Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry

This is a study of how contractual mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts in sub-advised mutual funds. Sub-advising contracts allow fund families to expand their product offerings to include new investment styles and thereby gain market share. We show that costly contractual arrangements, such as co-branding, multi-advising, and performance-based compensation, can mitigate agency conflicts in outsourcing and protect investors from potential underperformance. Fund families will find it cost-effective to implement such incentive mechanisms only when investors are sophisticated in assessing manager skill. The findings help to explain why a large percentage of fund families outsource their funds to advisory firms.     

The success of job applications: a new approach to program evaluation

This paper suggests a novel approach to program evaluation that allows identification of the causal effect of a training program on the likelihood of being invited to a job interview under weak assumptions, i.e., by measuring the program-effects by pre- and post-treatment data that are very close in time for the same individual.     

Asymmetric Demand Information and Foreign Direct Investment*

We examine the FDI versus exports decision of firms competing in an oligopolistic (quantity‐setting) market under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. Compared to a firm that chooses to export, a firm that chooses to set up a plant in the host market has superior information about local market demand. In addition to the well‐known tension between the fixed set‐up costs of investment, the additional variable costs of exports and oligopoly sizes, the incentive to invest abroad is explained by the strategic learning effect. FDI may be observed even if trade costs are zero. The analysis is robust to price competition and to the possibility that a foreign firm can engage in both FDI and exports.     

On Strategic Quantity Bidding in Multiple Unit Auctions

Standard studies of multiple unit auctions generally overlook the strategic role of bidders' quantity decisions. Using a simple equilibrium model of bidding I analyze bidders' incentives to choose quantities in discriminatory and competitive auctions. The main result is that bidders have a stronger strategic incentive to bid for fewer units in competitive auctions. Since under competition a bidder pays the lowest accepted price for each unit she gets, she may benefit from dropping her quantity to let lower-valuing bidders enter the set of winners. This prediction is consistent with empirical observations from foreign currency and spectrum auctions.     

Comparing Youth and Adult Desire for Unionization in Canada

Survey data for Canada indicates that youths have a stronger preference than adults for unionization. We show that most of that difference reflects the stronger desire of youths to have unions deal with workplace issues rather than a greater exposure of youths to these issues. In particular, youth preferences for unionization are influenced to a greater degree than for adults by social capital (e.g, familial union status and peer–group attitudes). The possible role of progressive HRM practices and legislative protection in substituting for unionization is also highlighted. Finally, implications of the findings for the future of unionization and organizing youth are discussed.     

Convergence in the Americas: Some Lessons from the DR‐CAFTA Process

The proliferation of trade agreements in the Americas is a major cause for concern as it might fragment or inhibit the emergence of a hemispheric trading system. In addition to establishing a free trade area between the US and six countries in Latin America, the DR‐CAFTA consolidates a set of trade arrangements among those six Latin American countries. The approaches and techniques employed to achieve this consolidation should be studied by policy analysts and negotiators of broader hemispheric‐wide negotiations since the DR‐CAFTA is in fact a microcosm of the spaghetti bowl of trade agreements now existing in the Americas. This paper points out the potential consequences of the proliferation of trade agreements in the Americas and provides an analysis of the convergence techniques and approaches used in the DR‐CAFTA, in particular in the areas of market access and rules of origin.     

INTERNATIONAL AND INTERTEMPORAL COMPARISONS OF REAL PRODUCT IN OECD COUNTRIES A GROWTH SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

This paper provides two new data sets for comparisons of real income in OECD countries. The first set provides adjusted real series for GDP and its components from 1960 to 1993 based on OECD 1990 purchasing power parities. The second set uses OECD PPP of different benchmark years, and interpolates these applying national price indices. Comparisons between both alternatives, Penn World Tahle Mark 5 (PWT 5) and its new version (PWT 5.6), in terms of economic growth and convergence, reveal some remarkable differences. Moreover, there are wider differences concerning the relative countries' position in GDP per capita ranking. Estimations of convergence equations based on OECD data yield a better fit than those obtained using PWT data, although there are also some significant differences between PWT 5 and PWT 5.6. Nevertheless, a very positive result is that other parameters of interest in these equations are not affected by the use of these different data sources.     

Trade effects of monetary agreements: Evidence for OECD countries

This paper analyses the effects of monetary agreements on trade flows using a sample of 25 OECD countries over the period 1950-2004. We find that these agreements have boosted intra-bloc trade. This result especially applies to the case of the euro. More importantly, in contrast to regional trade agreements, all monetary agreements analysed show evidence of trade-creating effects with third countries. Finally, only the euro shows a symmetric impact for the trade-creating effect with non-members, that is, using the euro promotes both the Eurozone's exports and its imports to non-Eurozone markets to a similar extent.     

The role of information in different bargaining protocols

We analyze a bargaining protocol recently proposed in the literature vis-à-vis unconstrained negotiation. This new mechanism extracts “gains from trade” inherent in the differing valuation of two parties towards various issues where conflict exists. We assess the role of incomplete vs. complete information in the efficiency achieved by this new mechanism and by unconstrained negotiation. We find that unconstrained negotiation does best under a situation of complete information where the valuations of both bargaining parties are common knowledge. Instead, the newly proposed mechanism does best in a situation with incomplete information. The sources of inefficiencies in each of the two cases arise from the different strategic use of the available information.     

A score-test on measurement errors in rating transition times

We model credit rating histories as continuous-time discrete-state Markov processes. Infrequent monitoring of the debtors’ solvency will result in erroneous observations of the rating transition times, and consequently in biased parameter estimates. We develop a score test against such measurement errors in the transition data that is independent of the error distribution. We derive the asymptotic χ²${\chi }^2$-distribution for the test statistic under the null by stochastic limit theory. The test is applied to an international corporate portfolio, while accounting for economic and debtor-specific covariates. The test indicates that measurement errors in the transition times are a real problem in practice.