Capital Adequacy, Bank Mergers, and the Medium of Payment

We examine how banks' capital requirements affect the way bank mergers are financed, as well as the stock-market reaction to the merger announcement. We find that the capital position of the acquirer is one of the two factors most strongly influencing the choice of financing method; the other is the relative size of the merging banks. The smaller the acquirer in relation to the target bank and the higher the acquirer's capital adequacy ratio, the more likely it is that the acquisition will be financed by a stock swap. The capital requirements also affect the market reaction, through their effect on the financing method choice. The value of the acquirer's equity decreases more at the time of the merger announcement if the method of payment is stock. Like prior studies, we find that the abnormal return on the target banks' stock is positive.     

Interest on reserves and inflation

The payment of interest on reserves has been a common practice in inflationary economies. This policy may seem paradoxical since it involves returning part of the seigniorage, generated by the inflation process, with the intention to finance the fiscal deficit. This paper argues that the motivation for this policy can be captured by the discretionary regime, where the policymaker pays interest on reserves because he is concerned with the erosion of real liquidity by inflation, which is in part beyond his control. However, this policy is an unlikely outcome in the commitment regime, where the policymaker is in full control of inflation.     

Is it ‘you’ or ‘your workplace’? Predictors of job‐related training in the Anglo‐American world

This paper examines the determinants of job‐related training and workplace voice. Using data from a unique 2016 cross‐national survey of Australian, British, Canadian and American employees, the paper contrasts two classic formulations in the literature; (1) the neoclassical/human capital approach which predicts that individual characteristics (such as age and education) which increase the efficiency of learning, will have the largest impact on the allocation of training (i.e. younger and more educated employees will be afforded training) and (2) the traditional institutional approach which favors the structural characteristics present at the industry and firm level, the nature of the job itself and the strategic choices of firms as the major predictors of job‐related training. We find that age – a key factor in the human capital model – plays a significant role in the allocation of training but that education (in keeping with recent evidence) does not. In sum the human capital model provides, at best, only a partial explanation for the differences in training observed across individuals. In contrast, variables invoked by the institutional literature (i.e. occupation level; industry; ownership type; and market structure) are highly significant and account for a much greater proportion of the variance in training observed across workers. Other institutional factors such as the presence of a union and a human resource department were strong positive predictors of job‐related training. But most important were product‐market strategy and employee voice. Respondents working in firms utilizing a ‘high road/high quality’ product/service strategy and with a workplace consultative committee were significantly more likely to receive training than similar workers employed in observably similar firms. This last finding supports the industrial relations view of voice as an important channel by which training is optimally delivered inside the firm.     

The Influence of Fannie and Freddie on Mortgage Loan Terms

This article uses a novel instrumental variables approach to quantify the effect that government‐sponsored enterprise (GSE) purchase eligibility had on equilibrium mortgage loan terms in the period from 2003 to 2007. The technique is designed to eliminate sources of bias that may have affected previous studies. GSE eligibility appears to have lowered interest rates by about ten basis points, encouraged fixed‐rate loans over ARMs and discouraged low documentation and brokered loans. There is no measurable effect on loan performance or on the prevalence of certain types of “exotic” mortgages. The overall picture suggests that GSE purchases had only a modest impact on loan terms during this period.     

Bank Capital Ratios Across Countries: Why Do They Vary?

This paper extends the literature on bank capital structure by modeling capital structure as a function of important public policy and bank regulatory characteristics of the home country, as well as of bank specific variables, country macro-economic conditions and country level financial characteristics. The model is estimated with annual data for an unbalanced panel of the 78 largest private banks in the world headquartered in 12 industrial countries over the period between 1992 and 2005. The results indicate that bank capital ratios are significantly affected in the hypothesized directions by most of the bank-specific variables. Several of the country characteristic and policy variables are also significant with the predicted sign: banks maintain higher capital ratios in home countries in which the bank sector is relatively smaller and in countries that practice prompt corrective actions more actively, have more stringent capital requirements, and have more effective corporate governance structures.     

The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs

Contrary to the implications of many payout theories, we find that announcements of open‐market share repurchase programs are not followed by an increase in operating performance. However, we find that repurchasing firms experience a significant reduction in systematic risk and cost of capital relative to non‐repurchasing firms. Further, consistent with the free cash‐flow hypothesis, we find that the market reaction to share repurchase announcements is more positive among those firms that are more likely to overinvest. Finally, we find evidence to indicate that investors underreact to repurchase announcements because they initially underestimate the decline in cost of capital.