Estimating nonlinear time-series models using simulated vector autoregressions

This paper develops two new methods for conducting formal statistical inference in nonlinear dynamic economic models. The two methods require very little analytical tractability, relying instead on numerical simulation of the model's dynamic behaviour. Although one of the estimators is asymptotically more efficient than the other, a Monte Carlo study shows that, for a specific application, the less efficient estimator has smaller mean squared error in samples of the size typically encountered in macroeconomics. The estimator with superior small sample performance is used to estimate the parameters of a real business cycle model using observed US time-series data.     

WARRANT PRICING USING OBSERVABLE VARIABLES

The classical warrant pricing formula requires knowledge of the firm value and of the firm‐value process variance. When warrants are outstanding, the firm value itself is a function of the warrant price. Firm value and firm‐value variance are then unobservable variables. I develop an algorithm for pricing warrants using stock prices, an observable variable, and stock return variance. The method also enables estimation of firm‐value variance. A proof of existence of the solution is provided.     

An Experimental Investigation of Increased Professional Education Requirements*

Abstract. We experimentally investigate the effects of a mandatory increase in education on the market for professional labor services when several service qualities are assumed to exist. We show that when suppliers have insufficient incentives to offer high-quality services in a free market, an increase in mandatory education can improve the coordination of supplier decisions and increase efficiency. If suppliers voluntarily provide a sufficient quantity of high-quality services, an education constraint can have the opposite effect. In both instances, however, an increase in the mandatory level of education can be expected to reduce the price of high-quality services while increasing the price of lower service qualities. Résumé. Les auteurs ont procédé à une analyse expérimentale des conséquences qu'aurait une hausse imposée du niveau d'études sur le marché des services professionnels, si l'on suppose l'existence de plusieurs qualités de services. L'analyse démontre que lorsque les stimulants sont insuffisants pour inciter les fournisseurs à offrir des services professionnels de qualité supérieure dans un marché libre, une hausse imposée du niveau d'études peut améliorer la coordination des décisions des fournisseurs et augmenter l'efficience. Si toutefois les fournisseurs offrent de leur propre chef une quantité suffisante de services de qualité supérieure, le fait d'imposer un niveau d'études supérieur peut avoir l'effet contraire. Dans les deux cas, on peut s'attendre à ce qu'une hausse du niveau d'études obligatoire réduise le prix des services de qualité supérieure tout en augmentant le prix des services de qualité plus faible.     

Golden Parachutes: Incentive Aligners,Management Entrenchers,or Takeover Bid Signals?

In this paper we investigate the effect of golden parachute (GP) adoptions on shareholder wealth. We control for the potential effect a GP adoption has on the probability that a firm will receive a takeover bid by investigating the wealth effects for firms that are in play when the GP is adopted. We find that announcements are wealth neutral when firms are in play and wealth increasing when firms are not in play when a GP is adopted. The results suggest that GPs have no influence on the success of a tender offer, refuting the hypotheses that they either align manager and shareholder interests or that they entrench inefficient managers. The difference in the results for in-play and not-in-play firms is consistent with the hypothesis that GPs signal an increased likelihood that a firm will receive a takeover bid.     

Initial Public Offerings: CFO Perceptions

We examine four issues pertaining to initial public offerings (IPOs) using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs). First, why do firms go public? Second, is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? Third, what concerns CFOs about going public? Fourth, do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? Results support funding for growth and liquidity as the primary reasons for IPOs. CFO sentiment is generally stationary in pre‐ and post‐bubble years. Managers are concerned with the direct costs of going public, such as underwriting fees, as well as indirect costs. We find a negative relation between a focus on immediate growth and long‐term abnormal returns.     

The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analysis

This study examines the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on liquidity, information asymmetry, and institutional and retail investors trading behavior. Our main findings suggest three conclusions. First, Regulation FD has been effective in improving liquidity and in decreasing the level of information asymmetry. Second, retail trading activity increases dramatically after earnings announcements but there is a significant decline in institutional trading surrounding earnings announcements, particularly in the pre‐announcement period. Last, the decline in information asymmetry around earnings announcements is closely associated with a lower participation rate in the pre‐announcement period and more active trading of retail investors after earnings releases.     

Distinctive characteristics of entities with an internal audit department and the association of the quality of such departments with errors*

Abstract. This research identifies those characteristics that could potentially influence a choice to create an internal audit department and tests via discriminant analysis to evaluate whether such attributes significantly distinguish between companies with and without an internal audit department. In addition, qualitative characteristics of such departments are described, as is the association of such traits with errors and the overall control environment. A sample of 260 companies is examined. Companies with internal audit departments are observed to be significantly larger, more highly regulated, more competitive, more profitable, more liquid, more conservative in accounting policies, more competent in their management and accounting personnel, and subject to better management controls. Key discriminant variables are the degree of regulation, decentralization, size, the duration of association with present auditors, the existence of an audit committee, EDP control, and pressures by external parties on management to achieve budgetary goals. Qualitative attributes of internal audit are systematically associated with the overall quality of the control environment, as well as errors. The most important attribute appears to be the independence of internal audit in terms of the propriety of the reporting level. An advantage of internal auditing is that external auditors report a 10 percent reduction in the number of hours incurred and greater flexibility appears to exist in the proportion of work performed in off-peak periods. Résumé. Les auteurs dressent l'inventaire des caractéristiques susceptibles d'influer sur le choix de créer un service de vérification interne et soumettent ces attributs à des tests, par voie d'analyse discriminante, afin de déterminer s'ils permettent d'établir une distinction claire entre les entreprises ayant et n'ayant pas de service de vérification interne. De plus, ils décrivent les caractéristiques qualitatives de ces services, de même que l'association de ces carctéristiques aux erreurs et au contexte global du contrôle. Les auteurs procèdent à l'examen d'un échantillon de 260 entreprises. L'étude révèle que les entreprises possédant des services de vérification interne sont beaucoup plus souvent des entreprises de grande taille, faisant l'objet d'une réglementation plus rigoureuse, plus concurrentielles, plus rentables, ayant davantage de liquidités, plus prudentes dans leurs conventions compatables, possédant une équipe de gestion et un personnel comptable plus compétents et soumises à de meilleurs contrôles de gestion. Les principales variables discriminantes sont le degré de réglementation, la décentralisation, la taille, la durée de l'association avec les vérificateurs actuels, l'existence d'un comité de vérification, le contrôle dans un cadre informatique et les pressions exercées par les tiers sur la direction pour l'atteinte des objectifs budgétaires. Les attributs qualitatifs de la vérification interne sont systématiquement asociés à la qualité globale du cadre de contrôle, de même qu'aux erreurs. L'attribut le plus important semble être le degré d'autonomie du service de vérification interne, c'est-à-dire le caractère approprié de ses liens hiérarchiques. La vérification interne comporte un avantage: les vérificateurs externes font état d'une réduction de 10 pour cent dans le nombre d'heures consacrées à la vérification, et il semble exister une plus grande souplesse dans la proportion du travail de vérification effectué en dehors des périodes de pointe.