A generalized audit simulation tool for evaluating the reliability of internal controls

Abstract. The study and evaluation of internal control requires an auditor to analyze all key controls and control relationships included in each major transaction cycle. Gaining the requisite level of understanding can become a formidable task where complex systems with intricate control relationships, computer-based accounting systems, or systems with suspected collusion, are involved. This study describes an audit simulation model which is designed to assist auditors in evaluating and documenting the reliability of complex internal control systems. The proposed simulation extends previous ones in two primary respects. First, dependencies between error and control processes can be modeled, which allows an auditor to investigate the effects of collusion on system reliability and final balance error amounts. Second, the simulation is an interactive computer model which can be tailored to different client applications without the need for programming knowledge. An application of the simulation approach in a typical payroll cycle is described. Résumé. L'étude et l'évaluation du contrôle interne nécessitent de la part du vérificateur d'analyser l'ensemble des contrôles-clé et les liens entre les contrôles compris dans chaque cycle d'opération important. L'obtention du niveau de compréhension requis peut s'avérer une tâche énorme lorsque le praticien étudie des systèmes à interrelations complexes, des systèmes comptables informatisés ou des systèmes où la collusion est soupçonnée. Cette étude décrit un modèle de simulation en vérification destiné à aider les vérificateurs dans l'évaluation et la documentation de la fiabilité de systèmes de contrôle interne complexes. La simulation proposée constitue un prolongement de simulations précédentes sous deux aspects primordiaux. En premier lieu, les dépendances entre les processus d'erreur et de contrôle peuvent être modelées, ce qui permet au vérificateur d'examiner les effets de la collusion sur la fiabilité des systèmes et les montants des erreurs dans les soldes finals. En deuxième lieu, la simulation est un modèle informatisé interactif qui peut être adapté aux diverses applications d'une entreprise sans avoir à posséder des connaissances en programmation. Un exemple d'application de cette approche de simulation, dans le contexte d'un cycle de paye, est présenté.     

Assessing Goodness-of-Fit of Asset Pricing Models: The Distribution of the Maximal R2

The development of asset pricing models that rely on instrumental variables together with the increased availability of easily-accessible economic time-series have renewed interest in predicting security returns. Evaluating the significance of these new research findings, however, is no easy task. Because these asset pricing theory tests are not independent, classical methods of assessing goodness-of-fit are inappropriate. This study investigates the distribution of the maximal $R^2$ when k of m regressors are used to predict security returns. We provide a simple procedure that adjusts critical $R^2$ values to account for selecting variables by searching among potential regressors.     

Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts' Incentives to Follow Firms

Motivated by extant finance theory predicting that insider trading crowds out private information acquisition by outsiders, we use data for 100 countries for the years 1987–2000 to study whether analyst following in a country increases following restriction of insider trading activities. We document that analyst following increases after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. This increase is concentrated in emerging market countries, but is smaller if the country has previously liberalized its capital market. We also find that analyst following responds less intensely to initial enforcement when a country has a preexisting portfolio of strong investor protections.     

Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants

We delineate key channels through which flows of confidential information to loan syndicate participants impact the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We isolate the timing of private information flows by estimating the speed of price discovery over quarterly earnings cycles in both secondary syndicated loan and equity markets. We identify borrowers disseminating private information to lenders relatively early in the cycle with firms exhibiting relatively early price discovery in the secondary loan market, documenting that price discovery is faster for loans subject to financial covenants, particularly earnings‐based covenants; for borrowers who experience covenant violations; for borrowers with high credit risk; and for loans syndicated by relationship‐based lenders or highly reputable lead arrangers. We then ask whether early access to private information in the loan market accelerates the speed of information arrival in stock prices. We document that the stock returns of firms identified with earlier private information dissemination to lenders indeed exhibit faster price discovery in the stock market, but only when institutional investors are involved in the firm's syndicated loans. Further, the positive relation between institutional lending and the speed of stock price discovery is more pronounced in relatively weak public disclosure environments. These results are consistent with institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading in the equity market.     

A Research Note on the Use and Perceived Usefulness of Analytical Procedures by Australian Auditors

This paper provides Australian evidence on the use and perceived usefulness of analytical procedures (AP) by both Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors. The following questions are posed in the paper. First, what is the extent of usage of AP? Second, which AP are used most frequently? Third, at what stage of the audit are AP used most frequently? Fourth, how effective are AP? Fifth, do auditors expect more or less use of AP in the future? In the context of these questions comparisons are drawn between Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors and with two recent overseas studies.     

Determinants of Corporate Leasing Policy

The existing finance literature assumes the real operating cash flows from leasing or owning are invariant to the ownership of the asset and focuses on tax-related incentives for corporate leasing policy. Our analysis suggests that taxes are important in identifying potential lessees and lessors, but are less important in identifying the specific assets leased. We provide a unified analysis of the various incentives affecting the lease-versus-purchase decision. We then show how these incentives explain the use of contractual provisions such as maintenance clauses, deposits, options to purchase the asset, and metering.