A Survey of Economic Understanding in U.S. High Schools

The recent widespread adoption of online competitions in economic education provides a unique opportunity to make frequent assessments of economic literacy in U.S. classrooms. In this survey, student responses to test items from the Test of Economic Literacy (TEL) are used to create economic concept and content area achievement benchmarks. These benchmarks provide an interim renorming of the TEL and allow the authors to gauge the status of economic understanding among high school students. The data also allow the authors to compare learning outcomes between regular and advanced economics classes. Finally, the authors find that students in advanced economics classes significantly outperform students in regular classes.     

The Test of Economic Literacy: Development and Results

In this study, the authors report on the revision of the Test of Economic Literacy for the fourth edition. The Test of Economic Literacy is a nationally-normed and standardized measure of the economic understanding of U.S. high school students. The economic content of the test is based on the Voluntary National Content Standards in Economics, which is used to establish the content validity for the test. The revision process is described and evidence on the test reliability and construct validity is presented from the test score analysis. The Test of Economic Literacy has a long and successful history of use by educators and researchers interested in economic education in high schools. The new edition should provide an improved instrument to continue that testing and research work.     

Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms. Blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive-compatible mediation plan. Membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator. Nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure, independent types, and sidepayments. An offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking. Core allocations are characterized in terms of virtual-utility scales that generalize the weighted-utility scales of the inner core. Mechanisms that achieve core allocations are coalitionally durable.     

Is the Swedish central government a wage leader?

Is the Swedish central government a wage leader? This question is studied empirically in a vector error-correction model using a unique, high quality data set. It is first shown that salaries of white-collar workers in the private sector and central government are cointegrated. It is then found that private sector salaries are weakly exogenous to the system of equations. This means that the private sector is the wage leader in the long-run model. It is also found that changes in central government salaries do not Granger cause changes in private sector salaries. Together, these findings clearly demonstrate that the central government is not placing undue pressure on salaries in the private sector. The central government is not acting as a wage leader.     

Commercialization,renewal, and quality of patents

One of the major reasons why inventors are awarded patents by governments is they encourage R&D investments and commercialization of inventions. If the patent holder commercializes his/her invention, he/she has stronger incentives to retain the patent. The purpose here is to empirically analyze the relationship between commercialization and the renewal of patents. At the same time, I take into account defensive patent strategies (e.g. deterring competitors from utilizing the patent) and pointedly ask if there are any third factors (quality of the patent) that affect the commercialization and renewal decisions. Using a detailed database of Swedish patents, I utilize a survival model to estimate how commercialization influences the patent renewal decision. Basic results show not only that commercialization and defensive strategies increase the probability a patent will be renewed, but also that quality influences commercialization and renewal decisions. When controlling for the endogenous commercialization decision, there is still a strong positive relationship between commercialization and renewal of patents. Thus, given the quality of the patent, if the owner decides to commercialize the patent on the margin, this leads to longer survival of the patent. With regard to commercialization modes, there is some evidence that licensed patents and patents commercialized in original and new firms – but not acquired patents – survive longer than non-commercialized patents. Looking more closely at the contracts of acquired and licensed patents, contracts with both variable and fixed fees – but not contracts with either variable or fixed fees – survive longer than non-commercialized patents. However, the analysis about modes and contract terms does not take into account the endogeneity problem.     

Can boundedly rational sellers learn to play Nash?

How does Nash pricing compare to pricing with adaptive sellers using reinforcement learning (RL)? We consider a market game similar to Varian’s model (Am Econ Rev 70:651–659, 1980) with two types of consumers differing by the size of their fixed sample search rule and derive the Nash search equilibrium (NSE) strategy (the density, the mean and the variance of the posted price distribution). Our findings are twofold. First, we find that the RL price distribution does not converge in a statistical sense to the NSE one except when competition is à la Bertrand. Second, we show that the qualitative properties of the NSE with respect to a change in buyers‘ search behavior are still valid for the RL distribution. The average price and the variance of both price distributions exhibit similar variations to a change in buyers’ search.     

A predictability test for a small number of nested models

We introduce quasi-likelihood ratio tests for one sided multivariate hypotheses to evaluate the null that a parsimonious model performs equally well as a small number of models which nest the benchmark. The limiting distributions of the test statistics are non-standard. For critical values we consider: (i) bootstrapping and (ii) simulations assuming normality of the mean square prediction error difference. The proposed tests have good size and power properties compared with existing equal and superior predictive ability tests for multiple model comparison. We apply our tests to study the predictive ability of a Phillips curve type for the US core inflation.     

