Bounds for VIX futures given S&P 500 smiles

We derive sharp bounds for the prices of VIX futures using the full information of S&P 500 smiles. To that end, we formulate the model-free sub/superreplication of the VIX by trading in the S&P 500 and its vanilla options as well as the forward-starting log-contracts. A dual problem of minimizing/maximizing certain risk-neutral expectations is introduced and shown to yield the same value.The classical bounds for VIX futures given the smiles only use a calendar spread of log-contracts on the S&P 500. We analyze for which smiles the classical bounds are sharp and how they can be improved when they are not. In particular, we introduce a family of functionally generated portfolios which often improves the classical bounds while still being tractable; more precisely, they are determined by a single concave/convex function on the line. Numerical experiments on market data and SABR smiles show that the classical lower bound can be improved dramatically, whereas the upper bound is often close to optimal.     

Borders and Growth

This paper presents a framework to understand and measure the effects of political borders on economic growth and per capita income levels. In our model, political integration between two countries results in a positive country size effect and a negative effect through reduced openness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Additional effects stem from possible changes in other growth determinants, besides country size and openness, when countries are merged. We estimate the growth effects that would have resulted from the hypothetical removal of national borders between pairs of adjacent countries under various scenarios. We identify country pairs where political integration would have been mutually beneficial. We find that full political integration would have slightly reduced an average country's growth rate, while most countries would benefit from a more limited form of merger, involving higher economic integration with their neighbors.     

Output and Price Determination in the Canadian Chicken Industry: Which Should Come First?

Bilateral bargaining between chicken producers and processing firms determined chicken prices in Ontario from 1995 to 2002. A significant reform in 2003 introduced a formula‐based live price that is a function of chicken producers' costs. The latter pricing mechanism reduces the risk faced by processing firms and producers because the chicken price is known when output decisions are made. However, the pricing formula also involves some risk in that the cost components may be far removed from actual costs when production is carried out. Expected farm prices under the two different pricing mechanisms are also not identical. The producers' and processors' expected utility of profits under each pricing mechanism is computed. The bargaining pricing mechanism generally yields higher expected utility for producers than the formula‐based price. Conversely, processing firms obtain a higher expected utility under the formula‐based pricing than under the bargaining framework. These conclusions critically hinge on the size of the producers' margin component in the formula‐based price. In that sense, the formula‐based pricing mechanism did not lessen the significance of relative bargaining strengths in establishing the distribution of welfare in the chicken industry. Des négociations bilatérales entre les producteurs de poulet et les entreprises de transformation déterminaient le prix du poulet vivant en Ontario de 1995 à 2002. Une formule de prix établie en fonction des coûts de production des producteurs de poulet fut introduite en 2003. Ce mécanisme réduit le risque auquel sont confrontés les transformateurs et les producteurs parce que le prix du poulet vivant est connu lorsque les décisions de production sont prises. Cependant, la formule de prix comporte aussi un risque dans le sens où la composante du coût dans la formule de prix peut être différente des coûts réels de production du poulet vivant. Les prix espérés du poulet vivant sont aussi différents dans les deux systèmes de prix. L'utilité espérée des profits pour les producteurs et les transformateurs de poulet est calculée dans les deux mécanismes. Le modèle fondé sur la négociation génère une utilité espérée des profits plus élevée pour les producteurs que la formule de prix. À l'inverse, les transformateurs obtiennent une utilité espérée des profits plus élevée selon la formule de prix que selon le modèle fondé sur la négociation. Ces conclusions sont étroitement liées à la taille de la marge des producteurs utilisée dans le calcul de la formule de prix. Dans ce sens, l'introduction d'un nouveau mécanisme de détermination des prix n'a pas modifié l'importance du pouvoir relatif de négociation dans la distribution du surplus économique au sein de la filière canadienne du poulet.     

