The Relaxation of Entry Barriers in the Banking Industry: An Empirical Investigation

Until recently, state laws restricted entry into local banking markets in many states by limiting both branching and multibank holding company (MBHC) operations. To the extent that these laws impeded entry into local banking markets, the removal or relaxation of the restrictions should have reduced barriers to entry, leading to more competitive price levels in the affected markets. This paper tests for such effects by examining the changes in deposit interest rates offered by banks operating in markets affected by liberalization of state banking law relative to the changes in deposit interest rates offered during the same time period by banks operating in markets not affected by such liberalization. We find evidence that liberalization of state laws restricting intrastate MBHC operations, interstate branches, and interstate MBHC operations caused deposit interest rates to become more competitive. We, however, find no evidence of such effects associated with the removal of restrictions on intrastate branching.     

Agency Costs,Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

Standard theories of ownership assume insiders ultimately bear all agency costs and therefore act to minimize conflicts of interest. However, overvalued equity can offset these costs and induce listings associated with higher agency costs. We explore this possibility by examining a sample of public listings of Japanese subsidiaries. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.     

Monitoring Job Search as an Instrument For Targeting Transfers

Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these three cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to those most in need. Enabling the government to monitor whether unemployed individuals are searching for work and accepting any offered jobs increases its ability to redistribute income. We show that these monitoring activities are complementary, and consider how a minimum wage might be a useful adjunct to monitoring contingent tax-transfer policies.     

Regulatory Impact Assessment and the Economic Transition to Markets

In most developing and transition economies, far-reaching legal and regulatory reforms are essential for a successful transition to market-led economic development. One of the most important capacities of a market regulator is the ability to assess the market impacts of a regulation before it is adopted. Regulatory impact analysis (RIA) is a tool now used in most developed countries to improve understanding of the economic and social welfare impacts of a law and other forms of regulation. This article argues that institutional reforms aimed at good governance are at the core of the development process, that RIA can contribute to the quality of legal reforms and support other good governance goals, and that RIA can be implemented step-by-step by building on existing practices and investing in skills and training.     

Incomplete Markets and Security Prices: Do Asset-Pricing Puzzles Result from Aggregation Problems?

This paper investigates Euler equations involving security prices and household-level consumption data. It provides a useful complement to many existing studies of consumption-based asset pricing models that use a representative-agent framework, because the Euler equations under investigation hold even if markets are incomplete. It also provides a useful complement to simulation-based studies of market incompleteness. The empirical evidence indicates that the theory is rejected by the data along several dimensions. The results therefore indicate that some well-documented asset-pricing puzzles do not result from aggregation problems for the preferences under investigation.     

Criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate new venture proposals

A questionnaire was administered to one hundred venture capitalists to determine the most important criteria that they use to decide on funding new ventures. Perhaps the most important finding from the study is direct confirmation of the frequently iterated position taken by the venture capital community that above all it is the quality of the entrepreneur that ultimately determines the funding decision. Five of the top ten most important criteria had to do with the entrepreneur's experience or personality. There is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all.The question is if this is the case, then why is so much emphasis placed on the business plan? In a business plan there is generally little to indicate the characteristics of the entrepreneur—it is generally devoted to a detailed discussion of the product/service, the market, and the competition. To us, the implications are obvious—such content is necessary, but not sufficient. The business plan should also show as clearly as possible that the “jockey is fit to ride” —namely, indicate by whatever feasible and credible means possible that the entrepreneur has staying power, has a track record, can react to risk well, and has familiarity with the target market. Failing this, he or she needs to be able to pull together a team that has such characteristics and show that he or she is capable of leading that team.Factor analysis of the results indicate that venture capitalists appear to assess ventures systematically in terms of six categories of risk to be managed. These are: risk of losing the entire investment: risk of being unable to bail out if necessary; risk of failure to implement the venture idea; competitive risk; risk of management failure; and risk of leadership failure.Finally, three clusters of venture capitalists were identified: those who carefully assess the competitive and implementation risks: those who seek easy bail out; and those who deliberately keep as many options open as possible.     

Robust min–max portfolio strategies for rival forecast and risk scenarios

We consider an extension of the Markowitz mean–variance optimization framework to multiple return and risk scenarios. It is well known that asset return forecasts and risk estimates are inherently inaccurate. The method proposed provides a means for considering rival representations of the future. The optimal portfolio is computed, simultaneously with the worst case, to take account of all rival scenarios. This is a min-max strategy which is essentially equivalent to a robust pooling of the scenarios. Robustness is ensured by the noninferiority of min–max. For example, a basic worst-case optimal return is guaranteed in view of multiple return scenarios. If robustness happens to have too high a cost, guided by the min–max pooling, it is also possible to explore other pooling alternatives. A min–max algorithm is used to solve the problem and illustrate the robust character of min–max with return and risk scenarios. We study the properties of the min–max risk–return frontier and compare with the potentially suboptimal worst-case where the investment strategy and the worst case are computed separately.