Motives for Giving: A Reanalysis of Two Classic Public Goods Experiments

Experimental work in economics prompted the development of theories of other‐regarding behavior. In this article we reanalyze two classic public goods experiments and focus on the nature of individuals' responses to others' behavior in order to help distinguish alternative motives for giving, including altruism, warm glow, reciprocity, and inequality aversion. Analysis that allows for asymmetric feedback responses generates support for inequality aversion motives but little for reciprocity (matching), altruism, and warm glow. We conclude that individual‐level analysis of existing public goods data can provide more insightful, informative estimates of treatment effects.     

Determinants of Geographic Differentials in the Voter Participation Rate

Voter participation rates vary widely across the 50 states. This empirical study seeks, within the context of a broadened version of the ‘rational voter model,’ to identify determinants of this interstate variation. Using the 2004 general election as the study period, it is found that the voter participation rate in a state is positively related to the percent of the state's adult population with at least a high school education, the state's unemployment rate, the percent of the state's population age 65 and older, and the female labor force participation rate in the state. In addition, it is found that voter turnout in a state is negatively related to the state's median family income and the percentage of its population that is Hispanic.     

Of lessees,lessors, and discount rates and whether pigs have wings

Recent articles on leasing suggest five principles that should aid analysts to understand this durable, much misunderstood financial instrument. The principles are 1) the lessor must be happy too, 2) the operating inflows have nothing to do with the case, 3) financial, like physical, matter tends to be preserved, 4) debt is a function of after-tax flows, and 5) inability to use tax shelters cuts two ways. In this paper we illustrate these principles and use illustrations to demonstrate that each of these principles has merit. We argue as well that the impression, often left by the principles, that leasing seldom benefits all parties to the transaction is incorrect.