Comparaisons de divers types de programmes de stabilisation des revenus agricoles du Québec

Deux modèles de programmation mathématique (MOTAD–cible statique et MOTAD-cible dynamique) ont été utilisés pour analyser l'impact de trois différents programmes d'intervention gouvernementale sur l'allocation optimale des ressources et sur les revenus totaux d'une ferme représentative au Québec. Les résultats montrent que sous les scénarios ASRA/ASREC et RARB, les revenus espérés sont supérieurs pour le RARB comparativement à ASRA/ASREC à un bas niveau de risque, mais ils sont du même ordre lorsqu'on considère les niveaux de risque plus élevés. L'allocation des ressources et la taille de la ferme sont quelque peu différentes. Afin de comparer ces deux programmes d'intervention, deux ratios ont été calculés : les dépenses nettes des gouvernements par rapport au revenu brut et au revenu net de l'entreprise. Les résultats montrent qu'un programme de type RARB est supérieur à un programme de type ASRA/ASREC, et ce, même si les transferts par unité assurée sont les mêmes. Sous le scénario CSRN, les résultats indiquent que les fermes ont des tailles de deux à quatre fois plus petites que dans les scénarios ASRA/ASREC ou RARB et que la stratégie financière des dépôts et des retraits dans le compte CSRN est déterminante dans l'augmentation du revenu espéré de la ferme.     

Efficacitè technique et coûts de production dans les secteurs laitiers du Québec et de l'Ontario

This study aims to estimate the level of technical efficiency in milk production and to analyze the relationship between the costs of production, the level of technical efficiency and farm size. Furthermore, the socio-economic variables that characterize the most efficient farms and those producing at lower cost are identified. The results indicate that in Quebec, the level of technical efficiency increases with herd size, but this increase is very small. In Ontario, herd size is not significant to explain technical efficiency. The level of education, the participation in milk recording programs, expenditures per cow fort are and artificial insemination, the quality of hay and the number of years as member of a management club are a11 variables that characterize efficient farms.     

The short-term timing of initial public offerings

This paper examines the effect of stock market conditions on the waiting time of initial public offering (IPO) candidates, from the date firms file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the effective IPO date. I find that issuers are going public faster when time-varying stock market valuations are high, and when time-varying market returns and time-varying market volatility are low. The volatility effect is not driven by regulatory delays consecutive to changes in the terms of the offers during the IPO process. Taken together, these results indicate that firms use a short-term market timing strategy when deciding the right time to go public and are consistent with a real option interpretation of IPO timing.     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.     

Robustness and sensitivity analysis of risk measurement procedures

Measuring the risk of a financial portfolio involves two steps: estimating the loss distribution of the portfolio from available observations and computing a ‘risk measure’ that summarizes the risk of the portfolio. We define the notion of ‘risk measurement procedure’, which includes both of these steps, and introduce a rigorous framework for studying the robustness of risk measurement procedures and their sensitivity to changes in the data set. Our results point to a conflict between the subadditivity and robustness of risk measurement procedures and show that the same risk measure may exhibit quite different sensitivities depending on the estimation procedure used. Our results illustrate, in particular, that using recently proposed risk measures such as CVaR/expected shortfall leads to a less robust risk measurement procedure than historical Value-at-Risk. We also propose alternative risk measurement procedures that possess the robustness property.     

The Collusion-deterring Effect of Pre-attributed Supplies and the Hog Auction in Quebec

The hog/pork industry in Quebec has been going through major institutional changes since 1989, the year an electronic auction was put in place to market all of the hogs in the province. Because the auction's ability to generate high prices did not meet the expectations of hog producers, the pure auction system was replaced by a hybrid one in 1994. In this system, most of the hog supply was pre-attributed to processors at a negotiated price based on the US. price while the remainder of the provincial supply of hogs was sold through the auction. In this paper, we investigate how a seemingly inefficient marketing mechanism like pre-attributions can increase the efficiency of a usually efficient mechanism like an auction. We present theoretical arguments regarding the sustainability of collusion under the pure auction and hybrid systems in addition to analyzing auction prices with modern time series tools.     

Agricultural Credit Subsidies and Farmland Values in Canada

The objective of this study is to determine the impact of farm credit subsidies on the value of farmland in Canada. The price-components model based on the capitalization principle is developed and estimated using the pooled data from four selected provinces (Quebec, New Brunswick, Manitoba and Saskatchewan) from 1972 to 1991. The results show that increases (decreases) in interest subsidies are expected to increase (decrease) farmland and building values. However, the short-term impact is estimated to be small. The regional analysis shows that the abolition of interest subsidies across the country is likely to have a relatively higher impact on land and building values in Quebec than in the prairie provinces.