Monopoly aspects of political parties

Conclusions The standard economic model of a natural monopoly offers a useful conceptual means to examine some of the characteristics of political parties. The declining cost curves for producing political products are attributable to the indivisible nature of the majority asset. In the absence of subsidies, political parties can be expected to produce at the point where their marginal evaluation equals average cost. Thus, they have an incentive to seek subsidies in order to expand production to the point where marginal evaluation equals marginal cost. While this is optimizing behavior on the part of the individual party, it may not be optimal in competing for the majority asset, because this process decreases the value of resources that the other party has expended towards acquiring the asset. Parties will determine their optimal output calculating only the private costs and benefits to be secured through party competition, but will ignore the social costs caused by the externality they generate in competing for a fixed percentage of votes. As a result, optimizing behavior by the individual parties may lead to an excess of resources devoted to producing political decisions.     

Accounting for personal disposition and organizational context: connecting role ambiguity,public service motivation,and whistle-blowing in federal agencies

Abstract

Organizational psychologists and HRM scholars have long argued that prosocial organizational behaviors enhance organizational performance. However, prosocial behaviors are motivated by both self-interested and altruistic intent. Moreover, some have recognized that the factors that encourage shifts between egoistically and altruistically motivated prosocial behaviors may result from inherent tensions between individual disposition and situational contexts. As such, this study draws from literature examining prosocial behavior to evaluate whether work situations with clear task expectations dampen the extent to which prosocial personal dispositions diminish egoistically motivated prosocial behavior. Findings from a series of structural equation models reveal that altruistic dispositional traits diminish egoistic motives for engaging in one specific prosocial behavior, whistle-blowing. However, findings also reveal that work situations characterized by clear task expectations dampen the negative effect of altruistic dispositions on egoistically motivated whistle-blowing. Our findings imply that managers can adjust organizational contexts to capitalize on the enhanced benefits resulting from altruistically motivated prosocial behaviors.     

Workplace civility training: understanding drivers of motivation to learn

Abstract

Training is recommended as an important human resource management (HRM) practice to prevent mistreatment and enhance civility, but little is known about what influences the effectiveness of civility training. The central aim of this study was to address how workgroup conditions influence employees' attitudes about civility training and motivation to learn, which previous research shows is a predictor of training outcomes. Predictors were posited to include psychological and workgroup climate for civility, and personal and ambient mistreatment experiences. These predictors were hypothesized to drive positive (training discrepancy) and negative (training skepticism) pre‐training attitudes, which in turn were expected to influence motivation to learn. Results suggest the influence of climate for civility and mistreatment experiences on motivation to learn is largely indirect via pre‐training attitudes. Training skepticism and training discrepancy have conflicting influences on motivation to learn. Findings provide an empirical basis for HRM professionals to maximize employee motivation to learn in their own civility interventions.     

Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression

We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership has risen from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership.