Turkmenistan: From Communism to Nationalism by Gradual Economic Reform

Turkmenistan's economic performance during the first decade after independence is interesting because it is an extreme case, regularly ranking last among all the former centrally planned economies by transition indicators measuring speed of reform or degree of economic liberalization. This paper analyses the evolution of the economic system and Turkmenistan's economic development since 1991. The country's abundant resource endowment provided favourable initial conditions for pursuing an agenda that gave a low priority to economic reform, while emphasizing the country's neutrality and minimizing internal political change. Nevertheless, in 1997 the unreformed economy suffered a deep decline and, although it has enjoyed some recovery since 1999, the overall performance of GDP since independence is one of the worst among all transition economies. Although the government had achieved its external and internal political goals, the economic strategy appeared to be unsustainable.     

Using Personal Car Register for Measuring Economic Inequality in Countries with a Large Share of Shadow Economy: Evidence for Latvia

We suggest using information from the state register of personal cars as an alternative indicator of economic inequality in countries with a large share of shadow economy. We illustrate our approach using the Latvian pool of personal cars. Our main finding is that the extent of household economic inequality in Latvia is much larger than officially assumed. According to Eurostat, the officially published estimate of the Gini coefficient for Latvia is 0.374 for 2009, which is much higher than the Gini coefficient value reported for all the 27 EU member countries (0.304), but significantly lower than 0.48 according to our results.     

Primary vs secondary prophylaxis with pegfilgrastim for the reduction of febrile neutropenia risk in patients receiving chemotherapy for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma: cost-effectiveness analyses

Objective:

Evaluate the cost-effectiveness of primary vs secondary prophylaxis (PP vs SP) with pegfilgrastim to reduce the risk of febrile neutropenia (FN) in Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma (NHL) patients receiving myelosuppressive chemotherapy from a US payer perspective.

Methods:

A Markov model was used to compare PP vs SP with pegfilgrastim in a cohort of patients receiving six cycles of cyclophosphamide, vincristine, doxorubicin, and prednisone (CHOP) or CHOP plus rituximab (CHOP-R) chemotherapy. Model inputs, including efficacy of pegfilgrastim in reducing risk of FN and costs, were estimated from publicly available sources and peer-reviewed publications. Incremental cost-effectiveness was evaluated in terms of net cost per life-year saved (LYS), per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gained, and per FN event avoided over a lifetime horizon. Deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to assess sensitivity and robustness of results.

Results:

Lifetime costs for PP were $5000 greater than for SP; however, PP was associated with fewer FN events and more LYs and QALYs gained vs SP. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) for PP vs SP for CHOP were $13,400 per FN event avoided, $29,500 per QALY gained, and $25,800 per LYS. CHOP-R results were similar ($15,000 per FN event avoided, $33,000 per QALY gained, and $28,900 per LYS). Results were most sensitive to baseline FN risk, cost per FN episode, and odds ratio for reduced relative dose intensity due to prior FN event. PP was cost-effective vs SP in 85% of simulations at a $50,000 per QALY threshold.

Limitations:

In the absence of NHL-specific data, estimates for pegfilgrastim efficacy and relative risk reduction of FN were based on available data for neoadjuvant TAC in patients with breast cancer. Baseline risks of FN for CHOP and CHOP-R were assumed to be equivalent.

Conclusions:

PP with pegfilgrastim is cost-effective compared to SP with pegfilgrastim in NHL patients receiving CHOP or CHOP-R.     

Taxation and Market Power

We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales tax increases in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of the tax burden to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers, as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behaviour of a monopolist. Several control treatments corroborate this finding.     

Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising

This article provides evidence on the determinants of royaltiesand upfront fees in share contracts by examining how state franchisetermination laws affect franchise contracts. The results areconsistent with the joint hypothesis that the two-sided moralhazard model explains the terms in franchise contracts and thattermination laws increase the relative importance of franchisoreffort (due to the extra effort that is required to controlsystem quality). I find that franchise companies that are headquarteredin termination-law states charge significantly higher royaltyrates than companies headquartered in other states (around 1%higher). Correspondingly, the initial franchise fees are lowerfor companies headquartered in termination states. Overall,franchisees appear to pay a higher price for franchises in stateswith protection laws. Consistent with a basic tenet of law andeconomics, price adjustments appear to offset at least someof the transfers that would otherwise be implied by the laws.     

Do bookmakers possess superior skills to bettors in predicting outcomes?

In this paper we test the hypothesis that bookmakers display superior skills to bettors in predicting the outcome of sporting events by using matched data from traditional bookmaking and person-to-person exchanges. Employing a conditional logistic regression model on horse racing data from the UK we find that, in high liquidity betting markets, betting exchange odds have more predictive value than the corresponding bookmaker odds. To control for potential spillovers between the two markets, we repeat the analysis for cases where prices diverge significantly. Once again, exchange odds yield more valuable information concerning race outcomes than the bookmaker equivalents.     

Choice, price competition and complexity in markets for health insurance

The United States and other nations rely on consumer choice and price competition between competing health plans to allocate resources in the health sector. While a great deal of research has examined the efficiency consequences of adverse selection in health insurance markets, less attention has been devoted to other aspects of consumer choice. The nation of Switzerland offers a unique opportunity to study price competition in health insurance markets. Switzerland regulates health insurance markets with the aim of minimizing adverse selection and encouraging strong price competition. We examine consumer responses to price differences in local markets and the degree of price variation in local markets. Using both survey data and observations on local markets we obtain evidence suggesting that as the number of choices offered to individuals grows, their willingness to switch plans given a set of price dispersion differences declines, which allows large price differences for relatively homogeneous products to persist. We consider explanations for this phenomenon from economics and psychology.     

Have Casinos Contributed to Rising Bankruptcy Rates?

This paper examines the relationship between casino gambling and bankruptcy rates in U.S. counties using a panel of U.S. county-level data from 1990 through 2005. We contribute to the literature in several ways, perhaps most notably by examining the possibility that the effect of a casino on bankruptcy may differ over the casino’s lifespan. Results confirm this possibility, indicating that the impact of casinos on bankruptcy follows a “U-shaped” curve over the life of the casino. More specifically, regression analysis indicates the existence of a casino in a county increases the bankruptcy rate by more than 9% in the first year of operation. The percentage of additional bankruptcies then decreases through the third year after the casino opens. Bankruptcy rates in casino counties then slightly fall below that of non-casino counties during the fourth through seventh years after opening, increasing once again in the eighth year and thereafter. This cycle corresponds closely to the 6 year statute of limitations period applicable to Chapter 7 bankruptcies.