Unemployment compensation and episodes of nonemployment

This paper examines the influence of unemployment insurance (UI) on the length of nonemployment spells experienced by young workers. The analysis introduces a flexible duration model to estimate the effects of the weekly benefit amount and weeks of eligibility on the amount of time spent between jobs by men, distinguishing between the experiences of UI and non-UI recipients. The empirical findings suggest three conclusions: (1) UI recipients experience longer spells of nonemployment than their non-UI recipient counterparts, at least up to the point of exhaustion of UI benefits; (2) the level of the weekly benefit amount does not significantly affect the length of nonemployment spells; and (3) increasing the number of weeks of eligibility offered by a UI program leads to longer episodes of nonemployment.     

The Distribution of Multifamily Mortgage Originations: What We Know and Why We Care

Three policy-relevant questions about multifamily mortgage originations (MFOs) are addressed. First, what is the annual volume of MFOs? This analysis highlights differences and problems among three publicly available multifamily lending surveys; the 1993 volume is estimated at $30 billion. Second, what is the size distribution of multifamily mortgages? Using kernel density estimation, variation in this distribution among central cities and suburbs, underserved areas, and lender type is examined. Third, what are the primary determinants of the variation in multifamily lending? A relatively simple regression model is estimated to shed light on the variables most highly correlated with multifamily lending. Tract income relative to MSA median income and minority concentrations are shown to be highly correlated with lending volume, but the largest source of variation is the number of multifamily rental units in the tract.     

INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: GOING BY THE BOOK

In the U.S., and increasingly in other countries as well, IPO securities are marketed to investors in a process known as "book-building"—one that amounts to polling institutional investors to establish a demand schedule for the issue and then allotting stock to individual investors according to the strength of their professed interest. Although book-building methods require use of discriminatory tactics that have attracted strong criticism from investors and regulators, this article defends such practices by demonstrating that book-building is more efficient than alternative methods. It effectively allows issuers to increase the net proceeds of their offerings by making better use of information about market demand conditions.
In the process of explaining the efficiency of the book-building method, this article also offers a plausible explanation for a phenomenon that has long puzzled economists: the systematic underpricing of IPOs. The key to the success of a book-building effort lies in the use of a strategic pricing and allocation policy designed to offset the investor's incentive to understate his or her interest in an IPO. By committing to favor investors who provide strong indications of interest with relatively large allocations of underpriced shares, the investment bank can limit the distortion of investor's incentives in bidding and so increase the level of proceeds the issuing firm can expect to generate from its IPO.     

Endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives

If banks have an informational monopoly about their clients,borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploitedvia high interest rates in the future. Banks can correct thisincentive problem by committing to share private informationwith other lenders. The fiercer competition triggered by informationsharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks.But, provided banks retain an initial informational advantage,their current profits are raised by the borrowers' higher effort.This trade-off determines the banks' willingness to share information.Their decision affects credit market competition, interest rates,volume of lending, and social welfare.     

A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLOSED-END FUND DISCOUNTS AND EXPENSES

In this paper the role of expenses in explaining closed-end fund discounts is re-examined. A present value model is developed to illustrate the relationship between expenses and discounts. Earlier studies find that discounts are not related to management fees. In this paper, using a larger sample over a longer and different period and a better specification of the expense variable consistent with the model developed, discounts are found to be significantly related to expenses. The relationship between expenses and discounts holds in the presence of other control variables.