How much does household collateral constrain regional risk sharing?

We construct a new data set of consumption and income data for the largest US metropolitan areas, and we show that the extent of risk-sharing between regions varies substantially over time. In times when US housing collateral is scarce nationally, regional consumption is about twice as sensitive to income shocks. We also document higher sensitivity in regions with lower housing collateral. Household-level borrowing frictions can explain this new stylized fact. When the value of housing relative to human wealth falls, loan collateral shrinks, borrowing (risk-sharing) declines, and the sensitivity of consumption to income increases. Our model aggregates heterogeneous, borrowing-constrained households into regions characterized by a common housing market. The resulting regional consumption patterns quantitatively match those in the data.     

General versus Product-Specific Life Style Segmentations

Given a segmentation problem, marketers may be forced to consider the benefits of both general and product-specific life style segmentations. This study therefore explores the procedures and refinements associated with each approach and offers overall conclusions as to each one's efficacy.     

Can fat taxes and package size restrictions stimulate healthy food choices?

Consumers prefer bonus packs, as opposed to price discounts, for healthy foods, but they want a price discount rather than a bonus pack for indulgent foods (Mishra & Mishra, 2011). This study conceptually replicates and extends this finding to show that consumers are more responsive to changes in price than to changes in package size for indulgent food options, whereas they are more responsive to changes in package size than to changes in price for healthy food options.     

Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight

We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the executive's proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to the correct policy to pursue, and both are motivated by the desire to appear competent. A partisan overseer is one who, in addition to seeking to promote her own reputation, cares how her decision will impact the executive's reputation. Our main result is that partisanship can improve the efficacy of an oversight regime, as the distortions caused by a partisan overseer's desire to affect the executive's reputation can offset the distortions caused by her desire to enhance her own. Our results provide a new rationale for divided government, as partisan considerations are often necessary to prevent the overseer from rubber stamping all executive proposals.     

Valuing the implicit guarantee of the Federal National Mortgage Association

The paper analyzes the guarantee of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Rather than try to price the guarantee, we used time-series estimates of its value from Kane and Foster to infer the behavior of FNMA in exploiting the guarantee. The results are consistent with a model that predicts that FNMA does not take as much risk as it might. Rather, it trades off risk and return, but it does increase risk and exploit the guarantee when it gets in trouble (as it did in 1981).We have received helpful research assistance from Peter Carr and Bruno Gerard.     

Loan Loss Severity and Optimal Mortgage Default

This paper tests the contingent claims model of mortgage default in its ruthless or frictionless form. The principal tests of the model are based on an unconventional source of data, namely, loan loss severities on defaulted mortgages. The frictionless model has well-defined predictions about loss severities which we test in detail. The data analyzed include a random sample of all mortgages originated during the period 1975–90 and purchased by Freddie Mac, as well as the loss severities on all mortgages purchased by Freddie Mac which defaulted during the period. The frictionless model does not do well in these tests.     

Organigraphs: drawing how companies really work

Walk into any organization and you will get a snapshot of the company in action--people and products moving every which way. But ask for a picture of the company and you will be given the org chart, with its orderly little boxes showing just the names and titles of managers. Now there's a more revealing way to depict the people and operations within an organization--an approach called the organigraph. The organigraph is not a chart. It's a map that offers an overview of the company's functions and the ways that people organize themselves at work. Perhaps most important, an organigraph can help managers see untapped competitive opportunities. Drawing on the organigraphs they created for about a dozen companies, authors Mintzberg and Van der Heyden illustrate just how valuable a tool the organigraph is. For instance, one they created for Electrocomponents, a British distributor of electrical and mechanical items, led managers to a better understanding of the company's real expertise--business-to-business relationships. As a result of that insight, the company wisely decided to expand in Asia and to increase its Internet business. As one manager says, "It allowed the company to see all sorts of new possibilities." With traditional hierarchies vanishing and newfangled--and often quite complex--organizational forms taking their place, people are struggling to understand how their companies work. What parts connect to one another? How should processes and people come together? Whose ideas have to flow where? With their flexibility and realism, organigraphs give managers a new way to answer those questions.     

Measuring Motivations for Media Exposure: A Thesis

The present article discusses the problem of separating the motivation conceptempirically from other relevant concepts in research on mass media audiences.For about half a century, audience researchers use questionnaire items with adistinct format as measurements of motivations for media exposure. It isargued that these motivation items grammatically reflect the nature of themotivation concept as a theoretically intermediate variable between behaviourand its social or mental background, thus constituting the most plausibleindicators of the concept. However, it is also argued that these questionnaireitems are double-barrelled and that any measurement of motivations based onthe items can largely be considered an ambiguous mixture of behaviour and itssocial or mental origin. A study is presented that provides empirical support for this position.     

Trade policy under imperfect competition: The economics of Russian roulette

Summary Neo-classical economic theory shows that managed trade or protectionism is (almost) always welfare decreasing. However, measurements of the welfare costs of protectionism based on neo-classical models seem to suggest that these costs are quite small. We discuss general new insights and developments in the theory, policy and empiricism of international trade. The observation that intra-industry trade and the services sector are important has led to a shift in theory away from constant returns to scale and perfect competition towards economies of scale and scope, externalities, market imperfections, and imperfect competition. Although this, in principle, opens the door to beneficial government intervention in the economic process, we emphasize that the true costs of protection can potentially be much higher than is generally acknowledged as a result of the above mentioned shift.We would like to thank, without implicating, Martin Fase, Harry Garretsen, Catrinus Jepma, Simon Kuipers, Ger Lanjouw, Tenn Schmidt, Albert de Vaal, and Jean-Marie Viaene for stimulating conversations and useful suggestions. We thank Thijs Knaap for excellent research assistance.