Loss aversion and the quantity–quality tradeoff

Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, play in the tradeoffs workers face? We address these questions with a theoretical model and an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with basic economic theory, higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, we also find that loss averse participants shift their attention from quality to quantity to a greater degree when quality is weakly incentivized. These results can inform managers of appropriate ways to structure contracts, and suggest benefits to personalizing contracts based on individual behavioral characteristics.     

Franchising: A marketing system to improve inner city conditions

One of the most pressing problems for society today is that of the Race/Poverty dilemma. The plight of the black and the ghetto are synonymous in that they are a portrait of poverty. One program which many have heard very little about can make a significant contribution to upgrading of a ghetto area. It can do so primarily by creating new opportunities for the nation's small businessman—and, in the process, for those in disadvantaged minority groups. This paper examines the many facets of thefranchise system exploring its attractiveness to minority group members who aspire to own their own businesses, in uplifting the economic base of the ghetto, and in easing the plight of its inhabitants.     

Centralized institutions and cascades

Why do sudden and massive social, economic, and political changes occur when and where they do? Are there institutional preconditions that encourage such changes when present and discourage such changes when absent? I employ a general model which suggests that cascades which induce massive equilibrium changes are more likely to occur in regimes with centralized coercive power, defined as the ability to impose more than one type of sanction (economic, legal, political, social, or religious). Centralized authorities are better able to suppress subversive actions when external shocks are small, as citizens have little incentive to incur numerous types of sanctions. However, citizens are also more likely to lie about their internal preferences in such regimes (e.g., falsely declare loyalty to an oppressive government), entailing that larger shocks are more likely to trigger a cascade to a vastly different equilibrium. The model is applied to the severity of protests that followed austerity measures taken in developing nations since the 1970s.     

From equilibrium to disequilibrium: the genesis of Don Patinkin's interpretation of the Keynesian theory

This paper explains the reasons that led Don Patinkin to interpret the Keynesian theory in a disequilibrium perspective. We claim that the author adopted this position because he believed that the assumption of wage rigidity misrepresented the concept of involuntary unemployment and that, consequently, it had to be rejected. It is shown that this conclusion resulted from the confrontation of Patinkin, during the writing of his Ph.D. thesis, with the interpretations of the Keynesian theory argued respectively by Lange, Klein and Modigliani.