Evidence on Simulation Inference for Near Unit-Root Processes with Implications for Term Structure Estimation

The high persistence of interest rates has important implicationsfor the preferred method used to estimate term structure models.We study the finite-sample properties of two standard dynamicsimulation methods—efficient method of moments (EMM) andindirect inference—when they are applied to an first orderautoregressive (AR[1]) process with Gaussian innovations. Whensimulated data are as persistent as interest rates, the finite-sampleproperties of EMM differ both from their asymptotic propertiesand from the finite-sample properties of indirect inferenceand maximum likelihood. EMM produces larger confidence boundsthan indirect inference and maximum likelihood, yet is muchless likely to contain the true parameter value. This is primarilybecause the population variance of the data plays a much largerrole in the EMM conditions than in the moment conditions foreither indirect inference or maximum likelihood. These resultssuggest that, under Gaussian assumptions, indirect inference(if practical) is preferable to EMM when working with persistentdata such as interest rates. EMM's emphasis on the populationvariance strongly enforces stationarity on the underlying process,so this same reasoning suggests that EMM may be preferable insettings where stability and stationarity are important anddifficult to impose.     

The Euro and International Equity Flows

We use a new panel data set on bilateral gross cross-border equity flows between 14 countries. We fit a “gravity model” to these data and a strictly comparable set of data for manufactures trade between these countries. The results are strikingly similar, although the coefficient on the distance variable is lower for equity than for trade flows (but still highly significant). We use the results to throw some light on the likely consequences of unifying the European equity markets.J. Japan. Int. Econ.December 1998,12(4), pp. 406–423. London Business School and CEPR, Sussex Place, Regent's Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom and London School of Economics, London WC2 2AE, United Kingdom.Copyright 1998 Academic Press.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers F21, F3.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation in a Transitional Economy: The Case of Viet Nam

Intergovernmental fiscal arrangements may play an important role in ameliorating poverty in many countries. Successful poverty alleviation generally requires both ‘capacity improving’ and ‘safety net’ policies, and both types of policies may, to some extent, be implemented through, or affected by, intergovernmental transfers. From this perspective, we analyse the efficacy of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in poverty alleviation in a transitional economy, Viet Nam. We argue that both general and specific transfers are needed for this purpose: the former to enable all provinces to provide a given basket of public services at a given tax-price by offsetting their revenue and cost disabilities and the latter to ensure that minimum levels of those public services provided by lower levels of government are targeted to the poor throughout the country.     

Minority owned banks and efficiency revisited

U.S. Government support for minority owned banks (MOBs) dates to the late 1960s. Evidence through the early 1990s suggested these banks are relatively inefficient. This study updates that research, using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and panel data from 2003 to 2014 on minority owned banks and other banks. It is, as far as we know, the first such study to exclude outliers in SFA estimation, while recovering the outliers for efficiency estimation. Initial results identify a disruption in cost efficiency during 2008, with statistically distinct regimes for 2003–2007 and 2009–2014. Including recovered observations alters the patterns of MOB efficiency in significant ways, and leads us to conclude that current MOB inefficiency is mainly limited to Asian American owned and Multi-racial and minority serving banks. Tests for the effects of government deposits under a U.S. Treasury program suggest these did not adversely effect efficiency among covered MOBs, but may have improved survival rates for those MOBs subsequent to the financial collapse.     

Aggregate implications of indivisible labor, incomplete markets, and labor market frictions

We study the impact of tax and transfer programs on steady-state allocations in a model with search frictions, an operative labor supply margin, and incomplete markets. In a benchmark model that has indivisible labor and incomplete markets but no trading frictions we show that the aggregate effects of taxes are identical to those in the economy with employment lotteries, though individual employment and asset dynamics can be different. The effect of frictions on the response of aggregate hours to a permanent tax change is highly nonlinear. There is considerable scope for substitution between “voluntary” and “frictional” nonemployment in some situations.     

Regulator performance,regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.