Decreasing absolute prudence: Characterization and applications to second-best risk sharing

In this paper, we provide two basic properties of utility functions u which exhibit decreasing absolute prudence i.e. (− u/u″)′ ≤ 0. These properties are used to examine the allocation of risks in an economy when some agents bear non-transferable risks. We show that it is fair Pareto-efficient to let those with a non-transferable risk bear relatively less of the transferable risk in the economy if and only if absolute prudence is decreasing. In another model, there is a complete set of contingent markets, but some agents have no direct access to them. We examine the fair efficient allocation of risk in a pool gathering a trader and a non-trader. Decreasing absolute prudence provides an upper bound to the share of the pool's risk that should be borne by the trader.     

On a use of stratified sampling in optimal estimation

Summary Postulating an intra-class correlation structure for a finite population vector of variate — values optimal stratified and unstratified strategies for estimating the total are identified and relative efficiencies noted. Higher efficiency of stratified over unstratified sampling is demonstrated for usual estimators in ppswr case, in particular. In the uncorrelated case appropriately chosen two-stage strategies are observed to fare at par with optimal stratified ones.     

Investment Decisions,Financial Flows,and Self‐Enforcing Contracts*

This article studies the role of risk sharing in dynamic credit relationships that are secured by physical collateral. It is shown that, when borrowers and lenders cannot commit not to terminate relationships (through default in the first case and liquidation in the second), overinvestment is optimal. Overinvestment facilitates risk sharing in this context: It occurs in expectation of periods in which lenders are unwilling to supply all the funds necessary to achieve complete risk sharing. Typically, overinvestment happens when investment decreases; it slows down the pace at which the capital stock is reduced and therefore results in production smoothing.     

Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution

We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economies such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty trap in which output converges asymptotically to zero. These results indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D50, O41.     

Unemployment insurance and union bargaining — an insider-outsider approach

A trade union is required to tax its own members to fund unemployment benefit paid to its unemployed members in an insider-outsider model of union bargaining over wages and employment. An increase in unemployment benefit imposed by the government increases employment overall but not necessarily the employment of insiders if the tax rate is exogenously fixed by the government.This paper has benefited from comments of Mick Common, Dipak Ghosh, Bob Hart, and Robin Ruffell. The comments of two anonymous referees and the advice of the Editor have greatly improved the presentation of the paper. Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.     

Der Beitrag kontrolltheoretischer Methoden zur Analyse der Stabilisationspolitik

Ohne ZusammenfassungFür Anregungen und Unterstützung danke ich besonders den Herren Professoren Abele (Universität Freiburg/Schweiz), Tintner (TU Wien), Aoki (Universität Urbana/Illinois, USA) und Ferschl (Universität Wien); für allenfalls verbleibende Irrtümer bleibe ich selbst verantwortlich.     

Welfare Measurement and Measurement Error

The approximate effects of measurement error on a variety of measures of inequality and poverty are derived. They are shown to depend on the measurement error variance and functionals of the error–contaminated income distribution, but not on the form of the measurement error distribution, and to be accurate within a rich class of error–free income distributions and measurement error distributions. The functionals of the error–contaminated income distribution that approximate the measurement error induced distortions can be estimated. So it is possible to investigate the sensitivity of welfare measures to alternative amounts of measurement error and, when an estimate of the measurement error variance is available, to calculate corrected welfare measures. The methods are illustrated in an application using Indonesian household expenditure data.     

Gold,liquidity and secured loans in a multistage economy Part I: Gold as money

This work relates to Department of the Navy Contract N00014-86-K0220 issued by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR 047-006. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the Government, and no official endorsement should be inferred. Revised with support of NSF contract SES-8812051.The United States Government has at least a royalty-free, non-exclusive and irrevocable license throughout the world for Government purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver, perform, dispose of, and to authorize others so to do, all or any portion of this work.     

Karoushi: Stress-death and the meaning of work

The present article is concerned with some of the human factors involved when overtime and overwork become part of the regular and accepted pattern of work, with sometimes tragic results. While the economic miracle of Japan can be much admired, it has not been without human cost. Only recently, national and global attention is being focused on a new and deadly phenomenon in Japan:Karoushi, which the Japanese define as death from overwork, and which I choose to re-define as stress-death related to feelings of helplessness.It is my tentative hypothesis thatkaroushi is not directly caused by overwork, as popularly assumed. Rather, I believe that overwork is only one factor, and that stress-death is actually caused by the cumulative, long-range effects of working in a situation where one feels trapped and powerless to effect any change for the better, which in turn leads to attitudes of hopelessness — attitudes which are exacerbated, rather than ameliorated, by environmental and managerial factors.Dr. Walter Tubbs received his Ph.D. in Neuropsychology and Philosophy after doing work at Stanford and Drew Universities. After involvement in brain research at Stanford, he practiced stress-management counseling and biofeedback training at Loma Linda University, and taught for 13 years at the University of Redlands in California. He has been in Japan for 11 years as a Senior Researcher.