Unionized Bertrand Duopoly and Strategic Export Policy

The paper reports that an export subsidy is optimal for a unionized Bertrand duopoly. Following results published by Brander and Spencer ( Journal of International Economics , 1988, pp. 217–34), this establishes the robustness of export subsidization to the mode of competition (Cournot or Bertrand), and contrasts with nonunion results in the literature. If both firms are unionized and both governments pursue active trade policies, a subsidy remains optimal except for a narrow range of extreme substitutability between products. Nations with a lower opportunity cost of labor employ more aggressive policies in equilibrium.     

Corporate Governance in India

The Indian corporate governance system has both supported and held back India's ascent to the top ranks of the world's economies. While on paper the country's legal system provides some of the best investor protection in the world, enforcement is a major problem, with overburdened courts and significant corruption. Ownership remains concentrated and family business groups continue to be the dominant business model, with significant pyramiding and evidence of tunneling activity that transfers cash flow and value from minority to controlling shareholders. But for all its shortcomings, Indian corporate governance has taken major steps toward becoming a system capable of inspiring confidence among institutional and, increasingly, foreign investors. The Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI), which was established as part of the comprehensive economic reforms launched in 1991, has made considerable progress in becoming a rigorous regulatory regime that helps ensure transparency and fair practice. And the National Stock Exchange of India, also established as part of the reforms, now functions with enough efficiency and transparency to be generating the third‐largest number of trades in the world, just behind the NASDAQ and NYSE. Among more recent changes, the enactment of Sarbanes—Oxley type measures in 2004—which includes protections for minority shareholders in family‐ or “promoter”‐led businesses—has contributed to recent increases in institutional and foreign stock ownership. And while family‐ and government‐controlled business groups continue to be the rule, India has also seen the rise of successful companies like Infosys that are free of the influence of a dominant family or group and have made the individual shareholder their central governance focus.     

Volunteer tourism and “The White Man’s Burden”: globalization of suffering,white savior complex,religion and modernity

While many volunteer tourism studies have acknowledged the significance of volunteer tourism and challenged conventional understandings of socio-economic change in the Global South, the ways in which ideas about globalization of suffering and religion and modernity flow through volunteer tourism and development discourses are rarely spoken about. Utilizing postcolonialism and whiteness studies theoretical framework, this study intends to take volunteer tourism research into a different trajectory by arguing that much like imperialism is operationalized through different kinds of institutional power (agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank), similarly volunteer tourism exerts power and exploits the Orient as the West’s pleasure periphery. Taking the case of Mother Teresa, this study also argues that Christian ideologies, which were so dominant during the colonial days, continue to pervade the structures and institutions in society with similar hegemonic connotations of privilege based on religion and race. Future tourism scholars should investigate these remarkable yet somewhat ignored issues in contemporary volunteer tourism practices.     

Monitoring process quality in off-shore outsourcing: A model and findings from multi-country survey

We investigate how recent advances in information technology and telecommunications have led to real-time monitoring of processes at the site of the provider by a buyer located across the globe. We construct a game-theoretic model of the dynamics of the buyer–supplier interaction in the presence of moral hazard and incomplete contracting. We derive the Minimum Quality Threshold (MQT) below which the provider's output will certainly be inspected. Our findings show that the buyer can pick a level of monitoring and thereby force the provider to exceed the quality level of the MQT in output quality and avoid costly and wasteful inspection. Finally, our model explains why the production of processes that are complex and more prone to errors are actually monitored less by the buyers. We furnish the results of a comprehensive, multi-year, multi-country survey of the efficacy of monitoring in off-shore outsourcing projects and demonstrate strong empirical support for the findings of the model.     

Will African Agriculture Survive Climate Change?

