Über die Existenz einer stetigen,reellenNutzenfunktion

Ohne ZusammenfassungHerrn Prof. J. Nitsche (Freiburg) danke ich für die kritische Durchsicht einer ersten Fassung des Manuskriptes, ebenso danke ich Prof. Robert Reichardt (Wien) für einige kritische Anmerkungen. Für mögliche Fehler bleibe ich jedoch allein verantwortlich.     

Dynamic effects of externalities,optimal saving and economic growth

Conclusion Recognizing the fact that provision of mixed public goods can result in both consumption externalities of the Samuelsonian variety as well as production externalities we set out to extend the earlier results of Rao and Kalpagam (1977) on the effect of public goods on economic growth. In so doing, we considered three standard specifications of production externalities and enlarged the concept of consumption displacement. Our basic conclusion is that the results of our earlier paper remain valid under the more general conditions set out in this paper.     

On the theory of macroeconomic quasi-equilibria

Conclusion It has been shown that for the Classical System a quasi-equilibrium cannot exist, unless we make the ad hoc assumption of inflexible nominal wages⁸. The equilibrium in the classical regime corresponds to the general competitive equilibrium, and of course the validity of Walras' Law cannot be questioned. At the same time, however, it has been shown that to extend these conclusions to the Keynesian system as well is not justified. The Keynesian system has, in general, a quasi-equilibrium. The model constructed in this paper and the resulting conclusions are significant because the model: (a) Incorporates the Keynesian notion of effective demand, which includes the demand for capital goods (investment) as being performed by a group of people distinct from the consumers (and so, answering Negishi's point, there is a prince in Hamlet!), (b) Unlike other models (like the recent paper by Glustoff), it does not rely on nominal wage rigidity to explain unemployment, but instead, again answering Negishi's remark, it explains rather than postulates why real wages do not adjust in the presence of unemployment so as to eliminate it. (c) It verifies the validity of Clower's proposition that in the Keynesian System Walras' Law holds only in equilibrium. (d) It reconsiles Bent Hansen's original quasi-equilibrium model with the Keynesian proposition of an unemployment equilibrium, against the apparent view of Hansen that to do that would require the assumption of a Phillips curve, a view also shared by Arrow and Hahn, and many others.An earlier version of this paper was presented in the December 1974 meeting of the Econometric Society in San Francisco. The author wishes to thank Prof. R. Clower, Prof. B. Hansen, Prof. S. Black, and Dr. G. Winckler for their valuable comments, but he obviously claims any errors for himself.     

Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality

The methodological ideal of experimentalists, E, is easily stated: derive a testable hypothesis, H, from a well-specified theory, T; implement experiments with a design; implicitly in the latter are auxiliary hypotheses, A, that surface in the review/discussion of completed research reports (payoffs are 'adequate,' Ss are 'relevant,' instructions, context are 'clear,' etc.). We want to be able to conclude, if statistical test outcomes support not-H, that T is 'falsified.' But this is not what we do; rather we ask if there is a flaw in the test, i.e. not-A is supported, and we do more experiments. This is good practice—much better than the statistical rhetoric of falsificationism. Undesigned social processes allow E to accumulate technical and instrumental knowledge that drive the reduction of experimental error and constitute a more coherent methodology than falsificationism.     

Der Beitrag kontrolltheoretischer Methoden zur Analyse der Stabilisationspolitik

Ohne ZusammenfassungFür Anregungen und Unterstützung danke ich besonders den Herren Professoren Abele (Universität Freiburg/Schweiz), Tintner (TU Wien), Aoki (Universität Urbana/Illinois, USA) und Ferschl (Universität Wien); für allenfalls verbleibende Irrtümer bleibe ich selbst verantwortlich.     

The relationship between technology and science: Some historical and philosophical reflections. Part I

This essay offers a detailed review of the literature on the relationship between technology and science. It is in two parts. Part I begins by describing science and technology, and the differences between them. It then discusses the commonly-held technology-as-applied-science (TAS) view; the origins of this view, the support for it, and the strong historical and philosophical challenges to it, beginning more than half a century ago, are explored. The development of the steam engine is then offered as a brief case study to illustrate that science-technology relations are more complex than implied by the TAS view. Part I concludes with a consideration of ontological arguments supporting the reverse view, namely that technology is often a necessary precursor to science.Part II, to be published in a following issue, explores some of the consequences of the TAS view. One consequence is that it has generated a story-line in which scientific ideas are emphasised and other factors necessary for technological innovation have been down-played. Another consequence is that, even in cases where technology does apply scientific knowledge, the process of application is often considered obvious; the difficulties of translating ideas into artefacts may not be appreciated. The essay argues for the telling of a more complex story of science-technology relations, one which recognises their historical independence in the past, and their mutual, two-way interaction in many modern fields of endeavour. It concludes with a consideration of some economic and educational implications.