Attitudes of police managers to different leadership roles in their jobs: An empirical study in Norway

The background for this study is the increased complexity in policing that has become more knowledge‐based and more professional in the past decade. The aim of this article is to present empirical results from a study of attitudes of police managers to different leadership roles in their jobs in two police districts in Norway. A questionnaire was developed and administered among police managers in two police districts in Norway. Participants in leadership programs were selected for this survey research. The Follo police district and Hedmark police district had a total of 130 participants in these programs, with 60 managers from Follo and 70 managers from Hedmark. The research was carried out in March and April 2010. The personnel leader role was found to be most important, followed by the resource allocator role. Responding police managers reported that they felt least competent in the liaison role.     

Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance

I analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare. However, with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs. private lenders' profits. Multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem — that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit.     

RETURN TO EXPERIENCE AND INITIAL WAGE LEVEL: DO LOW WAGE WORKERS CATCH UP?

This paper estimates the relationship between initial wage and return to experience. We use a Mincer‐like wage model to non‐parametrically estimate this relationship allowing for an unobservable individual permanent effect in wages and unobservable individual return to experience. The relationship between return to experience and unobservable individual ability is negative when conditioning on educational attainment, while the relationship between return to experience and educational attainment is positive. We link our findings to three main theories of wage growth, namely search, unobserved productivity and learning, and human capital. We devise several empirical tests in order to separate the theories. We find evidence in favor of the unobserved productivity and learning model and mixed evidence regarding the search model. We find no evidence in support of the human capital model. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralized screening: Coordination failure, multiple equilibria and cycles

We explore the inter-temporal effects of the pool externalities caused by imperfect screening in competitive credit markets. We find that imperfect screening may, depending on the parameters of the model, generate excessive screening, inefficient duplication of screening or screening cycles. Whenever screening cycles occur they are manifestations of either socially excessive or insufficient screening. We present a full equilibrium characterization and a welfare analysis. The implementation of socially optimal lending decisions requires communication across lenders (i.e. information sharing), which decentralized markets typically cannot achieve.     

Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms*

We analyse how different labour‐market institutions – employment protection versus ‘flexicurity’– affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider trade unions’ incentives to oppose or endorse labour‐saving technology and firms’ incentives to invest in such technology. Increased flexicurity – interpreted as less employment protection and a higher reservation wage for workers – unambiguously increases firms’ incentives for technology adoption. If unions have some direct influence on technology, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, as this increases the downside (job losses) of labour‐saving technology.