An Analytical Approach to Offer Generation in Concession-Based Negotiation Processes

We develop analytical models to assist negotiators in formulating offers in a concession-based negotiation process. Our approach is based on plausible requirements for offers formulated in terms of utility values for both the negotiator making the offer and the opponent receiving it. These requirements include value creation, reciprocity, and the fact that an offer actually leads to concessions. Trade-offs between their own and the opponent’s utilities can be formulated by negotiators and define a search path in the utility space. Solutions along this search path are then mapped back into the issue space to generate actual offers. We present and discuss several variants of optimization models to generate such offers and illustrate them with an numerical example.     

On the persistence of job creation in old and new firms

We analyze the persistence of new jobs in new and old firms. This measure assesses the sustainability of job creation in different circumstances. We find that new jobs in Austria last significantly longer in new than in old firms.     

Effizienzvorteile und ihre Grenzen: Wie sich Medienwandel erklärt

In hindsight history seems to be inevitable; nevertheless, prognostics are always difficult. Innovations have to offer an advantage. But what is their core? What is the driving force of change? Why is change nonlinear, contingent and oscillating between standstill and acceleration? Why are the consequences of innovations ambivalent at best? Efficiency is an agent of change and provides its key advantage. But the growth of efficiency is limited. The closer it gets to its limits, the smaller the growth ratio will become. Then, either progress stops or an innovation will occur. Innovation of new media will provide society with a more efficient and a more intense mode of communication. The principle of efficiency is deeply rooted in reality’s system software, i.e. thermodynamics.     

Wage curve, unemployment duration and compensating differentials

In this study unemployment effects on individual pay are investigated following the study on ‘wage curves’ by Blanchflower and Oswald (1990). In bargaining models, higher unemployment should lower wage pressure; due to compensating wage differential arguments, on the other hand, workers who take jobs with higher layoff risks should be rewarded. In a cross-sectional study on Austrian data, a negative wage curve is confirmed. Contrary to the results by Blanchflower and Oswald no U-shape is found, also long-term unemployment seems to be important. No conclusive evidence of compensating differentials has been determined.     

Analyzing the Multiple Dimensions of Negotiation Processes

Negotiation processes involve a substantive, a communication, and an emotional dimension. These dimensions have been analyzed mainly in isolation of each other. We introduce an approach to consider all three dimensions and present an empirical study on the relations between these dimensions. Results indicate a strong linkage between communication behavior and emotions, while connections to the substantive dimension of the negotiation process are weaker.     

Institutional Trust and Compliance with Measures to Fight COVID-19

International Advances in Economic Research - The paper investigates the causal relationship between the trust in institutions and compliance with measures introduced to slow down the spread of the...     

Disciplinary Takeovers and Industry Effects

This paper presents a disciplinary explanation for some seemingly paradoxical stylized facts from the takeover literature. Most notable among these are: (1) hostile takeovers are predicted better by industry-wide than by firm-specific performance failures; and (2) gains from a successful bid for a specific firm extend to other firms in the same industry. Our explanation is based on the idea that managerial incentives based on relative performance evaluation may induce an inefficient industry-wide equilibrium in which all firms underperform with respect to a value-maximizing firm, but no firm underperforms with respect to the industry average. A takeover can serve as a means to destroy such an inefficient industry-wide incentive equilibrium.