Briefing Paper

Between the end of 1979 and the end of 1981 unemployment rose by 1.4 million. After that exceptional period unemployment continued to rise rather less rapidly to its current level of 3.2 million, Of this 3.2 million, about 1.3 million have been unemployed for more than a year. In this Briefing Paper we describe and attempt to explain the processes by which long-term unemployment rose to its current level.
We also discuss two related questions; the first concerns the relationship between unemployment and vacancies and the second concerns the relationship between long-term unemployment and inflation. The final sections consider the policy implications of these findings.     

Common Divisors,Payout Persistence,and Return Predictability

In the finance and accounting literature, the use of a common divisor in the dependent and independent variables of ordinary least‐squares regressions is commonplace. What goes less recognized, however, is that their use induces spurious correlation between the regression variables and invalidates standard testing procedures. This paper analyses the common divisor problem by outlining analytical results concerning the expected R² and providing a simulation procedure that generates test statistics from which critical values can be drawn. To illustrate the procedure, we re‐investigate payout yield return predictability findings that have appeared in the literature and show that the results are spurious.     

The Interaction between Internal Control Assessment and Substantive Testing in Audits for Fraud*

We examine the interaction between internal control assessments and substantive testing in a model of fraud detection. The purpose of our study is to examine a two‐stage model of the auditor‐manager interaction in which the auditor assesses the “likelihood” or possibility of fraud in the first stage and conducts substantive tests in the second stage. We examine the allocation of audit resources across these two distinct facets of the audit. We find that, regardless of the auditor's allocation, the probability of undetected fraud remains the same, but the allocation of some audit resources to internal control assessment may provide cost savings for the auditor.     

What Factors Lead Management to Support or Oppose Employee Participation—With and Without Works Councils? Hypotheses and Evidence from Germany

This paper provides the first econometric analysis to distinguish between works councils in establishments where managers have a positive or negative view toward employee involvement in decision making. We similarly distinguish between establishments where no council is present in which management supports or does not support worker participation. We stress the potential role of works councils and participation in motivating employees. Our theoretical analysis and empirical results from German manufacturing establishment data show that the structure of the workforce, principal‐agent problems between owners and managers, collective bargaining, direct employee involvement, human resource management practices, and market strategy and innovativeness all play important roles. Some conflicting conclusions in the works council literature may be due to the failure to distinguish among industrial relations participation regimes characterized by cooperative or uncooperative relationships between works councils and management.     

Precautionary Saving and Endogenous Labor Supply with and without Intertemporal Expected Utility

We analyze precautionary saving behavior in a framework with labor and nonlabor income risks, an endogenous supply of labor, and a representation of preferences that disentangles attitudes toward risk, attitudes toward intertemporal substitution, and ordinal preferences for consumption and leisure. This preference structure allows us to disentangle and to describe in an intuitive way the different forces that determine precautionary saving “in the small” and “in the large.”     

Legitimating Inequality: Fooling Most of the People All of the Time

Over the three decades leading up to the crisis of 2008, inequality dramatically increased in the United States and Great Britain. What stands out, but is seldom noted, is that this occurred within democracies where the relative losers—the overwhelming majority—could in principle have used the political system to block or reverse rising inequality. Why did they not do so? A glance at history reveals that peoples have only very infrequently contested inequality because they were led to believe that their inferior status in terms of income, wealth, and privilege was just, that it was not really so bad, or that it was necessary for their future well‐being. Ideological systems legitimated a status quo of inequality, or in more modern times even increasing inequality. This article surveys the manner in which inequality has been historically legitimated, first predominantly by religion, then predominately by economic thought. Attention is then focused on the manner in which contemporary economic science and its popular interpretations in the media have served to legitimate inequality in the U.S. since the mid‐1970s. The article concludes with a reflection on the unique conditions that enable the legitimation of inequality to be delegitimated.