Measurement of the likely magnitude of the economic impact ofclimate change on African agriculture has been a challenge.Using data from a survey of more than 9,000 farmers across 11African countries, a cross-sectional approach estimates howfarm net revenues are affected by climate change compared withcurrent mean temperature. Revenues fall with warming for drylandcrops (temperature elasticity of –1.9) and livestock (–5.4),whereas revenues rise for irrigated crops (elasticity of 0.5),which are located in relatively cool parts of Africa and arebuffered by irrigation from the effects of warming. At first,warming has little net aggregate effect as the gains for irrigatedcrops offset the losses for dryland crops and livestock. Warming,however, will likely reduce dryland farm income immedia-tely.The final effects will also depend on changes in precipitation,because revenues from all farm types increase with precipitation.Because irrigated farms are less sensitive to climate, wherewater is available, irrigation is a practical adaptation toclimate change in Africa.     

Cross‐border Lobbying in Preferential Trading Agreements: Implications for External Tariffs and Welfare

This paper examines the effect of cross‐border lobbying on domestic lobbying and on external tariffs in both Customs Union (CU) and Free Trade Area (FTA). We do so by developing a two‐stage game which endogenizes the tariff formation function in a political economic model of the directly unproductive rent‐seeking activities type. We find that cross‐border lobbying un‐ambiguously increases both domestic lobbying and the equilibrium common external tariffs in a CU. The same result also holds for FTA provided tariffs for the member governments are strategic complements. We also develop a specific oligopolistic model of FTA and show that tariffs are indeed strategic complements in such a model.     

Illegal immigration: a supply side analysis

"This paper analyzes the supply-side determinants of illegal immigration using a three-sector general equilibrium model of the source country. Agricultural liberalization raises illegal immigration while liberalization of the high tech sector reduces it. In contrast, capital mobility in the source country renders trade policy ineffective for controlling illegal immigration. Paradoxically, increased enforcement (by the host country) may raise source country unskilled wages, although illegal immigration falls. Finally, under capital mobility, a rise in the source country restrictions on capital inflow raises the level of illegal immigration and reduces the effectiveness of border enforcement efforts by the host country."     

Demand Aggregation and the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference

We address the problem of aggregating demand across a group of consumers, who are identical in terms of wealth and face identical price vectors, but vary in their chosen consumption bundles. We show that, when a stochastic demand function is constructed to aggregate a number of deterministic demand functions, satisfaction of the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference by this stochastic demand function is weaker than the restriction that every underlying deterministic demand function satisfy Samuelson's weak axiom of revealed preference. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D11.     

A general revealed preference theorem for stochastic demand behavior

Summary. We present a general revealed preference theorem concerning stochastic choice behavior by consumers. We show that, when the consumer spends her entire wealth, the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference due to Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999) is equivalent to a restriction on stochastic demand behavior that we call stochastic substitutability. We also show that the relationship between the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and Samuelson's inequality in the deterministic theory, and the main result of Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999) are both special cases of our result.Received: 10 September 2001, Revised: 4 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D11. Correspondence to: Prasanta K. PattanaikOur greatest debt is to the referee of this paper, who made numerous helpful suggestions. We thank Robin Cubitt, Kunal Sengupta and seminar audiences at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Indian Statistical Institute, University of East Anglia, Universidad Carlos III, University of Essex and University of Montreal for their helpful comments. Prasanta K. Pattanaik acknowledges his intellectual debt to Salvador Barbera, Tapas Majumdar and Amartya Sen.     

Adaptive two-treatment two-period crossover design for binary treatment responses

Adaptive designs are sometimes used in a phase III clinical trial with the aim, of allocating a larger number of patients to the better treatment. In the present paper, we use some adaptive designs in a two-treatment two-period crossover design where the treatment responses are binary. We use some simple designs to choose between the possible treatment combinations AA, AB, BA or BB. The goal is to use the better treatment a larger proportion of times. We calculate the allocation proportions to the possible treatment combinations and their standard deviations. We also study related inferential problems. Related asymptotics are derived. The proposed procedure is compared with some possible competitors. Finally, we use real data to illustrate the applicability of our proposed design.