On the dynamics of inflation persistence around the world

We study the dynamics of inflation persistence in 45 countries for the period 1960–2008 using a recently developed test for multiple changes in persistence, which decomposes the sample information between adjacent I (0) and I (1) periods. We find that: (i) inflation persistence and average inflation tend to fall and rise at the same time; (ii) in some countries there are changes in the level of inflation which do not seem to be related to changes in inflation persistence; (iii) around half of the countries analyzed do not present any burst of I (1) behavior, and hence have stationary inflation throughout; (iv) for the other half, we detect switches of the type I (0) ? I (1) ? I (0), hence, inflation persistence, when it has occurred, has been temporal; and, (v) for about half of the countries in which inflation has presented I (1) behavior, persistent inflation lasted more than a decade. In addition, we find that in the last 50 years there have been mainly two episodes where long bursts of I (1) inflation took place simultaneously among groups of countries. In general, the “Great Inflation” occurred during the seventies and eighties in advanced economies, whereas it occurred during the eighties and nineties in emerging economies, particularly in Latin America.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

Sovereign Geopolitics? – Uncovering the “Sovereignty Paradox”

This paper reconsiders the importance of the sovereign state in contemporary geopolitics. The role of the state in an era of globalisation and devolution is a concern that has gained considerable attention in recent geographical scholarship. What has received less attention is how the state has historically functioned as a device that conflated the linked concerns of sovereignty and territoriality. The authors argue that there exist a number of “sovereignty paradoxes” that inhibit the interdisciplinary analysis of the interrelations between sovereignty, territoriality, and state power. Thus, reconsidering sovereignty and territoriality informs both how the state emerged as an important unit of geographical analysis historically, and why the state has become such a problematic concept in contemporary geopolitics. This work has implications for understanding popular struggles over civil liberties, foreign policy, and justice for indigenous peoples.     

Sunspot fluctuations in dynamics with predetermined variables

Summary. In this paper, I study the existence of Sunspot Equilibria in a general framework whose dynamics allow for the presence of predetermined variables in the system. The main motivation for this research comes from the fact that previous studies did not allow for such predetermined variables which, nevertheless, appear quite naturally in economic models. I show, for a non-negligible subset of dynamics with predetermined variables verifying usual assumptions, the existence of Stationary Sunspot Equilibria fluctuating between an arbitrary finite number of states arbitrarily close to a steady state. Received: March 1, 1995; revised version September 18, 1996     

The new goods margin in new markets

We analyze the role of the new goods margin in the Baltic countries’ exports and imports growth during the 1995–2008 period. Using the methodology developed in Kehoe and Ruhl (2013), we define the set of least-traded goods as those that account for the lowest 10% of total exports and imports in 1995, and then trace its growth in several markets including the Baltics’ main trade partners, the European Union and Russia. We find that, on average, by 2008 least-traded goods accounted for nearly 50% of total Baltic exports to their main trade partners. Moreover, we find that increases in the share of least-traded exports coincided with the timing of the trade liberalization reforms implemented by the Baltic countries. Least-traded imports also grew at robust rates, but their growth was lower than that of exports, accounting for slightly less than a quarter of total imports, that is, about half of the exports value. Moreover, we find that the shares of least-traded imports from the EU 15 and from Russia started diverging around the time the Baltic countries joined the EU, with the EU 15 share increasing and the Russian one declining. We also find that the Baltics’ share of least-traded exports outpaced that of other economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, exports of new goods from the Baltic countries suffered noticeably during the Global Financial Crisis. After the crisis ended, the restart in new goods exports growth displayed mixed patterns.