Governance Restructuring in Los Angeles and Toronto: Amalgamation or Secession?

Towards the end of the 1990s, a perplexing situation occurred in two large North American cities. In Toronto, Ontario, and Los Angeles, California, conservative political forces undertook to restructure the system of urban governance. While initiated by conservatives in both cases, in Toronto the result was consolidation; in Los Angeles secessionism is rampant. In both cases the political debate on amalgamation and secession is tied in with discourses on size, efficiency and form of urban government. In both cases, also, the shift from government to governance has been a central theme. This article investigates how local governance has changed in these two cities by comparing historical traditions of governance. Each city has a specific set of external relationships with other geographical and political scales and a set of characteristic internal contradictions. Internally, Los Angeles' tradition of splintered governance stands in contrast to Toronto's metropolitan governance model. Amalgamation and secession have been introduced as strategic options of governance restructuring in both cities in the late 1990s. Both (projected and realized) scalar changes of governance processes and institutions have been accompanied and characterized by social struggles and widespread political debate. The article outlines these debates and discusses the respective political alliances which have formed in both urban regions on the issue of amalgamation/secession. Vers la fin des années 1990, une situation troublante se produisit dans deux grandes villes d'Amérique du Nord: Toronto, en Ontario, et Los Angeles, en Californie. Les conservateurs y avaient entrepris de restructurer le système de gouvernance urbaine. Bien que l'initiative revienne aux mêmes forces politiques dans les deux cas, le résultat fut à Toronto une unification et à Los Angeles un sécessionnisme rampant. Dans les deux villes, le débat politique sur l'amalgamation et la sécession est lié aux discours sur la taille, l'efficacité et la forme d'un gouvernement urbain. De même, dans les deux villes, le passage de gouvernement à gouvernance s'est trouvé au centre des propos. Cet article recherche comment la gouvernance locale a évolué dans ces deux villes en comparant les traditions historiques. Chaque ville présente, d'une part, un ensemble particulier de relations extérieures avec d'autres échelles géographiques et politiques et, d'autre part, un ensemble de contradictions intérieures caractéristiques. Sur le plan intérieur, la tradition de gouvernance éclatée de Los Angeles s'oppose au modèle de gouvernance métropolitaine de Toronto. Vers la fin des années 1990, amalgamation et sécession ont été présentées dans les deux villes comme des options stratégiques pour la restructuration de la gouvernance. Les changements d'échelle –à la fois prévus et réalisés – concernant les processus et institutions de gouvernance ont été accompagnés et caractérisés par des conflits sociaux et un débat politique général. L'article expose ces discussions et aborde les alliances politiques respectives qui se sont formées dans les deux zones urbaines sur la question d'amalgamation/sécession.     

Professor Ludwig M. Lachmann (1906-1990): Scholar, Teacher, and Austrian School Critic of Late Classical Formalism in Economics

Ludwig M. Lachmann was born in Berlin in 1906 and died in Johannesburg in 1990. For more than forty years, until his retirement in 1972, Lachmann established himself as a prominent South African economist and for a time served as head of the economics department at the University of Witwatersrand. From 1974 to 1987, he worked with Professor Israel Kirzner in New York City to give new shape and life to the older Austrian school of economics. Lachmann influenced a small army of modern Austrians to discard the elaborate formalisms of orthodox economics for a "radical subjectivism" that had its roots in the teachings of the founder of the Austrian school, Carl Menger. Here a small platoon of scholars offer their thoughts about Lachmann, his contributions to economic reasoning, and his eccentric but engaging character. First hand reports explain what their mentor taught and what his students took away. Lavoie makes the case that Lachmann's "radical subjectivism" took a rhetorical turn toward the end of Lachmann's career in New York City. In addition, Kirzner reports on his long and most productive relationship with Lachmann and provides additional insights about the seminal role of the Austrian Economics Seminar at New York University from 1985 to 1987 in giving shape to the modern Austrian revival. This article is the written version of a "Remembrance and Appreciation Session" held on June 28, 1999 at the History of Economics Society meeting at the University of North Carolina in Greensboro. It is one of an ongoing series that appears in the July issues of this journal.