Alternative Forms of Mixing Banking with Commerce: Evidence from American History

Much of the discussion about banking and commerce in America has failed to make several crucial distinctions and has not accounted for many arrangements that have promoted the mixing of these activities. We investigate the history of banking and commerce in the United States, looking both at bank control of commercial firms and commercial firms' control of banks. We trace how these controls have changed with shifting definitions of "bank" and changing methods of "control." Despite the regulations prohibiting some arrangements that promote financial control, we find evidence of extensive linkages between banking and commerce in the United States. These linkages usually build on devices that are very close substitutes to the arrangements prohibited by law. Altogether, our findings question the often made claim that traditionally banking in the United States has been separated from commerce. Furthermore, given that research on Japan and Germany has shown that the mixing of banking and commerce matters for a variety of issues, our evidence also raises some questions on similar research in the United States which makes the simplifying assumption that these industries are separated.     

Service Competitiveness – An Anglo-US Study

This article reports on the latest in a series of international comparisons of management practices and performance outcomes of industries in various countries. Here, it is the service industries in the UK and the US which come under the microscope. Among the companies surveyed, there were more world-class performers in the US than the UK, but also more low performers. The concluding part of the article is diagnostic – the authors also suggest measures which could improve performance.     

Pricing Options on an Asset with Bernoulli Jump-Diffusion Returns

The price movements of certain assets can be modeled by stochastic processes that combine continuous diffusion with discrete jumps. This paper compares values of options on assets with no jumps, jumps of fixed size, and jumps drawn from a lognormal distribution. It is shown that not only the magnitude but also the direction of the mispricing of the Black-Scholes model relative to jump models can vary with the distribution family of the jump component. This paper also discusses a methodology for the numerical valuation, via a backward induction algorithm, of American options on a jump-diffusion asset whose early exercise may be profitable. These cannot, in general, be accurately priced using analytic models. The procedure has the further advantage of being easily adaptable to nonanalytic, empirical distributions of period returns and to nonstationarity in the underlying diffusion process.     

Action Teams That Work

A growing awareness of workplace hazards and identification of airborne contaminants, coupled with a changing safety and health regulatory environment, created an unexpected demand for new and innovative respirators in the early 1980s. 3M's Occupational Health and Environmental Safety Division broke new ground by taking the team concept further than ever before in the company. The division's Action Teams successfully designed, built and introduced products in less than half the time it would have taken previously. Robert Hershock, Charles Cowman and Douglas Peters describe how 3M learned important lessons about team selection, training, performance and motivation, the importance of project sponsors, and the role of middle management.     

Further Ambiguity When Performance Is Measured by the Security Market Line

This paper employs the optimality conditions for expected utility and mean-variance portfolio problems to examine the ambiguities associated with the security market line criterion both at a point in time and through time. At a point in time, we show that the security market line criterion can be irrelevant, even in meanvariance economies. In a multiperiod setting, we show that the analysis of performance based on portfolio choice is inconsistent with the analysis based on return generating models. Empirical work suggests that the inconsistency can lead to dramatically different estimates of a security's required return.     

Testing for Unit Roots with Breaks: Evidence on the Great Crash and the Unit Root Hypothesis Reconsidered

Nelson and Plosser (1982), in a classic paper, failed to find strong evidence against the null hypothesis of a generating process with a unit autoregressive root for thirteen US macroeconomic time series. Perron (1989) claimed that such evidence was available for a majority of these series if the alternative hypothesis was of trend stationarity with a break in 1929. Zivot and Andrews (1992) treated the break date as endogenous, then finding strong evidence agcainst the null for a minority of these series. Our own analysis extends theirs by permitting a break under the null as well as the alternative hypothesis, and allowing for the sequential nature of the testing. Our empirical findings complete the circle. We find no strong evidence against the unit root hypothesis for any of the thirteen Nelson–Plosser series.