending depresses nationalincome, more so in the long run than in the short run.     

Second-Best Renewable Subsidies to De-carbonize the Economy: Commitment and the Green Paradox

Climate change must deal with two market failures: global warming and learning by doing in renewable energy production. The first-best policy consists of an aggressive renewables subsidy in the near term and a gradually rising and falling carbon tax. Given that global carbon taxes remain elusive, policy makers might have to rely on a second-best subsidy only. With credible commitment the second-best subsidy is higher than the social benefit of learning to cut the transition time and peak warming close to first-best levels at the cost of higher fossil fuel use in the short run (weak Green Paradox). Without commitment the second-best subsidy is set to the social benefit of learning. It generates smaller weak Green Paradox effects, but the transition to the carbon-free takes longer and cumulative carbon emissions are higher. Under first best and second best with pre-commitment peak warming is 2.1–2.3 \(^{\circ }\)C, under second best without commitment 3.5 \(^{\circ }\)C, and without any policy 5.1 \(^{\circ }\)C above pre-industrial levels. Not being able to commit yields a welfare loss of 95% of initial GDP compared to first best. Being able to commit brings this figure down to 7%.     

Consequences of Environmental Tax Reform for Unemployment and Welfare

We investigate the welfare effects of environmental tax reform, i.e. raising environmental taxes and using the proceeds to reduce distortionary taxes on labour. The framework of analysis is a small open economy with involuntary unemployment due to a rigid consumer wage. Environmental tax reform boosts not only environmental quality but also employment if substitution between labour and resources is easy, the production share of the fixed factor is large, and the initial tax rates on resources and profits are small. If the initial tax system is sub-optimal with a negligible tax on resources, profits rise as well.     

Political economy of prudent budgetary policy

The principles of tax smoothing and public debt management with stochastic shocks to future national income are extended for prudence. A prudent government deliberately underestimates future national income and the tax base, especially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting the tax base are large and the tax rate is high. As a precaution the tax rate is thus set higher and public spending lower to build precautionary buffers. This leads to gradual reductions in debt and debt service over time and thus, depending on political preferences, cuts in taxes or increases in public spending. Prudence offsets the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from common-pool distortions. Appointing a strong finance minister with as many voting rights as the spending ministers combined ensures that the intratemporal common-pool distortions of an excessively large public sector are eliminated. A strong and prudent minister of finance can thus offset the impatient profligacy of squabbling spending ministers. However, if voters care about outcomes on election eve, finance ministers are tempted to build excessive precautionary buffers early on to dish out tax cuts and boost spending on election eve. Too much prudence may thus be abused for short-run electoral gains.     

Does a nutritious diet cost more in food deserts?

Food deserts and their potential effects on diet and nutrition have received much attention from policymakers. While some research has found a correlation between food deserts and consumer outcomes, it is unclear whether food deserts truly affect consumer choices. In this article, we compare food prices in food deserts, defined as low‐income, low‐access census tracts, and nonfood deserts to observe whether and to what extent consumers face higher prices for a complete diet in food deserts. If a nutritionally complete diet costs significantly more in food deserts, resident consumers may be constrained from consuming healthier foods. We use store‐level scanner data from a nationally representative sample and calculate a census‐tract level Exact Price Index (EPI) based on a food basket defined by the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP). The EPI addresses potential biases from both product heterogeneity and variety availability. We find that the overall price impact of living in a food desert is small; low‐access areas have only 3.5% higher EPI than high‐access counterparts. However, consumers who are constrained to shop within their own census tracts face a much higher EPI than high‐access counterparts (9.2%). The higher EPI primarily comes from lower variety availability in food deserts.     

Rapacious Resource Depletion,Excessive Investment and Insecure Property Rights: A Puzzle

For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The theory suggests that power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. Also, adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving. Since our theory suggests that genuine saving is zero while empirically they are negative in resource-rich, fractionalized countries, we suggest ways of resolving this puzzle.     

Do Natural Resources Depress Income Per Capita?

Most evidence for the resource curse comes from cross‐country growth regressions suffers from bias originating from the high and ever‐evolving volatility in commodity prices. These issues are addressed by providing new cross‐country empirical evidence for the effect of resources in income per capita. Natural resource dependence (resource exports) has a significant negative effect on income per capita, especially in countries with bad rule of law or bad policies, but these results weaken substantially once we allow for endogeneity. However, the more exogenous measure of resource abundance (stock of natural capital) has a significant negative effect on income per capita even after controlling for geography, rule of law and de facto or de jure trade openness. Furthermore, this effect is more severe for countries that have little de jure trade openness. These results are robust to using alternative measures of institutional quality (expropriation and corruption instead of rule of law).