A Note on Trading Stamp Strategy

A Special class of promotions where the consumer is invited to play a game, receive trading stamps or accept gifts has continually elicited reactions from economists, congressional investigators and certain consumer groups. Furthermore, many of these promotions are condemned by their originators, yet they persist! I submit that our ability to effectively treat the problem has been limited by a lack of theoretical understanding of the fundamental causes and features that underlie such promotions. This paper is an attempt to provide a general theory of these cases which I have titled the oligopolistic ‘lock-in’.

Government intervention may often be necessary for the dissolution of the ‘lock-in’, but while firms may wish to free themselves from its grip, unfavorable publicity from such intervention has historically forced them to defend the status quo. In such cases, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure: if managers in industries where the ‘lock-in’ can exist understand the phenomenon, they can (hopefully) avoid its dilemma. Likewise, economists concerned with the public policy aspects can treat the causes rather than the symptoms.     

Concentric circles of limits to the rate of accumulation: an interpretation of Joan Robinson's theory of economic dynamics

In addition to her well-known contributions to the theory of capital, Joan Robinson provided, in her Accumulation of Capital and Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, a theory about the determinants of the rate of growth. The growth rate was limited by entrepreneurs' animal spirits. Within that constraint, growth might be further limited by the inflation barrier, which could occur either because of a floor to real wages or because of full employment. This paper provides a series of simple dynamic models that illustrate these situations, drawing attention to this neglected aspect of her work and making it easier to compare her work with the monetary growth models produced by her neoclassical contemporaries.     

Second Best Redistributive Policies: The Case Of International Trade

The paper presents a brief review of recent work that focuses on the normative economics of international trade. In a Heckscher–Ohlin-like economy, with skilled and unskilled workers, the available redistributive tools (that include income taxation) are not powerful enough to allow the separation of efficiency and equity issues, and "production efficiency" is no longer desirable. At a social optimum that calls for redistribution toward the unskilled workers, the social value of the unskilled intensive good is necessarily smaller than its production price. This finding allows us to unify existing results and suggests conjectures.     

A parametric control function approach to estimating the returns to schooling in the absence of exclusion restrictions: an application to the NLSY

An innovation which bypasses the need for instruments when estimating endogenous treatment effects is identification via conditional second moments. The most general of these approaches is Klein and Vella (J Econom 154:154–164, 2010), which models the conditional variances semiparametrically. While this is attractive, as identification is not reliant on parametric assumptions for variances, the nonparametric aspect of the estimation may discourage practitioners from its use. This paper outlines how the estimator can be implemented parametrically. The use of parametric assumptions is accompanied by a large reduction in computational and programming demands. We illustrate the approach by estimating the return to education using a sample drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Accounting for endogeneity increases the estimate of the return to education from 6.8 to 11.2%.     

A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty

Why would potentially intolerant majorities in a democracy protect the rights of unpopular groups? This paper models the formation of legal standards that determine the extent of civil liberty in a society. It is shown that tolerant legal standards emerge over time, despite all individuals having intolerant preferences. Each period citizens choose activities that have social consequences. A majority vote determines which of these activities are legally protected. Because of errors in interpreting the symbolic content of these activities, voters from the majority will not impose excessively intolerant standards, otherwise they may end up severely punishing members of their own group by mistake.
Extending this framework to a dynamic model, we examine Markovian equilibria of the game when government improves with time in its ability to correctly interpret citizens' activities. These improvements allow an unchanging majority to impose increasingly intolerant standards over time. It is shown that societies with high political turnover due to population changes are apt to choose tolerant legal standards. Societies with low turnover are more apt to choose more intolerant and unstable ones. Each group seeks to prevent auditing capabilities of government from improving too much over time in order to prevent future majorities from successfully enforcing more intolerant standards.     

International Benchmarking for Monopoly Price Regulation: The Case of Australian Gas Distribution

Price-cap regulation is widely applied to network industries. However, regulators often encounter the problem of asymmetric information on efficient costs. Benchmarking can help reduce this problem. We present a benchmarking analysis, conducted for an Australian regulator, that derives measures of efficiency for Australian gas distributors relative to U.S. counterparts. Several techniques, such as data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis, are used to ensure that our measures are robust to methodology choice. We conclude with a discussion of how the regulator used the benchmarking results, along with other information, to help it determine appropriate price caps.