Measuring the quality of managerial learning on the job

This article describes the development of an instrument to measure the quality of managerial learning on the job. The instrument can be used to analyse the quality of the individual learning process on the job. The literature shows that two factors determine the quality of the learning process: the learning potential of the job context and the way in which the manager approaches their work. So the instrument has two components. The first component measures the four types of work experience that offer potential opportunities for individual learning. These are transitions, task-related characteristics, obstacles and support. The second component, the so-called learning behaviour, analyses the way the individual approaches the potential learning opportunities present in the job. This can also be divided into four categories: emergent learning, planned learning, instruction-oriented learning and meaning-oriented learning. Based on these two components, an instrument has been developed to measure the quality of learning on the job. This has been shown to be valid and reliable in a sample of European managers.     

British employers and the Social Chapter: some survey evidence

This note reports the results of a survey of firms operating in Britain concerning the impact on their costs and operations of the Social Action Programme. We find that the realised and anticipated adverse impacts of the legislation are rather limited, although both do appear to be greater for firms which are relatively large, skill intensive, and which have a substantial amount of trade with other EU countries. In particular, the survey results provide little evidence to suggest that the imposition of a minimum wage of £3.50 per hour would have a substantial adverse impact on employment. Evidence does, however, suggest that firms which pay relatively low wages are likely to be affected more than others by the legislation.     

A Note on Trading Stamp Strategy

A Special class of promotions where the consumer is invited to play a game, receive trading stamps or accept gifts has continually elicited reactions from economists, congressional investigators and certain consumer groups. Furthermore, many of these promotions are condemned by their originators, yet they persist! I submit that our ability to effectively treat the problem has been limited by a lack of theoretical understanding of the fundamental causes and features that underlie such promotions. This paper is an attempt to provide a general theory of these cases which I have titled the oligopolistic ‘lock-in’.

Government intervention may often be necessary for the dissolution of the ‘lock-in’, but while firms may wish to free themselves from its grip, unfavorable publicity from such intervention has historically forced them to defend the status quo. In such cases, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure: if managers in industries where the ‘lock-in’ can exist understand the phenomenon, they can (hopefully) avoid its dilemma. Likewise, economists concerned with the public policy aspects can treat the causes rather than the symptoms.     

Micro evidence on international patenting

Globalization, high growth rates in high-tech industries, growing emerging markets and harmonization of patent institutions across countries have stimulated patenting in foreign markets. We use a simple model of international patenting, where the decision to patent in a foreign country depends on country characteristics and the quality of the patented invention. With access to a detailed database on individual patents owned by small Swedish firms and inventors, we are able to estimate some of these relationships and test their validity. Our results indicate that the propensity to apply for international patent protection increases with indicators of the quality of the invention, technological rivalry and market size in the host market.     

The Organization of Innovation Brokers: An International Review

Research on networks of innovation has typically focused on relationships of competition and collaboration between firms in the network, sometimes extending the analysis to sources of new ideas such as universities. More recently, attention has been paid to the activities of intermediaries in such networks, which facilitate the innovation process, which are positioned between the sources and users of innovations. This paper focuses on the organization of a distinctive type of intermediary, which we have defined as an innovation broker, by providing an analysis of 10 case studies of organizations dedicated to innovation broking from around the world. Innovation brokers in our definition are organizations that are founded especially to undertake an intermediary role, rather than performing that role as a by-product of their principal activities. The results of this analysis suggest that the key role played by innovation brokers in the innovation process is the independent validation of new ideas, thereby facilitating diffusion. In order to carry out this task, innovation brokers are organized on a not-for-profit basis, typically as a public–private partnership. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for innovation theory and research in networks of innovation.     

An Equity-based Redefinition of Underemployment and Unemployment and Some Measurements

An attempt is made in this article to redefine underemployment and unemployment without making reference to an excess supply of labor or any causal mechanism of unemployment. Instead, underemployment and unemployment are defined in terms of equity which draws upon the individual's preferences. A specific proposal is that underemployment be defined by the presence of contribution inequity relative to at least half the persons employed in a field that the underemployed person might prefer to move into. Empirically, most recent survey data on preferences for contingent and other nontraditional employment are used to illustrate the application of the concept. The major finding is that nearly 10 million Americans in the nontraditional workforce are underemployed.     

Why Any Seatbelt Mandate is an Infinitely Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Health Economics Perspective

Abstract

Among the most controversial of public health measures are those that restrict people’s freedom of choice presumably for the purpose of protecting their own health and safety. Mandatory use of automobile seatbelts can inspire allusions to the “tyranny of health” and the ‘health police.” This study revisits state seatbelt legislation, which is in force in all but one state of the USA. In modeling seatbelt mandates as indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games, the study qualifies and overcomes the limitations of conventional interest group and expressive voting theories. It indicates why and how utility-maximizing players, particularly carmakers, insurance companies, consumer advocates and regulators, may choose to cooperate, even in instances where mutual defection would bring each of them higher payoffs. The study suggests why state seatbelt mandates endure, despite ongoing concerns that they undermine individual autonomy or that their social costs outweigh the benefits of law-enforcement. The evolution and mediating effects of reputation and reciprocity in otherwise highly contestable healthcare decisions are consequently explored. Finally, the study identifies the implications of indefinitely repeated games on the continuing nature of strategic relationships and for mitigating conflict over traffic safety regulation, regardless of time and place.